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Executive remuneration is about how to pay executive directors for their work. The 
definition of executive remuneration is from the agency cost developed from agency 
theory, proposing that shareholders shall pay directors for managing the company 
since the separation of ownership and management of firms.  
 
This thesis proposes that, three levels of elements are needed to understand executive 
remuneration: 1. The level and structure of executive pay; 2. The intrinsic factors that 
will influence the level and structure of executive remuneration: capital market, labour 
market, product market and corporate governance; 3. The regulation provided by 
government to interfere with executive remuneration issues. It will also be proposed 
that, there is no objective standard of justifying what is a good executive remuneration 
design. Pay for performance is currently the most proper principle and goal for 
remuneration design.  
 
There are two research questions to be answered by this thesis, first is should 
executive remuneration be regulated and, second is what regulation should be made 
under current situation of executive remuneration.  
 
After discussions around the problems of executive remuneration without regulation, 
the first research question will be answered by suggesting that executive remuneration 
problems cannot be solved without regulation. This thesis will then focus on the 
regulations that provided to solve executive remuneration problems. Various 
regulations from several countries from the company law and corporate governance 
perspective and their effects in adjusting the level and structure of executive 
remuneration will be analysed. The UK’s 2013 reform which provides shareholder with 
a binding vote on executive remuneration will be emphasised to investigate the merits 
and faults that regulations can bring to executive remuneration.  
 
Several suggestions towards remuneration regulation will be made in this thesis from 
the aspects of shareholder empowerment, board accountability and the design of 
executive remuneration. Targeted with the concerns left by the UK remuneration 
reform and other countries, these regulatory suggestions are designed from a 
normative perspective. They will answer the second research question by proposing 
that if regulations are designed in a proper way, certain problems of executive 
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The board of directors leads and controls a company. According to the UK 
Corporate Governance Code 2016, an effective board is “collectively responsible 
for the long-term success of the company”.1 The board links managers and 
investors, and is essential to good corporate governance and investor relations.2 
Mallin suggests that the board is responsible for determining the company’s aims 
and strategies, developing plans and policies to achieve the aims, monitoring 
progress in the achievement of those aims, and appointing a chief executive 
officer (CEO) with high leadership qualities.3 Most commonly there are two types 
of board structure: the unitary board, which is one single board comprising 
executive and non-executive directors, and the dual board consisting of a 
supervisory board and an executive board of management. Unlike many other 
European countries that use dual boards, the UK employs unitary boards. Not 
only the CEO but also all the executive directors are responsible for the running 
of the company’s business, along with managers who are not board members. 
On the other hand, the non-executive directors have responsibility for monitoring 
the executives’ behaviour and contributing to board decisions. The board should 
always pursue a balance between executive and non-executive directors to avoid 
either group becoming too powerful.  
 
With public companies, which is where one sees the most use of non-executive 
directors, under most circumstances the non-executive directors are paid an 
agreed set amount, which includes no share options and has no relevance to their 
performance on the board. In contrast, the executive directors generally receive 
                                            
1 Financial Reporting Council (FRC), The UK Corporate Governance Code, April 2016, Section 
A, Leadership, available at https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-
governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code.aspx, last accessed, 12 July 2016 
2 C. A. Mallin, Corporate Governance, 4th edition (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 
164. 
3 Ibid 
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not only basic salaries and annual bonuses, but also stock options and restricted 
share plans. It is obvious that the executive directors’ payment is more 
complicated, as the UK Corporate Governance Code requires: “a significant 
proportion of executive directors’ remuneration should be structured so as to link 
rewards to corporate and individual performance”.4 In practice, the required link 
is not easily established, and executive remuneration remains a debatable issue. 
 
The economist Roger Bootle once argued that “the level of executive pay is a total 
and complete scandal. There is a real crisis of capitalism about all this. Where 
people are paying themselves tens of millions of pounds, it adds up to a form of 
expropriation”.5 It was emphasised by the High Pay Commission in the UK that 
excessively high pay is “a symptom of a wider market failure based on a 
misunderstanding of how markets work at their best.” 6  According to the 
Commission’s investigation, in 2011, even though economic growth was still slow, 
executive remuneration in FTSE 100 companies7had risen by 49% on average, 
compared with a 2.7% average increase in employees’ payments. 8  It was 
suggested that the growing income gap between top executives and average 
employees may pose a threat to companies’ long-term interests.9 What has 
driven executive remuneration to this level? 
 
To understand the executive compensation problem, it is essential to have a 
general idea of the rationale for the awarding of compensation. In the UK, the 
Corporate Governance Code defines the board’s role as “to provide 
                                            
4 Supra, n.1, FRC, Corporate Governance Code 2016, Section D, Remuneration, main 
principle.  
5 The Guardian, J. Finch, J. Treanor & R. Wachman, “Critics unite over executive pay to force 
the ‘aliens’ of business down to earth”, 31 March 2010, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/mar/31/myners-urges-fsa-to-investigate-shareholders-
role, last accessed, 12 July 2016  
6 The High Pay Commission, “Cheques with balance: why tackling high pay is in the national 
interest” (2012), available at: http://highpaycentre.org last accessed 12 July 2016 
7 London Stock Exchange (LSE), “The FTSE UK Index Series is designed to represent the 
performance of UK companies, providing investors with a comprehensive and complementary 
set of indices that measure the performance of all capital and industry segments of the UK 
equity market” available at: http://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/ftse/ftse.htm last 
accessed 12 July 2016. FTSE 100 is the first 100 public companies listed in the LSE, FTSE 250 
is the companies listed from the 101st to 250th in the LSE.  
8 Ibid. 
9 M. Jensen & K. Murphy, “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives” (1990) 98 
Journal of Political Economy 225, p.261 
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entrepreneurial leadership of the company within a framework of prudent and 
effective controls which enables risk to be assessed and managed”.10 In many 
jurisdictions directors owe personal fiduciary duties to their companies, as well as 
a duty of care. One of the fiduciary duties is the duty to avoid conflicts, and this in 
particular requires a personal obligation to practice good conscience and loyalty 
to the company. Because a “deficient” remuneration structure can encourage risk-
taking and thereby cause damage to the company,11 directors cannot decide on 
the amount of their own remuneration. Neither can they permit someone who is 
dependent on the directors to decide on their remuneration, and nor may they 
receive an “excessive and unreasonable” amount of money.12 Furthermore, it is 
often suggested that the shareholders, as the “owners” of the company, must be 
given the power to protect their interests, and they should have a right to express 
their views on the directors’ remuneration or on the risks imposed by the 
company’s remuneration practices. 13  From a contract perspective, when 
directors are employed by the company they are bound by the company’s articles 
of association. Problems may then appear if the company seeks to amend the 
terms of a director’s remuneration without complying with the articles. 14 
According to the Code, this situation can be resolved by the introduction of a claw-
back provision to prevent rewards for failure.15 
 
Many scholars explain executive remuneration problems though “principal-agent” 
theory. As Conyon and Mallin16 have suggested, shareholders are viewed as the 
“principal” while managers are seen as their “agents”. The economic literature 
demonstrates that the compensation earned by senior management should be 
                                            
10 Supra, n. 1, FRC, Corporate Governance Code 2016 
11 J. Miller, R. Wilseman & L. Gormez-Mejia, “The Fit between CEO Compensation Design and 
Firm Risk” (2002) 45 Academy of Management Journal 745, p.754 
12 J. Lee, “Regulatory regimes and norms for directors’ remuneration: EU, UK and Belgian law 
compared” (2012) 13 European Business Organization Law review 599, p.603 
13 Ibid., p.609. 
14 Ibid., p.612. 
15 Supra, n.1, FRC, Corporate Governance 2016, Schedule A, “Consideration should be given 
to the use of provisions that permit the company to reclaim variable components in exceptional 
circumstances of misstatement or misconduct.” About Claw-back, “A claw-back is required when 
managers take a contractual share of early investment gains that are subsequently reduced by 
losses.” D. L. Scott, Wall Street Words: An A to Z Guide to Investment Terms for Today’s 
Investors, 3rd Edition (Boston, New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003) p.63 
16 M. J. Conyon & C. A. Mallin, “Directors’ share options, performance criteria and disclosure: 
Compliance with the Greenbury Report” (1997), ICAEW Research Monograph, London, p.16 
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related to company performance for incentive reasons. In this context, a well-
designed compensation policy will help to ensure that the objectives of directors 
and shareholders are aligned, using share options and other long-term incentives 
as a key mechanism. However, others, such as Bebchuk and Fried,17 think that 
there are obvious flaws in companies’ pay arrangements, which can hurt 
shareholders both by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by 
leading to practices that dilute and distort managers’ incentives. The global 
financial crisis helped to highlight the inequities existing between executive 
directors’ considerable remuneration and the underperformance of the companies 
in which they acted as agents. In this situation shareholders can lose vast sums 
of money, even their life savings, and employees may find themselves on shorter 
working weeks, lower incomes, or being made redundant.18 
 
In Anglo-American systems, statutory provisions are designed to regulate 
executive remuneration by imposing reporting duties on directors and auditors. In 
order to improve corporate governance for the benefit of both shareholders and 
stakeholders, the statutory trend is to increase the disclosure of executive 
remuneration and empower shareholders’ by granting them a “say on pay”. In the 
UK the issue of executive remuneration has caused significant concern, ever 
since the 1980s. With the privatisation of many entities, the pay level of the 
executive directors in many companies increased dramatically without any 
evidence that their performance improved to reflect the increase in their pay.19 In 
1995 the Greenbury Committee was established as an industry-sponsored study 
group to address the remuneration problem. In the same year the Committee 
published the Greenbury Report, recommending that a code should be produced 
to force boards to give more detailed and audited remuneration disclosures, 
alongside the introduction of an independent remuneration committee that was to 
be a sub-committee of the board.20 These suggestions were first included in the 
Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange, and were then inserted into the 
                                            
17 L. Bebchuk and J. Fried, “Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive 
compensation” (2004) Harvard University Press, Boston, MA., p.80  
18 Supra, n.2, Mallin, p.190. 
19 J. N. Gordon, “‘Say on Pay’: Cautionary Notes on the UK Experience and the Case for 
Shareholder Opt-in” (2009) 46 Harvard Journal on Legislation 323, p.341. 
20 Greenbury Committee Report on Directors’ Remuneration (1995) available at: 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/greenbury.pdf pp.26-34, last accessed 12 July 2016 
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Combined Code of Corporate Governance formulated in 1998 after the work of 
the Hampel Committee.21 They were implemented on a “comply or explain” 
basis. 22  One important provision of the Code was the requirement that the 
remuneration packages of executives should be approved by the shareholders, 
especially when they are controversial or when they have changed significantly.23 
 
The British Government intervened in 1999, publishing a consultation paper about 
the introduction of regulations that would empower shareholders of quoted 
companies to vote on executive compensation.24 In 2001 a Green Paper was 
published by the Department for Trade and Industry concerning the issue of 
rewards for failure in cases of directors leaving the company, while also 
suggesting that shareholders should be given the power to change the culture in 
which directors exit the company after perceived failure, but nevertheless 
enriched by the amount of exit pay that is received.25 These consultation papers 
led to the introduction of the Directors’ Report Regulations, which commenced 
operation in 2002.26 The Regulations mean that quoted companies were required 
to publish an annual directors’ compensation report with details of remuneration 
packages, the company’s future remuneration policy, and how the remuneration 
committee works in the boardroom.27 According to the new provision in section 
241A of the Companies Act 1985, which was introduced, shareholder democracy 
would be improved by authorising a mandatory but non-binding vote for the 
shareholders on deciding the annual remuneration report at the general 
meeting.28 This report aimed to achieve three principles concerning directors’ 
                                            
21 UK Corporate Governance Code, available at: http://www.icaew.com/en/library/subject-
gateways/corporate-governance/codes-and-reports/uk-corporate-governance-code, last 
accessed 12 July 2016 
22 Supra, n.1, FRC,  
23 Charlotte Villiers, “Controlling Executive Pay: Institutional Investors or Distributive Justice” 
(2010) 10 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 309, p.317. 
24 B. Main, “Directors’ Remuneration and the DTI Review of Company Law” (2001) 53 Economic 
Affairs 48, p.54  
25 Department for Trade and Industry (DTI), Green Paper, “‘Rewards for Failure’ Directors’ 
Remuneration – Contracts, Performance and Severance”, June 2003, para 20  
26 Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, SI 2002/1986,  
27 Companies Act 1985, s. 243B, referred by L. Roach, “The Directors’ Remuneration Report 
Regulations 2002 and the Disclosure of Executive Remuneration” (2004) 25 The Company 
Lawyer 141, p.145 
28 Ibid. 
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remuneration: accountability, transparency, and linkage between pay and 
performance.29  
 
Critical shareholders of large public companies are often institutional investors 
such as pension funds, banks and insurance companies. To ensure the correct 
alignment between the interests of executives and shareholders, and in order to 
provide the best return to shareholders, the representatives of institutional 
shareholders also issued their own guidelines indicating their expectations of the 
compensation policy. For example, the Hermes Equity Ownership Service, the 
National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF, the now PLSA, Pensions and 
Lifetime Savings Association) and other institutional investors published their 
guidelines for their investees’ remuneration practice.30 Early in 2009, the NAPF 
Guidelines required that for the formulation and implementation of compensation 
policy, they “expect companies to give a transparent, succinct and easily 
understood statement of the objectives of their remuneration policies”.31 
 
The effects of regulations have been examined by various studies. According to 
the 2004 Deloitte survey of institutional investors, 70% of the respondents thought 
that shareholder votes have a very significant influence on companies’ 
remuneration policies.32 These regulations led to increased and richer dialogue 
between shareholders and companies, with shareholders getting more 
transparent information to consider and shareholder democracy was improved by 
being able to take a view on remuneration.33 Ferri and Maber also found that 
there was an increase in penalties for poor performance, and controversial CEOs 
would be more easily removed because of shareholders’ increased voting 
                                            
29 Ibid. 
30 Hermes EOS, NAPF et al, “Remuneration Principles for Building and Reinforcing Long-Term 
Business Success”, November 2013, available at: 
http://www.plsa.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary/0351_remuneration_principles_for_
building_and_reinforcing%20_longterm_business_success_nov2013.aspx last accessed, 12 
July 2016 
31 NAPF, Corporate Governance Policy and Voting Guidelines, February 2009, available at: 
http://www.plsa.co.uk/PolicyandResearch.aspx p.7, last accessed,12 July 2016 
32 Deloitte, Report on the Impact of the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations: A Report 
for the Department for Trade and Industry (2004), available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/6-200-
2235?q=&qp=&qo=&qe= p.13, last accessed, 12 July 2016 
33 D. Gilsham, “Say on Pay Six Years On: Lessons from the UK Experience”, 2010, Railpen 
Investments and PIRC Limited, available at: http://www.corpgov.net/2010/07/say-on-pay-six-
years-on-lessons-from-the-uk-experience/ p.16, last check on July 12th, 2016 
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powers.34 This finding suggests that those regulations did contribute to reducing 
the rewards for failure. Additionally, early studies in 2009, carried out during the 
global financial crisis, showed a “significant upsurge in opposition to remuneration 
reports in general”.35 
 
However, there was a huge amount of evidence showing that the shareholders 
who rejected remuneration proposals did not always defeat proposed 
remuneration policies. By August 2009 there were only eight rejections among 
thousands of votes over the six years since the advisory vote had been introduced 
by the Companies Act.36 Gilsham concluded that “given the low level of votes 
against remuneration reports prior to the current spike in opposition, we would 
query whether shareholders in UK companies have used the rights granted to 
them effectively”. 37  Meanwhile, the executives’ pay levels had not stopped 
increasing. More transparent compensation reporting actually had the effect of 
raising the pay level. 38  More intense monitoring leads to increased risk for 
managers, and as a consequence managers will require higher payment for the 
increased risk that they are subjected to. In turn, complaints from shareholders 
and employees about the excessive executive pay levels will then cause stricter 
monitoring, leading to a negative cycle.39 Gordon thinks that the NAPF guidelines 
have also had a huge negative impact: they invite a tendency to “follow the 
guidelines, stay in the middle of the pack, and avoid change from a prior year, 
when the firm received a favourable vote”.40 Gordon suggests that “the system 
as a whole seems to tilt toward stasis rather than innovation in compensation 
practices”.41 
 
                                            
34 F. Ferri & D. Maber, “Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK”, 
(2013) 17 Review of Finance 527, p.551 
35 Supra, n.33, Gilsham, p.16.  
36 Supra, n.19, Gordon, p.341. 
37 Supra, n.33, Gilsham, p.16 
38 Supra, n.23, Villiers, p.317 
39 R.E. Hoskisson, M.W. Castelton & M.C. Withers, “Complementarity in Monitoring and 
Bonding: More Intense Monitoring Leads to Higher Executive Compensation” (2009) 23 
Academy of Management Perspectives 57, p.63. 
40 Supra, n.19, Gordon, p.341 
41 Ibid. 
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On 27 June 2012 the British Government announced the draft of new regulations 
determining what companies must disclose in their pay reports.42 New clauses 
made changes to Part 10 (section 226) and Part 15 (sections of 421, 422 and 439) 
of the Companies Act 2006, and the implementation of these clauses were 
supposed to commence by October 1st, 2013.43 These provisions were designed 
to create a robust framework within which directors’ pay is set, agreed and 
implemented, 44  while ensuring that shareholder engagement with the 
remuneration policy is sustained over the long term.  
 
The UK 2013 remuneration reform specified that the directors’ remuneration 
report should contain two distinct parts:45 
 
“1. A policy report setting out all elements of a company’s remuneration 
policy and key factors that were taken into account in setting the policy. 
This part of the report will only be required when there is a shareholder 
vote on the policy. 
2. A report on how the policy was implemented in the past financial 
year, setting out actual payments to directors and details on the link 
between company performance and pay.” 
 
To increase the confidence of investors, the UK reform upgraded shareholders’ 
power of say on pay. The UK shareholders are able to use their binding say on 
pay to vote on the remuneration policy, which is regulated to be voted on a three 
year basis.46 On the remuneration implementation report, shareholders have an 
                                            
42 The BIS, “Government strengthens reporting framework for directors’ pay”, June 2012, 
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-strengthens-reporting-framework-
for-directors-pay--2 last accessed, 12 July 2016 
43 UK Government Legislation, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act of 2013, Chapter 24, 
Payments to director of quoted companies, chapters 79-82, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/24/part/6/crossheading/payments-to-directors-of-
quoted-companies/enacted last accessed, 12 July 2016 
44 Supra, n.42, BIS, p.12 
45 The BIS, “Directors’ Pay: Consultation on revised remuneration reporting regulations”, June 
2012, p.4, available at http://www.bis.gov.uk last accessed, 12 July 2016 
46 Supra, n.43, UK Government Legislation, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act of 2013, 
Chapter 79  
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advisory vote and listed companies shall provide their reports for resolution 
annually.47 
 
This thesis seeks to make an original contribution to knowledge by investigating 
the effect of this new binding say on pay approach, suggesting that under current 
circumstances empowering shareholders to solve managers’ remuneration 
problems does have some merit, with the rate of compensation increases slowing 
down and the board putting other concerns above the voice of their investors. 
However, this thesis also argues that the effect of the binding vote on 
remuneration policy is not enough to stop firms paying for executives’ 
underperformance and to promote the structure of remuneration during pay 
setting, since the government’s aim in publishing this regulation was to reduce 
the outrage felt in relation to excessive pay from the public and investors – acting 
rather like a camouflage, increasing shareholders’ power but not focusing on 
reducing the level of remuneration and improving pay structures. 
 
On the basis of accepting that shareholder intervention is still the right direction 
to take in regulating executive remuneration practice, it will also be recommended 
that to increase shareholders’ engagement in board decisions and the board’s 
accountability towards shareholders on remuneration issues, several other 




As mentioned above, how the commercial world should deal with executive 
remuneration has been a problem for many years, and it continues to be so. For 
instance, there has been a debate as to whether executive remuneration should 
be a matter left to the remuneration committee or the shareholders, or whether it 
should be the subject of regulation. The whole issue of executive remuneration 
warrants further examination. There are essentially two questions which this 
thesis seeks to answer. 
 
                                            
47 Ibid. 
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1. Is it necessary to regulate executive remuneration? 
 
Joseph Lee claims that among all corporate governance issues, the problem of 
executive remuneration has proven itself to be “the most challenging area” for 
regulation.48 According to Lee, regulating directors’ compensation means direct 
intervention from the government over market prices, which will raise questions 
concerning legitimacy in a liberal society, and efficiency in a market economy in 
which individual rights and freedom of contract are crucial constitutional 
conditions.49 However, public outrage has reached a high point because of the 
gaps between the perceived excessive compensation received by executives and 
the low, stagnant wages of ordinary employees, together with concern that 
excessive executive compensation poses a risk to social and financial stability.  
 
A second question that follows on from this is: 
 
2. If regulation is appropriate, what form should it take? 
 
It is a general international view that excessive executive remuneration is due to 
a lack of alignment between the interests of the board and shareholders, and the 
UK has not been the only nation using the shareholder advisory vote to solve the 
executive remuneration problem. In 2011, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) of the United States (US) government introduced section 951 
of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (commonly referred to as 
“Dodd-Frank”) to empower their public companies’ shareholders, giving them a 
non-binding advisory vote to approve or disapprove the remuneration of the five 
highest paid executive directors, at least once every three years.50 This was 
known as “say on pay”. Evidence from the first two years has shown that the 
shareholders’ say on pay did help to link executive compensation with firm 
                                            
48 Supra, n.12, J. Lee, p.603 
49 Ibid. 
50 US Securities and Exchange Commission, “Testimony on Implementation of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act by the U.S. SEC”, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2011/ts021711mls.htm last accessed. 12 July 2016 
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performance and shareholder returns. 51  However, whether the shareholder 
advisory vote is the most efficient mechanism to curb excessive executive 
remuneration still remains to be seen. 
 
In March 2013 Switzerland (the country which has the second highest median 
executive compensation in the period since 1997 (the US has the highest) passed 
a new law giving a binding say on pay to shareholders.52 This was the strictest 
regulation in Europe to date regarding executive remuneration problem. In spite 
of its intention to keep an investor-friendly environment, the Swiss government 
was determined to stop remuneration of executive managers from growing 
excessively.53 Is this binding vote the most suitable way to control excessive 
compensation? Will empowering shareholders in terms of payment policy be the 
right action to solve the remuneration problem? This thesis will endeavour to 
provide analysis of these questions. 
 
Also, this thesis proposes that there are three levels in understanding the subject 
of executive remuneration: 1) the level and the structure of executive pay, which 
form the objective and also the obvious content of the pay design and report; 2) 
market factors that may influence objective issues: corporate governance, the 
labour market, the capital market, and the product market; and 3) regulations from 
various governments intended to solve executive compensation problems by 
adjusting those markets, most of which act by improving corporate governance, 
including increasing shareholder monitoring and board independence.  
 
The correlation between these three levels is the key to solving and mitigating 
executive remuneration problems. If regulation (the third level) provides efficient 
methods for corporate governance (the second level), then the level and structure 
of executive pay (the first level) will remain reasonable and fair.  
                                            
51 M. B. Kimbro & D. Xu, “Should Shareholders Have a Say on Executive Compensation? 
Evidence from Say-on-Pay in the United States”, (2016) 35 Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy 19, p.37 
 
52 The Economists, Berlin, “Fixing the fat cats”, 9 March 2013, Business. 
53 Wall Street Journal, A. Peaple, “Swiss Shareholders Get More Say on Pay”, 4 March 2013, 
available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324539404578340052679731408 
last accessed, 12 July 2016 
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Aims 
 
In particular, the thesis endeavours to address the following aims. First, it will 
discuss and analyse the theories that underpin the concept of remuneration. 
Second, it will examine the various components that can constitute an executive’s 
remuneration package. Third, it will identify and examine the way that 
remuneration has become an issue over the years. Fourth, it will ascertain what 
obstacles have existed in the past, and some that still do exist, in determining the 
remuneration of executives. Fifth, the study endeavours to consider how various 
jurisdictions have addressed the issue of executive compensation, including 
examination of the regulations that have been enacted in some nations. Sixth, the 
thesis analyses whether regulation is the best way of dealing with the 
remuneration issue. The thesis argues that regulation is by far the best way, and 




In order to achieve the aims a mixture of research methods will be applied, which 
will be classified as doctrinal or theoretical. This will involve some consideration 
of existing empirical studies. 
 
First, the doctrinal research will involve an in-depth study of relevant literature 
regarding executive remuneration issues in the UK. This research will then focus 
on reform in the UK, investigating how regulation will control excessive 
remuneration and improve the economy, as has been mentioned by the British 
Government. The review will consider academic papers, books, case law, news 
articles and company reports systemically. In addition, there will be some 
comparison of how other countries, like the US, Germany, Australia and 
Switzerland, regulate executive compensation, discovering what can be learned 
and borrowed from their legislative experience.  
 
Second, the theoretical method will be used to examine relevant underpinning 
theories in relation to executive remuneration. Starting with agency theory, which 
explains why it is hard to achieve an alignment of interests between shareholders 
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and directors, the thesis will proceed by investigating other theories, such as 
optional contract theory and managerial power theory, that derive from agency 
theory. These theories will contribute to understanding what causes the executive 
remuneration problem, and what is the rationale underlying it. After the theoretical 
research, the thesis will have arrived at a clear view of the remuneration problem 




After this chapter, Chapter 2 will examine the variety of theories that have been 
devised in relation to executive remuneration. To solve the problems around 
executive pay, it will be essential to understand this area and various factors 
relating to it. The study will start by distinguishing the role of the directors by 
analysing basic corporate governance theories. Agency problems, agency theory 
and optimal contracting theory from which manager’s pay was developed will be 
analysed first. The managerial power approach, which has become the second 
popular theory in explaining executive remuneration will be discussed next. Its 
initiators, Bebchuk and Fried, have suggested that “any discussion of executive 
compensation must proceed against the background of the fundamental agency 
problem afflicting management decision-making”.54 There will be a discussion of 
the pros and cons of theories analysing how executive remuneration and the 
agency problem are linked. The optimal contract view emphasises that executives, 
who are always risk averse, will not automatically seek to maximise shareholders’ 
benefits. Therefore, providing directors with adequate incentives in their 
remuneration is very important in solving agency problems. On the other side of 
the debate, the managerial power approach argues that executive remuneration 
should not only be viewed as a potential instrument for addressing the agency 
problem, but also as part of the problem in itself.  
 
Chapter 2 will prove that, for all that scholars and theories have attempted to 
explain executive compensation, only one relationship can be certain, and its 
                                            
54 L. A. Bebchuk & J. M. Fried, “Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem” (2003) 17 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 71, at p.72. 
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invariability will be applied to develop all of arguments in this thesis. This is the 
idea that executive pay must be aligned to performance. Also, Chapter 2 will offer 
a brief introduction of the key elements of remuneration packages, including base 
salary, bonuses, stock options and other option plans.  
 
After Chapter 2 has discussed the relationships around executive compensation 
and suggested that it should be designed according to performance, Chapter 3 
will explain how to align pay to performance and why this relationship has been 
disrupted, leading to excessive levels of pay and also their irrational structure. It 
will be shown that excessive remuneration problems and their clear unfairness 
cannot be solved by market forces (including the capital and product markets) 
and corporate control (such as independent boardroom and incentive 
compensation) alone. The necessity of regulating for remuneration will be 
discussed. A balance will be sought between government intervention and the 
freedom of the market.  
 
Chapter 4 will provide a detailed history of executive remuneration in the US while 
analysing the influence of various factors. It examines the various approaches 
that have been taken to deal with executive remuneration, and it explores 
evidence collected from papers and reports on the current situation that exists as 
far as executive remuneration is concerned. Evidence from the US is examined 
because this jurisdiction has experienced an entire process, from executive 
remuneration acting as a solution to the agency problem to this solution becoming 
a problem in itself. Furthermore, large amounts of research that have been 
produced have been based on this country’s experience. Chapter 4 also provides 
a comparison study on how executive remunerations are regulated under different 
legal systems and how these regulations work in particular circumstances. This 
will involve an examination of Anglo-American systems as well as systems from 
the European continent. 
 
Chapter 5 will focus on the shareholders’ binding vote that is used to regulate 
executive remuneration in the UK and Switzerland. After analysing how the 
previous advisory vote by shareholders worked as a mechanism (especially in the 
UK and the US), the pros and cons of the advisory vote will be summarised. Then 
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this chapter will consider a variety of evidence that is able to analyse how the new 
reforms in the UK and Switzerland have solved executive remuneration problems. 
Evaluation will be carried out by investigating firms’ performance and 
shareholders’ paybacks compared to the previous few years, and by studying any 
changes in the level and the structure of executive remuneration. Moreover, a 
debate on whether the regulation will empower shareholders to control executive 
remuneration will be presented, since shareholders still suffer from an information 
asymmetry problem and there are other ways in which remuneration could be 
regulated, such as providing the say-on-pay power to the representatives of a 
company’s employees. After that, a general idea of how the reform has changed 
UK companies will be provided, and the most appropriate regulation for the 
current economy will be examined.  
 
Chapters 6 will then present a summary of problems in the corporate governance 
area, which still remain after the market adjustments and government regulations 
related to executive remuneration. This is followed by the provision of suggestions 
to address the problems. 
 
After analysing the new regulations for executive remuneration in the UK and 
Switzerland, there will be some lessons to learn for some countries operating 
within the same legal systems. The rationale for choosing shareholder primacy in 
pay decisions will be emphasised, demonstrating that it is not only because of 
their efficiency and convenience that various regulations will empower 
shareholders and give them a say on pay; also, giving shareholders the right to 
intervene in pay policy within a reasonable scope will help to keep executive pay 
under control, and thus will promote the long-term success of the company. 
Moreover, how to allow shareholders to engage with remuneration decisions to 
have a better influence on pay will be discussed, and the range of shareholders’ 
power over pay will be analysed. For example, governments in the US and 
Germany are also thinking of changing their regulations, especially whether or not 
to import shareholders’ binding say on pay.55 Whether the UK’s binding vote is 
                                            
55 R. S. Thomas & C. Van der Elst, “Say on Pay Around the World”, (2015) 92 Washington 
University Law Review 653, p.728. 
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useful to empower shareholders and reduce pay levels will be analysed. 
Suggestions towards how to use shareholder say on pay to influence 
remuneration more efficiently will be provided. 
 
There are also problems related to the board and the remuneration committee 
designing pay policies with high levels of transparency and dealing with 
managerial influence while having actual remuneration paid to executive directors. 
Chapter 6 will make several suggestions for improving director accountability to 
shareholders and how to guarantee, on a normative level, the independence and 
competence of the remuneration committee and remuneration consultants. 
Additionally, for executive remuneration, the devil is in the detail; in the third 
section of Chapter 6 there will be a proposal for how to design some controversial 
elements of remuneration packages to ensure that pay is always be aligned with 
performance.  
 









This chapter will introduce the concept of executive remuneration in public 
companies, and discuss several theories dealing with the issue on how we should 
understand and explain executive remuneration. It will contribute to answering the 
first research question of why we need to regulate remuneration issues by building 
up a fundamental understanding of executive pay and its intrinsic problems 
caused by the creation of executive pay from a theoretical perspective.  
 
Companies hire and pay executive directors to increase shareholders’ interest. 
Companies are run by professional managers (some of whom will be executive 
directors and members of the board of directors) and, they are often said to be, 
owned by shareholders, due to dispersed ownership and the separation of 
ownership and management in the Anglo-American corporate system.1 It is the 
managers’ fiduciary duty to align their interests with the firm’s, to improve 
company’s performance and preserve it from takeover. However, most managers 
tend to protect themselves from failure and from incurring a bad reputation, rather 
than putting themselves in prudential positions by making decisions that may 
increase shareholders’ benefits. To increase the executives’ incentives to improve 
their companies’ success and decrease their risk aversion, modern corporate 
governance has created and provided several ways to align the interests of 
executives and firms. One of the most efficient ways is executive remuneration.  
 
There are many theories trying to explain the executive remuneration issues and 
to provide solutions towards how to solve problems that remuneration has caused. 
                                            
1 From cases such as: Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd [1897] AC 22 and Santa Clara 
County v. Southern Pacific R. Co. 118 US 394 (1886) 
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The agency theory proposed by Jensen and Meckling2, the tournament theory by 
Lazear and Rosen 3 , the human capital theory by Combs and Skills 4 , the 
managerial power approach by Bebchuk and Fried, the institutional theory by 
Balkin5, the political theory by Ungson and Steers6, and the fairness theory by 
Wade.7 This chapter will only select several of them which are important to 
understand the current system of executive remuneration.  
 
In this chapter, for ease of exposition, different elements of executive 
remuneration will be analysed first. That is, we will consider the different 
incentives of remuneration that currently being used by companies to pay their 
executives directors.  
 
Starting with the agency problem and the principal-agency theory, the second 
section of this chapter will explain the creation of executive remuneration and why 
we need to address remuneration as an important issue in modern corporate 
governance.  
 
The third part of this chapter will give a general view of optimal contracting theory, 
addressing the issues on how we moderate conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders and how the managers’ remuneration should be 
designed to align these interests.  
 
In the fourth part, another popular but contestable theory, the managerial power 
approach, will be discussed. Since none of these theories can explain executive 
                                            
2 M. Jensen & W. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs and 
ownership structure” (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305; also M. Jensen & K. Murphy, 
“Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives”, (1990) 98 Journal of Political Economy 
225  
3 E. P. Lazear & S. Rosen, “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labour Contracts”, (1981) 
89 Journal of Political Economy 841   
4 J. Combs & M. Skills, “Managerialist and Human Capital Explanations for Key Executive Pay 
Premiums”, (2003) 46 Academy of Management Journal 63 
5 D. Balkin, “Explaining High US CEO Pay in a Global Compensation: An institutional 
approach”, (2008) Global Compensation: Foundations and Perspectives, edited by Gomez-Mejia 
& Werner, London Routledge 
6 G. Ungson & R. Steers, “Motivation and Politics in Executive Compensation,” (1984) 9 
Academy of Management Review 313 
7 J. Wade, C. O’Relly & T. Pollock, “Overpaid CEOs and Underpaid Managers: Fairness and 
Executive Compensation”, (2006) 17 Organizational Science 527 
 19 
remuneration and predict it in a satisfactory way, the fifth section will provide some 
detailed suggestions to improve these explanations and have a general 
understanding of executive remuneration set for this thesis.  
 
I. Executive Remuneration 
 
Generally, a public company has at least two kinds of directors, namely executive 
directors and non-executive directors. Executive directors are responsible for the 
running of the company’s business, while non-executives are expected to monitor 
the executives’ management behaviour as well as contribute to strategic decision-
making. The following discussion will be focused on executive directors.  
 
When directors are employed to be the managers of the company, they will sign 
a service contract under which they are responsible to exercise certain functions 
and be responsible, effectively, for the company’s success. The contract also 
gives them the right to be paid. Directors owe their fiduciary duties to the company 
in the UK8 and other common law jurisdictions. In this regard directors are 
regulated so as to ensure that they do not act in conflict with the interests of the 
company unless there are approved exceptions.9 The UK’s Companies Act 2006 
gives an explanation of how the no-conflict rule should be applied.10 The main 
point is that a director must avoid a situation where he has, or he may have, a 
direct or indirect interest that conflicts or may conflict with the interests of the 
company.11 However, pursuing a penalty after the directors have broken their 
duties is often too late to get an appropriate remedy, sometimes even resulting in 
no remedy at all. On the other hand, case law shows that directors acting in good 
faith may be treated unfairly in a conflict situation.12 In cases such as Regal 
(Hastings) Ltd. v Gulliver,13 it might be said that the courts have applied the non-
conflict rule too “inflexibly”, so that directors acting in good faith in conflict 
                                            
8 Sections 170-177 of the UK Companies Act 2006. 
9 A. Keay, “The Authorising of Directors’ Conflicts of Interest: Getting a balance?” (2012) 12 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 129, p.136 
10 Section 175 of the UK Companies Act 2006 
11 Ibid 
12 Supra, n.9, Keay, p.136 
13 Regal (Hastings) Ltd V. Gullier [1967] 2 A.C.134; [1942] 1 ALL E.R. 378 
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situations are penalised. 14  To make sure that such conflicts of interest are 
avoided and to ensure that directors are responsible for the firm, it was thought 
that providing proper compensation was a good solution.15 This suggestion was 
emphasised by Jensen and Murphy in 1990,16 who argued that the problem of 
conflicts between executives and the firm will not be solved by only enforcing 
directors’ duties or raising executive pay, but also by introducing compensation 
that could bring an alignment of interests. This alignment of interests may be 
achieved by offering fair incentives in relation to the directors’ pay policy. 
Moreover, giving incentives in remuneration packages to encourage directors to 
improve the firm’s performance has become a controversial issue, concerning 
whether executive pay can be designed according to their performance.  
 
A. The elements of executive remuneration 
 
The structure and level of remuneration are important methods to incentivise 
executive directors to align their interests with those of the firm. Normally the 
components of executive remuneration would include: a basic salary, bonuses, 
stocks and stock options, insurance, pensions, and other severance payments. 
According to the timing of the realisation of cash flow, these components can be 
classified as follows: 
 
A.1. Short-term remuneration 
 
The short-term remuneration includes basic salary and any bonus plans based 
on ex post performance. Separately speaking, the basic salary is based on the 
tasks and challenges that executives will face, their seniority and experience, and 
also the salaries earned by their peers in other firms in the same industry.17 With 
the popularity of stock option plans since the 1990s, the basic salary has 
                                            
14 Ibid. 
15 Supra, n.2, M. Jensen and W. Meckling, p.312  
16 M. Jensen & K. Murphy, “CEO Incentives-It’s Not How Much You Pay, but How” (1990) 68 
Harvard Business Review 138, p.150 
17 M. Goergen & L. Renneboog, “Managerial Compensation” (2011) 17 Journal of Corporate 
Finance 1068, p.1069. 
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accounted for a steadily declining percentage of an executive’s pay.18 However, 
in Murphy’s analysis, basic salaries still draw substantial attention from outside 
because they can often be significantly high when compared with those of other 
employees.19  Also, the executives are concerned about their basic salaries, 
which is a key component of their employment contract that guarantees a 
minimum increase in pay for the subsequent five years.20 Because basic salaries 
constitute fixed amounts of cash compared to the other compensation 
components aligning pay to performance, executives who worry about poor 
performance leading to less pay will prefer to have a remuneration contract with 
a bigger fraction formed by the basic salary.21  Moreover, the compensation 
committee will generally decide other elements of pay contracts, such as stock 
options and bonuses.22  
 
The annual bonus is also determined by the remuneration committee, and is 
categorized in terms of the following components: performance measures, 
performance standards, and the sensitivity of pay and performance. These 
components can be explained as follows. Based on performance measures, the 
final bonus can be calculated either by aggregating the outcomes or measuring 
for other subcategories.23 In a typical performance standard plan, no bonus 
should be paid unless a threshold performance has been achieved, and if only 
the threshold performance is attained then the executive will be paid a minimum 
bonus. Also, a target bonus is paid for achieving a performance standard, and 
normally there is a cap on this bonus. The range between the threshold and the 
cap is called the “incentive zone”, implicating the “range of performance 
realisation where incremental improvement in performance corresponds to 
incremental improvement in bonuses”.24 The details of these three components 
will be discussed in the following chapters.  
                                            
18 M. Conyon & K. Murphy, “The prince and the pauper? CEO pay in the United States and 
United Kingdom” (2000) 110 Economic Journal 640, pp.647-8 
19 K. Murphy, “Executive Compensation”, (1999) Ashenfelter, Orley, Card & David (Eds.), 




23 P. Geiler & L. Renneboog, “Managerial Compensation: Agency solution or Problem?” (2011) 
11 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 99, at p.108. 
24 Supra, n.19, Murphy, p.648 
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A.2. Long-term pay  
 
A.2.1 Stock Options 
 
Stock options were invented to give executives the right to buy shares of the firm’s 
stock at a pre-specified price, which generally become exercisable over time.25 
For example, if executives are issued with shares by their firm, they may be only 
allowed to sell parts of these shares separately in the following five years. These 
executive-owned stocks should be rewarded with stock-price appreciation but not 
the total shareholder return that is usually available, because the latter includes 
dividends.26 Additionally, these stock options are not allowed to be traded, and 
they will be forfeited if the executives leave the firm before their rights are 
exercised.27 
 
Created in the 1950s, the method of using stock options to remedy the risk 
aversion of executive directors (risk aversion will be discussed later in this chapter) 
and to encourage them to make wise investments to enhance shareholders’ 
wealth has been increasingly popular, and has been applied regularly since the 
1990s. 28  As Geiler and Renneboog have summarised, under most 
circumstances, the options’ exercise price is equal to the stock price on the date 
of the granting of the option.29 Typically, the maturity of executive options will be 
after the elapse of ten-year service while they normally become vested after three 
years, meaning that executives can have access to the cash after three years.  
 
In the UK, performance-vested stocks are forfeited unless a performance 
threshold is achieved. When purchasing stock options, executive managers pay 
                                            
25 C. Frydman & D. Jenter, “CEO Compensation”, (2010) 2 Annual Review of Financial 
Economics 75, p.80 
26 Investopedia, Ben MacClure, “A Guide to CEO Compensation”, February 2007, available at 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/stocks/04/111704.asp last accessed, 12 July  2016 
27 Ibid. 
28 C. Frydman & R. Saks, “Executive Compensation: A new view from a long-term perspective” 
(2010) 23 Journal of Financial Study 2099, pp.2107-8 
29 Supra, n.22, P. Geiler & L. Renneboog, p.108 
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a fraction of the strike price30 when options are granted and the remaining part 
will be due at the exercise of options.31 If executives fail to realize their options, 
for example if they have not achieved certain performance requirements, they will 
lose their prepaid price. Meanwhile, executives can still hold reload options.32 
The reload options are the rights to buy the remaining shares which have not 
been paid for by executives according to the firm’s stock options plans. If 
executives exercise these options before their maturity, they will have to pay the 
exercising price with shares, rather than with cash, and then receive additional 
reload options for the same number of shares and maturity as for the exercised 
options.33 That is to say, if executive directors have foreseen that they cannot 
achieve their target performance before their options are exercisable and they do 
not want to lose the money they have already paid to buy the shares, they can 
trade the shares they own to buy new options and extend the maturity. The 
exercising price of the new reload options is equal to the share price at the time 
the options are exercised. Thus, executives can lock in all future price 
appreciations through their options.34 As a result, the value of the executive stock 
option is less than that of the equivalent stock-exchange traded option. However, 
in practice, executives who are risk-averse may still prefer their bonus in cash 
rather than options, while demanding a premium salary for taking more of these 
risky options.35  
 
A.2.2 Restricted stocks 
 
Restricted stocks are shares whose ownership is transferred to the executives 
after certain conditions are met. For example, these shares will not be granted if 
the executives leave the firm, for when an executive leaves any right to them is 
                                            
30 “A Strike Price is the fixed price at which an option contract can be exercised. In the trade 
market, strike price is important to the option buyer because it determines the price at which 
they can buy or sell in the future, or if they choose not to exercise, how much profit/loss will 
occur in the trade.” Dough, Strike Price Definition, available at: 
https://www.dough.com/blog/strike-price-options last accessed, 12 July 2016 
31 M. Georgan & L. Renneboog, “Managerial Compensation” (2011) 17 Journal of Corporate 
Finance 1068, at p 1077 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Supra, n.23, P. Geiler & L. Renneboog, p.109  
35 Supra, n.31, M. Georgan & L. Renneboog, p.1078  
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forfeited. This possibility allows for several benefits, such as executives avoiding 
taxation on the shares until restrictions lapse, or costs from the shares which can 
be amortised in their vesting period and recorded as the grant-date stock price.36 
The first condition of restricted stock is normally the vesting period, which is 
usually three to five years. In the UK there are additional conditions; for example, 
options can only be vested when specific performance targets have been 
achieved. 
 
A.2.3 Long-term incentive plans 
 
Long-term incentive plans are issued based on cumulative executive performance, 
usually vested over three to five years in the US. After the publication of the 
Greenbury Report on Directors’ Remuneration in the UK in 1995, the popularity 
of long-term incentive plans increased rapidly. With the advent of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code which encourages companies to apply incentive 
plans in executive pay,37 long-term incentive plans have replaced stock options 
in accounting for the biggest fraction of long-term pay in executive remuneration 
packages.  
 
A.3. Retirement plans and others 
 
Top executives will often join supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs) 
over and above the existing company-wide retirement programmes. SERPs 
benefits are based on firm performance or the tenure of the executives. Besides 
this, executives may receive substantial remuneration from additional 
programmes or components, such as cash recruitment incentives, known as 
“golden hellos”, or pay for relocation consumption.    
 
Additional compensation may include severance pay and golden parachutes. A 
golden parachute or golden goodbye is a type of substantial benefit given to an 
                                            
36 Ibid. 
37 FRC, the UK Corporate Governance Code 2016, Schedule A, available at: 
https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Corporate-
Governance-Code.aspx, last accessed, 12 July 2016 
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executive director in the event that companies are taken over by another firm with 
directors’ employment being terminated as a result. This benefit will take the form 
of share options, cash bonuses or combinations of these benefits.38 The purpose 
of these types of pay is to encourage executives to work hard for the shareholders 
while minimising their concern that they will lose their jobs. Severance pay and 
golden parachutes do not create any incentives, and setting them creates a big 
problem for remuneration committees.  
 
B. Who decides on the level and structure of executive pay? 
 
The UK and US remuneration routes are mostly the same. In the UK, the 
Corporate Governance Code 2016 provides that a remuneration committee, 
which contains at least two (for smaller public companies) or three independent 
non-executive directors, should be established by the board of a public 
company.39 The independent directors are typically defined as directors who are 
neither current nor past employees, and who have no direct business tie with the 
firm.40 However, the recommendations for executive remuneration are seldom 
made by the remuneration committee alone, but by remuneration consultants, 
since the directors of the remuneration committee rarely examine market studies 
of competitive pay levels or propose new incentive plans. These remuneration 
consultants are expected to be experts who know about executives’ basic salaries 
and bonuses in the same industry and know how to design and evaluate option 
plans for executives. After recommendations for executive pay, including pension 
rights and any compensation payments, have been discussed and passed by the 
remuneration committee, these recommendations will be presented for the 
                                            
38 L. Bebchuk & J. Fried, “Executive Compensation as An Agency Problem"(2003) 17 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 71, p.88 
39 Supra., n.37, FRC, Corporate Governance Code 2016, Section D, D.2.1.  
40 Summarised by K. Murphy, Supra n.19; in Mallin’s Corporate Governance, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 
. “Directors’ independence can be examined as follows: whether the director was a former 
employee of the company or group within the last five years; whether additional remuneration 
(apart from the director’s fee) is received from the company; whether the director has close 
family ties with the company’s other directors and advisors; whether he or she has served on the 
board for more than ten years; whether he or she represents a significant shareholder.” 
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approval of the full board of directors, and then presented to the shareholders. 
The remuneration committee should also have a formal and transparent 
procedure for setting the levels of executive pay. In the US, public companies 
have a compensation committee in which there are two to three “outside” directors, 
i.e. independent directors as they are referred to in the UK. The compensation 
committee is designed to prevent executives from setting their own compensation 
levels. Nonetheless, in the US the recommendations from compensation 
consultants will always be delivered to the executives for revision or approval 
before they are sent to the compensation committee.41  
 
The boards in UK and US companies, like those in several Member States of the 
European Union, are unitary boards. In the unitary board system, both the 
executive and the non-executive directors work in one single board, which is 
responsible for all the activities of the firm. In comparison, dual boards, consisting 
of a supervisory board and an executive board, are predominant in companies in 
Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Denmark. The supervisory board 
monitors the executives and the direction of the business, while the executive 
board works on the management of the business. Generally, supervisory board 
members should not hold any position on the executive board, nor should they 
have any advisory role in relation to the boards of the firm’s competitors. In the 
dual board system, the remuneration committee consists of the whole of the 
supervisory board. According to the Cromme Code in Germany, which is a typical 
dual board nation, members of the remuneration committee decide on the 
executive compensation based on suggestions from the compensation 
consultants, while the supervisory board members’ compensation, which is also 
performance-related, is set during the general meeting or regulated in the articles 
of association.42  
 
                                            
41 Supra, n.19, K. Murphy, 
42 Germany Corporate Governance Code, ( the Cromme Code), available at: 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=44 last accessed, 12 July 12  2016  
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C. The problems that excessive executive remuneration can cause 
 
Generally, there are two main methods used by remuneration committees and 
pay consultants to set pay, which are according to stock performance and 
according to peer group comparison. It has been a general view that aligning the 
interests of executive managers and investors should be achieved by regulating 
pay through the company’s equity share return; if the executive pay level outpaces 
the increasing stock price, then executives may be over-compensated.43 The 
other method is according to pay information from the same industry and similar 
sized companies, although executives of the leading firms within an industry may 
be paid higher than their peers. However, the majority of managers should be 
paid at about the same level.44 
 
Several concerns stem from the pay policies mentioned above, for instance the 
problem that relying on the remuneration committee and compensation 
consultants to set executives’ pay may lead to unreasonable levels of pay, since 
problems like insider-dealing between independent directors and executives and 
shirking behaviour among non-executive directors are common in big firms. 
Issues like this will be discussed from a theoretical aspect in the following sections 
of this chapter, but the main point here is the importance of paying attention to 
executive remuneration problems and the necessity of reducing excessive levels 
of executive pay. Excessive executive compensation does not only jeopardise 
notions of fairness and social cohesion, it also imperils economic growth. The 




                                            
43 Investopedia, J. Kuepper, “Evaluating Executive Compensation”, Feb 2007, available at: 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/stocks/07/executive_compensation.asp last accessed, 12 
July 2016 
44 M. Conyon, S. Peck & G. Sadler, “Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence 
from the United States and the United Kingdom” (2009) 23 Academy of Management 45, p.53.  
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Thomas Piketty suggests that excessive pay for top managers is a “key driver” in 
the increasing income inequality in the EU nations and North America.45 This 
inequality will also harm political stability. According to research by the High Pay 
Centre, the growing pay gap does not help social cohesion aspects of government 
policy making. 46 Public consent will be hard to obtain under a system which is 
mostly run by the well-paid elite and is perceived as beneficial to them; any 
regulation from such a government will not be appealing to the general public.47 
The President of the Institute of International Finance has emphasised that 
failures to decrease the income gap will risk “brewing more populist pressure on 
governments”.48  
 
C.2. Economic Case 
 
Raghuram Rajan suggests that the reason why low- and middle-income 
households’ debts are increasing is because of rising inequality and their 
willingness (or difficulty) in keeping pace with the standard of living enjoyed by 
the rich.49 On the other hand, Lansley proposes that the economy will be forced 
to slow its pace of recovery because so much wealth is concentrated in the hands 
of such a small number of people.50 Moreover, the economist Andrew Smithers 
suggests that the UK cannot recover sustainably from the 2008–2009 financial 
crisis unless the government provides regulation of the incentives that are 
provided for in executive pay packages.51 
 
                                            
45 Y. Allaire & M. E. Firsirotu, “Inequality and Executive Compensation: Why Thomas Piketty Is 
Wrong?” (2014) Institute for Governance of Private and Public organizations, p.3 
46 High Pay Centre, “Reform Agenda: How to make top pay fairer” (2014), available at: 
http://highpaycentre.org/pubs/reform-agenda-how-to-make-top-pay-fairer pp. 9-10, accessed, 12 
July 2016 
47 Ibid. 
48 Bloomingberg, “Davos Finds Inequality Its Business as Backlash Seen” 23 January 2014, 
available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-23/davos-makes-inequality-its-business-
as-political-backlash-seen.html last accessed 12 July  2016  
49 R. Rajan, “How Inequality Fuelled the Crisis” July 2013, available at: http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/how-inequality-fueled-the-crisis last accessed, 12 July 2016 
50 S. Lansley, The Cost of Inequality: Why Economic Equality is Essential for Recovery 
(London, Gibson Square Books Ltd, 2011) p.37 
51 A. Smithers, The Road to Recovery: How and why economic policy must change (New 
Jersey, John Wiley & Sons, 2013) p.104 
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However, compared to the effects that a large pay gap may cause in society, 
uncontrolled pay levels will cause more serious economic problems, since 
compensating managers highly regardless of low shareholder return will certainly 
influence the confidence of investors and the productivity of a nation. As will be 
discussed in future chapters, managers in listed companies tend to focus on their 
short-term profits rather than the long-term productivity of their firms. Take the UK 
as an example: from 1990 to 2015, with the investment of gross domestic product 
(“GDP”) in the UK declining from 26% to 17%, economists propose that it is the 
remuneration to blame for this decline, as the country was paying excessively to 
directors for a short-term success. 52  Investors worried about the threat 
constituted by executive remuneration incentives designed for short-term profits 
and the jeopardising of firms’ long-term success, their confidence towards 
investing in this country has made the investment situation even worse. 53  
However, investment is needed to increase productivity. Thus, excessive 
incentives in executive pay lead to low investment, while low investment may 
cause low productivity and slow the recovery of the economy. This is the rationale 
of governments emphasising long-term productivity of public firms and their 
countries when they provide regulations towards executive remuneration, which 
will be mentioned in the following chapters.  
 
Also, from the business perspective, excessive pay will not only affect firms by 
giving them bad reputations, but also in terms of staff turnover, absenteeism and 
complaints from the public.54 Additionally, studies show that companies with 
more equal levels of pay amongst their employees have performed better, and 
their employees are more loyal because they are less resentful of executive 
directors and the implementation of distributive justice makes them feel more 
attached to their firms.55 
                                            
52 Financial Times, A. Smithers, “Executive Pay Holds the Key to the Productivity Puzzle”, 28 
May 2015. 
53 Ibid. 
54 High Pay Centre, “The High Cost of High Pay: An analysis of pay inequality within firms” 
January 2014, available at: http://highpaycentre.org/pubs/the-high-cost-of-high-pay-unequal-
workplaces-suffer-more-strikes-and-higher last accessed, 12 July 2016  
55 D. Cowherd, “Product Quality and Pay Equity Between Lower-level Employees and Top 
Management: An investigation of distributive justice theory” (1992), 37 Administrative Science 
Quarterly 302, p. 316; see also, P. Martins, “Dispersion in Wage Premiums and Firm 
Performance” (2008) 101 Economic Letters 63, at pp. 64-5. 
 30 
 
C.3. Further concerns 
 
A high level of executive compensation will provide standards for people from 
various positions, which may increase the pay gap between the well-paid elite 
and others. Studies carried out by Professor Wilks suggest that executive 
remuneration has set a “benchmark” for other leading professions, such as 
financial services, corporate law firms and accountants.56  
 
Inequality in one generation may not only influence people’s life from a horizontal 
perspective, but also in a vertical way – that is to say, there may also be an effect 
on the next generation. Evidence has shown that household income differences 
can have huge effects on children’s education outcomes.57 Research from the 
Education Institution in London has indicated that income gaps influence 
generations differently according to the size of the gaps.58 They proposed that 
the differences in adulthood between children who grew up in the 1970s and 
1980s, during which time the pay gap was wider than in the period after World 
War II, were more obvious than among those who grew up in the 1950s and 
1960s.59  
 
From the above, we can conclude that executive remuneration was invented to 
decrease the interest conflict between shareholders and managers, but the 
problems developing from it can be serious indeed. The definition of executive 
pay and why its incentives should be designed to reward executive performance 
will now be analysed. 
 
                                            
56 S. Wilks, The Political Power of the Business Corporation (2013), Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd., p.82. 
57 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, “Does Money Affect children’s outcomes?” (2013), available at: 
http://www.jrf.org.uk/publications/does-money-affect-childrens-outcomes last check on July 12th, 
2016 
58 J. Blanden & L. Macmillan, “Education and Intergenerational Mobility: Help or Hindrance?” 
(2014), CASE – Social Policy in a Cold Climate Working Paper 08, Centre for Analysis of Social 
Exclusion, LSE, p.21  
59 Ibid.  
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II. Agency Problem and Agency Theory 
 
A. The Agency Problem 
 
Many suggest that a company is owned by its shareholders and managed by its 
directors. In the eighteenth century Adam Smith predicted a number of potential 
problems stemming from the separation of ownership and management: “The 
directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance (as if it were their own).”60 
 
In 1932 Berle and Means published The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 
describing their proposal for the separation of corporate ownership and 
management control. This gave rise to a huge literature elaborating, refuting and 
testing their theory. Berle and Means developed theoretical categories of control 
types, which are divided into “owner-control” and “management-control”. 61 
Ownership-management structural change leads to problems connected with the 
delegation of control to agents. Under agency theory, agents are viewed as 
having a tendency to use their positions to satisfy themselves, rather than making 
more profits for the principal. During the 1960s and 1970s the risk-sharing 
literature described how risk-sharing can arise as a problem when cooperating 
parties hold different attitudes towards risk. 62 Agency theory then broadened this 
examination to explain the agency problem, which occurs when there are parties 
with different goals and where there is division of labour.63  
 
                                            
60 G. Kennedy, “On Smith’s Approach to Corporate Governance”, October 2009, available at: 
http://adamsmithslostlegacy.blogspot.co.uk/2009/10/on-smiths-approach-to-corporate.html last 
accessed, 12 July 2016 
61 J. Cubbin & D. Leech, “The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on The Degree of Control in 
British Companies: Theory and measurement” (1983) 93 The Economic Journal 351, p.352. 
62 K. Arrow, Essays in the theory of risk bearing (Chicago, Markham, 1971) p.79; R. Wilson, “On 
the theory of syndicates”, (1968) 36 Econometrica 119, p.127.  
63 Supra, n.2, M. Jensen & W. Meckling, p.311; S. Ross, “The Economic Theory of Agency: The 
principal’s problem” (1973) 63 American Economic Association 134, p.136  
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From the company law perspective, the agents are directors and the principals 
are shareholders, and agency problems can be caused by opportunism or self-
interest among directors. Though enacted in different jurisdictions, in general 
every company law will set a non-conflict rule64 to specify that directors must 
avoid conflicts with their company’s interests, to prevent directors from using their 
management power to further their own interests. Once again taking the UK as 
an example, case law uses this rule, now found in s.175 of the Companies Act 
2006 to make sure that directors, who owe fiduciary duties to firms and 
shareholders, will not be tempted to foster their own interests to the detriment of 
the company.65 There are also provisions in the UK Company Act (such as 
sections 171-177) regulating the duties of directors to ensure that they act in the 
best interests of the company.  
 
B. Agency Theory 
 
In corporate governance, the agency theory is directed at the agency relationship 
in which the principals, i.e. the shareholders, delegate work to the agents, the 
managers, who perform that work and have control of the company’s affairs. The 
managers are those directors who are executives employed by the company, as 
well as senior non-director managers who have critical roles to play in the 
company’s management. Agency theory attempts to describe this relationship 
using the “metaphor” of a contract.66  Narrowly speaking, agency theory was 
expected to resolve two problems that can occur in such a contract. The first is 
the agency problem that arises when: (1) the desires or goals of the principal and 
the agent are in conflict; and (2) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify 
what the agent is doing.67 The issue here is that the principal cannot verify that 
the agent has behaved appropriately. The second problem is the risk sharing that 
                                            
64 B Hannigan, Company Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2009), p. 246. 
65 Wilkinson v West Coast Capital [2005] EWHC 3009 (Ch), [2005] BCC 717, [251]. See, A. 
Keay, “The Authorising of Directors Conflicts of Interests” (2012) 12 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 129, p.150 
66 K. M. Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An assessment and Review” (1989) 14 The Academy of 
Management Review 57, pp.59-60 
67 Ibid.  
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arises when the principal and agent have different attitudes towards risk. Here, 
the principal and the agent may prefer different actions because they possess 
different risk preferences.68 The agent in the company context is assumed to be 
risk-averse while the principal is risk-neutral, because the potential firm income 
has different effects on their relationship with the company – the agent’s security 
and profits are inextricably tied to the single firm, while the principal can diversify 
investments in multiple companies.69 Moreover, executive managers’ utilities are 
positively related to financial incentives provided by the firm in terms of pay, and 
negatively related to effort.70 This is why executive compensation was created, 
in order to align interests between these two parties, with financial incentives 
designed in the form of specific executive pay packages.  
 
Agency theory emphasises the importance of incentives in manager’s 
remuneration and self-interest in their organisational thinking and suggests that 
these issues can be dealt with in several ways.71As Jensen, a leading writer on 
agency theory, has suggested,72 there are four factors that can mitigate the 
agency problems between executive directors and shareholders in publically 
traded companies. These factors include: (a) corporate internal control, namely a 
firm’s board of directors; (b) capital markets, which affect efficient cash flow and 
equity transactions; (c) legal systems; and (d) the product market.73 Jensen 
proposes that the latter two factors can ameliorate agency problems and excess 
capacity when the former two factors have failed to do so.74 The factors identified 
by Jensen will now be examined. 
 
B.1. Boards of directors 
 
                                            
68 Ibid. 
69 R. Wsieman & L. Gomez-Mejia, “A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Risk Taking” 
(1998) 23 Academy of Management Review 133, p.135; also O. E. Williamson, “Managerial 
Discretion and Business Behavior” (1963) 53 American Economic Review 1047, p.1041. 
70 G. Donaldson, Managing corporate wealth: The operation of a comprehensive financial goals 
systems (New York: Praeger,1984) p.110 
71 C. Perrow, Complex Organisations (New York: Random House, 1986) p.90 
72 M. Jensen, “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control 




As mentioned above, a fraction of directors on the board’s remuneration and 
nomination committees are independent, in that they are hired from outside the 
firm. Conceptually, having independent directors on these committees can help 
to reduce the agency problem by threatening errant executives with termination 
and by enforcing highly incentivised contracts which tie pay to performance.75 
The contracts drawn up by such committees are supposed to tie executives’ pay 
to the value that they create, through stock options, restricted stock and other 
forms of pay-for-performance measures. Under optimal contracting theory, these 
contracts contribute to the maximisation of shareholder value because they 
provide executives with enough compensation to make them eager to work, and 
make sure they will take future responsibilities seriously since the incentives 
provided by the contract align the company’s performance to their 
compensation.76 
 
Many scholars have expressed surprise at the low levels of performance-based 
executive compensation that have been approved by shareholders and boards.77 
From an agency theory perspective, however, they should not be so surprised, 
since excessive compensation may be produced under an incomplete information 
system. This is the problem of information asymmetry, one of the main forms of 
which is characterised by incomplete contracts (another form is the cognitive 
limitations of contracting parties). 78  From the economic perspective, it is 
impossible for contracting parties to make complete provisions for every 
eventuality in a contract because of the limitations of the human mind.79 Agency 
theory reminds us of the importance of information, which should be treated as a 
commodity among and inside organisations. Agent opportunism can be controlled 
if the information system in a company can be well investigated. Specifically, the 
                                            
75 Summerised by K. Murphy, “Executive Compensation: Where we are, and how we got there” 
(2012) Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edited by G. Constantinides, M. Harris & R. 
Stulz, North Holland: Elsevier Science, p.132 
76 Ibid. 
77  J. Pearce, W. Stevenson & J. Perry, “Managerial Compensation Based on Organisation 
Performance: A time series analysis of the effects of merit pay” (1985) 28 Academy of Managerial 
Journal 261, p.265; G. Ungson& R. Steers, “Motivation and Politics in Executive Compensation” 
(1984) 9 Academy of Managerial Review 313, p.318. 
78 A. Keay & H. Zhang, “Incomplete Contracts, Contingent Fiduciaries and A Director’s Duty to 
Creditors” (2008) 32 Melbourne University Law Review 141, p.154  
79 Ibid. 
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more information that principals have, the more they can contribute to decreasing 
managerial opportunism and increasing performance-contingent pay. 80  One 
relevant information system for monitoring the executives is the board of directors. 
Optimal contracting theory holds that if the board of directors provides richer 
information for the shareholders about what the executives are doing and how the 
committee is planning to pay the executives, the executives are more likely to 
engage in behaviours that are consistent with the shareholders’ interests. 81 
Elisenhardt also provides several practical ways to improve the board’s 
monitoring function with richer information, such as increasing the frequency of 
board meetings, hiring more members with managerial and industry experience, 
and increasing members’ tenure on the board.82 Therefore, if the transparency of 
information provided to shareholders can be improved and the remuneration 
committee plans a remuneration policy with a broader disclosure of the firm’s 
equity income and peer compensation, the pay for performance sensitivity in the 
executive pay contract can be increased. These situations will be discussed in 
detail later. 
 
There are also problems around boards which are dominated by independent 
directors. These directors have little material interest in the firm, and they do not 
necessarily make decisions and engage in a process of bargaining leading to 
contracts with executives for the benefit of shareholders who select them. Even 
worse, independent directors may be influenced by executives to over-pay the 
latter, since they are in need of social networks and this action might enhance 
such networks. The non-executives are in effect paying the executives with the 
shareholders’ money (rather than their own). This situation will be mentioned 
again in a later section on managerial power theory. 
 
B.2. Capital markets 
 
                                            
80 K. M. Elisenhardt, “Agency theory, An assessment and review” (1989) 14 The Academy of 




The second factor referred to by Jensen in mitigating agency problems is capital 
markets. Capital markets are financial markets where individuals and institutions 
can sell and buy debt or equities, which, according to Jensen’s research, 
developed on a worldwide level with capacity expanding quickly in the nineteenth 
century.83 
  
There are three main effects that capital markets can have on executive 
directors.84 The first is that capital markets, shareholder activists and large-block 
institutional shareholders can mitigate agency problems by pressing firms to 
strengthen links between executives’ income and the firm’s share price 
performance. Second, capital markets contribute to resolving agency problems 
by incentivising executives to make every effort to achieve or even exceed analyst 
and market earnings expectations for their companies. Thirdly, pressures from 
capital markets will encourage executives to focus on the “expectation market”, 
in which investors gamble on expectations of future performance, rather than the 
“real market”, in which goods and services are produced and sold and value is 
created or destroyed.  
 
In particular, economists have also investigated how executive pay, if it contains 
stock incentives, is influenced by a firm’s share price and the condition of capital 
markets. Calcagno and Heider found that without other distracting factors, like the 
existence of executives’ self-serving deals, a more informative stock price and a 
more liquid capital market can lead to executive pay that is market-based to a 
greater degree.85 Other scholars have also established the relevance of the 
extent of stock incentive executive pay and market trading conditions,86 which 
will be discussed and analysed further in later chapters.  
 
B.3. The legal system 
 
                                            
83 Supra, n.72, Jensen, p.850 
84 Supra, n.75, Murphy, p.133 
85 R. Calcagno & F. Heider, “Market Based Compensation, Price Informative and Short-term 
Trading” (2007) European Central Bank, Working Paper Series, No. 735, p.17 
86 Q. Kang & Q. Liu, “Stock Market Information Production and CEO Incentives” (2005) 
University of Hong Kong Working Paper p.11; B. Holmsrom & J. Tirole, “Market Liquidity and 
Performance Monitoring” (1993) 101 Journal of Political Economy 678, p.688.
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Agency problems, especially executive remuneration, have been recognised as 
an international issue, which cannot be simply solved by the economy and 
markets, a matter that will be developed further in Chapter 3. Therefore, 
governments have started to create their own laws, securities rules, regulations 
and listing requirements aimed at preventing embezzlement, corporate theft and 
fraudulent conveyances.87 Interference from government includes tax policies, 
accounting rules, disclosure requirements and direct legislation empowering 
shareholders and giving them a greater say on pay.  
 
There are three main consequences arising from these legislative innovations: 
increasing shareholder intervention; making the pay policy more transparent; and 
giving the board total independence. However, as suggested by Murphy, the 
independence requirements which were expected to reduce excessive executive 
pay levels have been disappointing in their effects. Evidence shows that both the 
level of pay and the implementation of equity-based compensation increase with 
the proportion of independent directors on the board.88 Murphy proposes that this 
phenomenon may be consistent with independent directors not fully 
understanding the opportunity cost of equity-based compensation.89 
 
On the other hand, Murphy also thinks that it is not wise to relate board 
independence to the setting of appropriate executive pay.90 Many shareholder 
activists argue against the idea that the CEO can be a member of her/his own 
remuneration committee, since there would be managerial influence on the board 
to overpay the CEO, and ultimately this harms the interests of the shareholders. 
However, according to Bizjak and Anderson’s research, CEOs who sit on their 
own remuneration committees turn out to be paid less than CEOs who do not, 
although they have relatively more shares and are usually the firm’s founder or 
the founders’ family members.91 Under Murphy’s analysis, CEOs sitting on their 
own remuneration committees in the above situation would not influence the 
                                            
87 Supra, n.75, Murphy, p.54 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Supra, n. 75, Murphy, p.132 
91 R. C. Anderson & J. M. Bizjak , “Corporate Governance and Firm Diversification” (August 23, 
1998), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=121013, last accessed on July 26th 2016, pp.19-20 
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board to increase their own compensation, but rather would use their power to 
adjust the level and structure of compensation for subordinates – for example, by 
decreasing other executives’ stock options or bonuses in the interests of 
shareholders. 92  Therefore, prohibiting such CEOs from joining in their own 
remuneration discussions may harm shareholders, illustrating a potential cost of 
the “one-size-fits-all” nature of corporate governance regulation in this regard.93  
 
All of these attempts to regulate executive compensation, in Murphy’s view, have 
failed to remedy the problem. He maintains that even well intentioned regulation 
inherently focuses on relatively narrow aspects of compensation, leaving other 
areas open to expensive mistreatment, while he also suggests that “the only 
certainty with pay regulation is that new leaks will emerge in unsuspected places, 
and that the consequences will be both unintended and costly”.94 This conclusion 
will be discussed towards the end of this chapter.  
 
B.4. Product markets        
 
Product market is economically a marketplace where final goods or service is 
bought and sold. Competition in product markets can have the effect of either 
reducing or increasing the agency problem,95 and companies that have no power 
to compete in their product market cannot survive. Therefore, product markets 
will contribute to disciplining executive behaviour when they have failed to create 
value for firms and markets. Further, product markets do not only help to force 
executives to save their jobs, they also encourage them to increase value for their 
firms.96  
 
Thus, product markets provide one important mechanism to force executives to 
improve firm performance in case they are replaced – i.e., to avoid takeovers. 
Takeover has been identified as playing two roles in markets. The first is to 
                                            
92 Supra, n. 75, Murphy, pp.39-40 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 O. Hart, “The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme” (1983) 14 Bell Journal of 
Economics 366, at p 370; D. Scharfstein, “Product Market Competition and Managerial Slack” 
(1988) 19 Rand Journal of Economics 147, at p 149 
96 Supra, n.75, Murphy, at p 137 
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achieve synergies between the bidder and the target company, while the second 
is to replace incompetent managers in the target company.97 The latter function, 
known as a discipline takeover, has two main functions in disciplining the 
executives.98 The first is that the takeover can play an important role in driving 
senior executives to align their interests with the firm’s, since the possibility of 
being taken over serves as a threat that may reduce their non-value-maximising 
behaviour. 99  Second, the bidders who have observed executives’ poor 
performance may cause these executives to lose their positions if the takeover is 
successful. 
 
As mentioned above, all the mechanisms for improving executive performance 
that are discussed by agency theory, such as having an executive remuneration 
committee on the board, the capital market, regulation from government and the 
threat of takeovers, are sometimes seen as weak because they are all external. 
When these mechanisms become weak, companies tend to use monetary 
incentives in their pay policies to encourage executives to align their interests with 
those of the firm,100 as predicted by optimal contracting theory.                     
  
III. Optimal Contracting Theory 
 
Various financial economists have noted that optimal contracting theory 
emphasises contracts between agent and principal, which should be designed to 
attract talented agents and incentivise them to exert effort to maximise the 
principal’s interest while minimising the cost of doing so.101   
 
                                            
97 K. J. Martin & J.J. McConnell, “Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers and 
Management Turnover” (June 1991) 46 The Journal Finance 671, at p 680. 
98 Ibid. 
99 At this point directors have an obligation to take into account the interests of creditors. See, D. 
Milman, The Governance of Distressed Firms (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2013) p.117; A Keay, 
“Directors’ Duties and Creditors’ Interests” (2014) 130 Law Quarterly Review 443, p.450 
100 M. Bertrand & S. Mullainathan, “Executive Compensation and Incentives: The impact of 
takeover legislation” (December 1998), National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, 
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101 A. Edmans & X. Gabaix, “Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A survey of new optimal contracting 
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A.  The main idea of optimal contracting theory 
 
Optimal contracts are concerned with one specific concept, namely agency cost. 
Because of the separation of ownership and management, agents need to be 
paid and monitored in managing business for the principals, which is the source 
of agency cost. According to the solutions provided by agency theory, as 
discussed above, there are two main ways to solve agency problems, which are 
shareholder monitoring102 and pressure from capital markets and government 
intervention (generally the government intervenes by strengthening shareholder 
monitoring). However, the agency cost from shareholder monitoring can be 
significant, and it will only generate a sufficient payoff when the monitoring 
shareholder owns a large proportion of shares.103 Therefore, optimal contracting 
theory was proposed to design agency costs optimally by encouraging the agents 
to work for the principals, who are shareholders in the company, and ensuring 
returns for them while minimising the cost of doing so.  
 
According to Jensen and Meckling, there are three elements that make up agency 
costs: incentive and monitoring expenditures by the principal, bonding 
expenditures by the agent, and the residual cost.104 The residual cost includes 
payouts when agents expand the business for principals, an issue which will not 
be discussed in this thesis. The agent’s bonding expenditure is used to ensure 
that there will be some penalty for the agent if the agent takes actions to harm the 
principal. The incentive and monitoring expenditures from the principal come from 
shareholders, establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and incurring 
                                            
102 Shareholders’ indirect monitoring takes place through the remuneration committee, while 
direct monitoring can be though proxy proposals (P. Cziraki, L. Renneboog & P. Szilagyi, 
“Shareholder Activism Through Proposals: The European perspective” (2010) 16 European 
Finance Management 738, p.760; L. Renneboog & P. Szilagyi, “Corporate Restructuring and 
Bondholder Wealth” (2008) 14 European Finance Management 792, p.801), shareholders 
coalitions (M. Becht, J. Franks, M. Julian & S. Rossi, “Returns to Shareholder Activism: 
Evidence from a clinical study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund” (2009) 23 Review of Finance 
Study 3093, p.3102), and the threat of discipline takeovers (J. Franks, C. Mayer & L. 
Renneboog, “Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?” (2001) 10 
Journal of Financial Intermediation 209, p.230). 
103 Supra, n.17, M. Goergen & L. Renneboog, p.1073 
104 Supra, n.2, M. Jensen & W. Meckling, p.350 
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monitoring costs designed to limit harmful activities; these are compensation for 
managers and the cost of hiring a board in a firm. 
 
Specifically in terms of executive remuneration, optimal contracting theory 
suggests that boards of directors will seek to align the interests of executive 
directors with those of shareholders by tying a much larger portion of the 
executives’ pay to the increase of the shareholders’ wealth. Shareholders’ wealth 
will generally increase in line with the firm’s share prices. Therefore, one of the 
ways to align those interests is by issuing stock options to executives. According 
to Jensen and Murphy, variable alignment mechanisms can be categorised as: 
(a) compensation, including the executives’ annual salaries, bonuses, new equity 
and other gifts; (b) changes in the value of executives’ ownership of stock and 
options; and (c) the possibility that the market’s assessment of the executives’ 
human capital may decrease after termination because of their poor performance. 
For executives below the level of the CEO, the chance of promotion may also be 
an incentive.105 
 
B. Discussion around optimal contracting theory 
There was a good deal of discussion in the 1970s and 1980s around whether we 
should use compensation as a way to motivate directors. Criticisms of introducing 
pay-for-performance plans came primarily from psychologists and behaviourists, 
who claimed that monetary rewards were counterproductive. 106  Slater once 
argued that “getting people to chase money … produces nothing but people 
chasing money. Using money as a motivator leads to a progressive degradation 
in the quality of everything produced.”107 In addition, Kohn thought that monetary 
rewards encourage people to focus narrowly on a task, only doing that task as 
quickly as possible while taking few risks.108 What is worse, financial incentive 
                                            
105 M. Jensen & K. Murphy, “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives” (1990) 98 
Journal of Political Economy 225, p.252, summarised by J. Core, W. Guay & D. Larcker in their 
paper, “Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey”, (2003) Economic Policy 
Review 27, p.38. 
106 G. P. Baker, M. Jensen & K. Murphy, “Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory” 
(1988) 43 The Journal of Finance 593, p.610 
107 P. Slater, Wealth Addiction (New York: Dutton, 1980), p.130. 
108 INC, A. Khon, “Incentive Can Be Bad for Business”, January 1988, pp. 93–94. 
 42 
measures were thought to induce significant adverse side effects on employee 
morale and productivity. In the behavioural literature, since a horizontal equity pay 
system, which ensures that employees at the same level in an organisation 
receive the same pay, has long been accepted as fair and equitable, an 
aggressive pay-for-performance system will ultimately jeopardise employee 
morale by treating them differently from each other.109 Hammer suggested that 
in a context of imperfect performance measurements, financial incentives would 
decrease the motivation of employees because some executive directors 
mismanage the pay-for-performance system.110 Holmstrom’s “informativeness 
principle”111 proposes that stock-based measures should be used to decide on 
executive compensation, not because it is the shareholders’ desire to have higher 
share prices, but because the share price can be useful for the shareholders’ 
understanding of information provided about what the executives have done. He 
also suggests that if non-stock-based measures can be “sufficiently statistical” in 
describing the executives’ actions, stock-based information will not necessarily be 
required.112  
 
However, Baker, Jensen and Murphy believed that these criticisms of pay-for-
performance systems do not indicate that these incentives are counterproductive, 
but rather that they are too effective. They hold that a strong pay-for-performance 
system may motivate employees to do exactly what they should do. Financial 
incentives generate unintended and possibly counterproductive results because 
they are lacking in practical and precise measurements. Baker et al. suggested 
in the 1980s that it is how to develop the pay-for-performance system that really 
matters, rather than discussing whether it should exist, because in the 1990s 
stock options had replaced base salary as the biggest single component of 
executive remuneration in the US.113 Additionally, empirical evidence that will be 
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discussed below will also show that there are no grounds to argue over whether 
a pay for performance system should exist or not; rather, the important question 
is how to develop it to improve the design of executive remuneration.  
 
Jensen and Murphy think that actual executive remuneration contracts, in which 
financial incentives play an important role, cannot be predicted by economic 
theory in several circumstances.114 Economic theory predicts that executive pay 
should not be based on factors beyond the control of the executives,115 and 
therefore executive compensation should be based on performance measured 
relative to the performance of all firms or at least firms in the same industry, not 
only on measures relating to their own firm’s performance. Jensen and Murphy 
suggest that absolute firm-value changes should be the predictor of basic salary 
and bonuses, rather than value changes measured by the industry and the market. 
They also suggest that the pay-performance relation is independent of stock 
ownership. Moreover, Holstrom and Milgrom116 proposed their “multiple” optimal 
contracting model, with conditions where executives owning stock options will be 
successful: (a) the executives are not too risk-averse; (b) the variance of stock 
options is low; and (c) the variance of measurement in other aspects of the 
executives’ performance is low. However, though it was reasonable for Jensen 
and Murphy to suggest that basic salary and bonuses should be emphasised in 
executive pay and that economic theory contains some errors in explaining in an 
increase in financial incentivising pay because of the efforts of other peers within 
the same industry, long-term incentive equity and other share options are still the 
most important part in promoting pay for performance. In the decades since 
Holstrom and Milgrom proposed their idea, it is not the variance of financial 
incentives that remuneration committees should concern themselves with, but 
rather the setting of them to improve the firm’s long-term success, with executives 
taking a proper level of risk to allow them to run the company.  
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There are also several problems within optimal contracting theory in terms of 
explaining what executive remuneration is and how it may be developed. 
According to Kevin Murphy’s research, there are three factors in optimal 
contracting theory that need to be corrected in explaining the growth of stock 
options in executive pay packages.117 First, optimal contracting theory suggests 
that the sky-high incentives among executives in the 1990s were because the 
executives became less risk and effort-averse, while shareholder returns 
increased over this period.118 However, Murphy has simply objected to these 
explanations using economic theory,119 claiming that these explanations lack 
support from empirical evidence.120 There will be further discussion of the high 
executive remuneration incentives in the 1990s in later chapters. Second, Murphy 
was not satisfied with the fact that optimal contracting theory mentioned the 
increase in equity-based remuneration, but did not explain why this increase 
came entirely in the form of stock options.121 As mentioned above there are 
several equity incentives, such as restricted stock options and long-term incentive 
plans. Third, in Murphy’s view the biggest mistake made by optimal contracting 
theory lies in assuming that the increase of equity-based compensation in the 
1990s was because pay contracts were suboptimal before the 1990s.122 There 
may be other explanations for the state of affairs, in terms of other aspects of 
remuneration, such as social relationships inside the boardroom and influence 
from executives in designing their own pay policy.  
 
Thus, optimal contracting theory developed from agency theory while focusing on 
executive remuneration, and it has explained why the pay for performance 
relation exists from an optimal economic perspective, and why using financial 
incentives may align interests between managers and shareholders. However, 
this theory alone cannot fully explain why regular incentive pay plans have led to 
high levels of executive compensation since the 1990s, which did not match the 
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payback for companies. Theories emphasising other remuneration relationships 
will be introduced in the following discussion. 
 
IV. Managerial Power Theory 
 
Managerial power theory, which sums up nearly every perspective on the 
disadvantages of current executive remuneration arrangements from the 
management point of view, has led to a remarkable and highly controversial 
debate within academia. The theory has been promoted by law academics, 
Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, who started by disproving optimal contracting 
theory and describing it as an “arm’s-length bargaining approach”.123 The central 
view of managerial power theory is that in practice it is the executive directors 
who decide on how much they are paid, and therefore the presumption of optimal 
contacting theory will not stand, and optimal contracting theory cannot explain or 
solve executive compensation issues.   
 
A. Denial of previous theories 
Bebchuk and Fried assume that executive directors naturally tend to be self-
interested, 124  so that permitting them to set their own pay would certainly 
generate significant agency costs. Therefore, it is the board’s job to work out the 
remuneration policy. Arm’s-length bargaining, which they view as an official 
theory of explaining executives’ pay, assumes the board is negotiating pay with 
executives at arm’s length, solely based on the interest of shareholders, but 
according to Bebchuk and Fried that does not happen.125 
 
The managerial power approach denies the board’s function in restraining the 
executive directors’ power and protecting the rights of shareholders, with Bebchuk 
and Fried suggesting that arm’s-length bargaining does not even exist in the 
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process of executive compensation design between the board and the managers, 
for the following reasons. 
 
First, from the social and psychological points of view, non-executive directors 
tend to satisfy the executives. Non-executive directors always want to hold 
positions on the board so as to be provided with financial and non-financial 
benefits, such as the prestige of using the company’s assets and valuable 
business and social connections. According to Bebchuk and Fried, since it is the 
executives who have considerable and often decisive influence over the non-
executives’ nomination process, the non-executives will want to benefit the 
executives in order to be reelected to the board.126 Apart from the nomination 
process, a situation may occur where one company’s executives may be another 
company’s non-executives, which will bring interlocking benefits for each other.127 
There are also several objective factors, such as the fact that independent non-
executives are not supplied with sufficient information by the company’s human 
resources department or with advice from compensation consultants, along with 
an under-developed pay-setting process, which will lead to unrealistic and 
excessive executive compensation.128  
 
Second, they argue that shareholders have limited ways to constrain 
unreasonably high executive remuneration.129 Shareholders are given rights to 
challenge the board’s decisions on executive pay packages in courts by pursuing 
breaches of directors’ fiduciary duties. However, in practice, due to procedural 
restrictions and the courts’ delay in reviewing the substantive merits of board 
decisions, the courts have failed to impose any meaningful constraints on 
executive pay.130 The case of Disney, Brehm v. Einser in 1997 proved this 
argument. 131  In January 1997 a derivative suit was brought by Disney 
shareholders challenging the compensation of Michael Ovitz on the grounds of a 
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breach of fiduciary duty.132 Michael Ovitz, who was recruited to be the president 
of the board, was terminated after only a year in the job, and had received up to 
140 million dollars in termination benefits, which was higher than the payment for 
his full five-year term of employment.133 The shareholders, William Brehm and 
others, sued the company and the board for making and approving this payment 
decision.134 The court decided to proceed only because there was egregious 
carelessness during the compensation decision-making process, which lasted for 
only an hour, not because of certain flaws and perverse incentives in Ovitz’s pay 
package.135 In the final analysis, the court upheld the board’s decision while 
ignoring the substantive merits of Ovitz’s compensation arrangement.136 Even 
though Disney’s board “fell significantly short of the best practices of ideal 
corporate governance”, their decision was perceived by the court to have been 
made in good faith.137 However, should there be any consequence for the board 
after deciding in favour of such unreasonable compensation under the influence 
of their CEO? Since the recent improvements in corporate governance regulation 
in the US, through Dodd-Frank, shareholders have been given the power to have 
a say on executive pay and remove the members of remuneration committees, or 
even the CEO, if they are not satisfied with the results of the final pay policy. 
These modernising rules will be discussed further in Chapter 4.  
 
Bebchuk and Fried also mention that even though shareholders have the power 
to vote on the executives’ stock option plan in the remuneration package, 
shareholders cannot decide whether the option incentive plan is excessive 
because they do not have detailed information about it.138 Evidence from the 
Disney Company case again supports this argument. Michael Eisner, the CEO 
and Chairman of Disney until 2005, who was a good friend of Ovitz’s and acted 
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in good faith when promoting Ovitz to the position of president, received a 
substantial amount of criticism from the shareholders about his compensation as 
well as Ovitz’s termination. 139  However, Eisner still had his sky-high 
compensation plan approved after a four-hour meeting with shareholders, since 
the majority of shareholders were persuaded that 98% of his remuneration was 
performance-based.140 Therefore, Bebchuk and Fried conclude from this that 
shareholders do not have enough knowledge to help the board to make arm’s-
length arrangements.141  
 
Third, Bebchuk and Fried do not agree with the “Chicago School” view, which 
understands the market as an important factor in regulating executive pay. 
Bebchuk and Fried think that because dismissals of executive directors are rare 
and takeovers are usually well defended by the board, executives will not fear 
pressures from the labour market and the market of corporate control. 142 
Additionally, since selling additional shares to the public and the executives’ 
diversion of company profits may not always affect the cost and quality of the 
firm’s products, a market for additional capital and the product market will not 
prevent executives from chasing higher payoffs.143 Again, market forces are 
“unlikely” to impose tight constraints on executive remuneration. 
 
Thus, Jensen’s factors that might act within agency theory to promote an optimal 
remuneration contract have all been rejected by Bebchuk and Fried from a 
management perspective. These authors’ ideas about compensation and 
financial incentives will be introduced next.  
 
B. The main idea 
After analysing and rejecting the classic arm’s-length bargaining approach, 
Bebchuk and Fried propose their own view of executive remuneration. Since it 
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has been proved that the influence of boards, shareholders and market forces 
have all failed to stop executive directors from increasing their own payments, the 
more powerful the executives are on the board, the more they will be paid and the 
less sensitive their payments are to their performance. Nonetheless, there is still 
one important restraining factor, which Bebchuk and Fried refer to as the “outrage 
cost”.144  
 
If a board approves a pay policy favourable to the executives, the extent of the 
economic and social cost which the board and its executives will bear will depend 
on how this policy is perceived by the parties whose views matter to the board 
and the executives. When the policy is perceived as outrageous or unreasonable, 
shareholders will tend to veto it or even vote against the retention of executives. 
This outrage cost can lead to another problem, known as “camouflage”.145 In 
order to minimise outrage cost, the designers of excessive remuneration 
packages will seek to obscure and legitimate both the level and the performance-
insensitivity of the remuneration.146 This pay arrangement can be hidden within 
numerous remuneration policy practices, such as “postretirement perks and 
consulting arrangements, deferred compensation, pension plans, and executive 
loans”.147 Overall, these camouflage methods end up by allowing executives to 
reap benefits at the expense of shareholders.  
 
Bebchuk and Fried then give a detailed analysis of elements of pay, explaining 
how executive directors are paid excessively without corresponding positive 
performance. They propose that, although they are ignored by many financial 
economists, cash compensation strategies such as bonuses, favourable loans, 
pensions and deferred compensation have been shown to be weakly correlated 
with firm performance, but are generously awarded. In terms of the equity option, 
Bebchuk and Fried’s analysis indicates that because executives are powerful 
enough to obtain this option that favours themselves, it will enable them to reap 
substantial rewards even when their performance is mediocre or even poor.148  
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It can be concluded from Bebchuk and Fried’s research that there is no efficient 
way to stop executives from benefitting themselves. Executives’ managerial 
influence on their own pay will dilute their incentives to improve performance and 
will decrease shareholder value, which is Bebchuk’s greatest concern. 
Unrestrained executive remuneration has already imposed significant losses on 
shareholders, according to data from the US during the years from 1998 to 
2002. 149  Furthermore, prevailing executive compensation arrangements will 
provide weaker incentives to reduce managerial slack and increase shareholder 
value than would be the case under arm’s-length bargaining. Current 
remuneration practices can lead to perverse incentives for executives, who will 
use their influence to obtain options and shares while misreporting results, 
suppressing bad news and choosing projects and strategies that are less 
transparent to the market.150  
 
Bebchuk and Fried’s ideal situation with regard to executive remuneration would 
be to cut it down to a reasonable level without weakening managerial incentives. 
However, according to the previous analysis in which managerial influence has 
no real restraints, this situation needs practical schemes to be implemented. They 
suggest: first, since outrage cost can serve as a check on managerial rent 
extraction, executive compensation arrangements should be regulated so that 
they are highly transparent; second, since we cannot rely on arm’s-length 
contracting between executives and the firm to arrive at a proper executive 
compensation, directors on boards should be insulated not only from the 
executives but also from shareholders so as to allow them to agree neutral pay 
policies.151 
 
                                            




C. Criticism of managerial power theory 
This managerial power theory explains specifically how boards are manipulated 
by greedy executive directors in order to secure overpayments. However, the 
theory’s criticism of optimal contracting theory and the implication that boards 
should be made more independent are compelling, although controversial. 
According to Rakesh Khurrana, the growth in executive compensation over the 
past decade has occurred because of greater shareholder involvement and 
director independence.152 Kevin Murphy criticises the Bebchuk view as both 
“problematic” as a theoretical matter, and too “simplistic” in explaining executive 
remuneration arrangements.153 Franklin Snyder recognises that this theory only 
provides a partial picture of the executive remuneration puzzle, and at worst it 
may be entirely misguided.154  
 
C.1. Not conflicting with optimal contracting theory 
 
Core, Guay and Thomas point out that optimal contracting theory, which Bebchuk 
and Fried referred to as arm’s-length bargaining, and the managerial power 
approach are not competing.155 On the contrary, these commentators argue that 
these two theories are complementary in explaining executive remuneration.  
 
First, they propose that even though Bebchuk and Fried view optimal contracting 
as synonymous with arm’s-length bargaining, meaning negotiation between 
executive directors who are trying to argue for high compensation and the board 
who are seeking to set up this compensation in the best interests of shareholders, 
these two definitions are not the same.156 An optimal contract is not necessarily 
achieved on the basis that there is an independent board, sometimes allowing 
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some influence from executives with the aim of maximising net shareholder value, 
given the fact the board also has other duties to implement. 157  Therefore, 
managerial power does not automatically change the pay policy into a suboptimal 
contract. Second, they disagree with Bebchuk and Fried on the standards for 
deciding whether a compensation contract is optimal. They note that it is important 
to distinguish “contracts that are optimal in the presence of contracting costs” from 
“suboptimal contracts”. 158  The former are contracts that are made under a 
rational process by the remuneration committee, which may be influenced by 
executive directors but will not set pay policies that are bad for its shareholders’ 
interests. The latter contracts are set under perverse incentives, which are not 
related to shareholders’ benefits and are sometimes only beneficial to executives. 
Core, Guay and Thomas provide empirical evidence comparing the efficiency of 
US executive remuneration with that in European countries, and show that the 
US remuneration environment has not made shareholders as dissatisfied as in 
other countries.159 Therefore, they conclude that it is dangerous to judge an 
executive remuneration policy to be suboptimal or inefficient simply because it is 
not determined from an arm’s-length bargaining position.160 On the other hand, 
Core, Guay and Thomas accept that executive directors do influence the board.161 
They conclude that these two theories should complement each other in 
explaining executive remuneration, and they are not contradictory.  
 
C.2. Exaggerating the influence of executives 
 
Franklin Snyder actually doubts the nature of executives’ influence on the 
determination of remuneration packages.162 He asserts that Bebchuk and Fried 
failed to distinguish between executives’ improper dominance over the 
compensation negotiating process and executives’ bargaining power. He 
suggests that a situation in which executives have more bargaining power than 
the board does not necessarily compromise the firm’s financial decisions, and 
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neither does it mean that executives dominate in deciding on the determination of 
their payment at board level. 163  There is a significant degree of expense 
associated with hiring or replacing executives, and therefore the board tends to 
make concessions on remuneration policies for the new or incumbent executives, 
even when the executives have not become dominant over the board.164 Also, 
Snyder employs Bebchuk and Fried’s analysis of how executives use their power 
to extract rents during takeovers to prove that there is a huge difference between: 
(a) executives who can still persuade the board to offer high levels of pay; and (b) 
executives using their bargaining power to delay or prevent desirable 
acquisitions. 165  He proposes that the former situation requires executive 
domination, while the latter needs the executive managers’ bargaining power.166 
Therefore, he concludes that since Bebchuk and Fried misunderstand these 
executive-enriching situations in takeovers, it is worth considering whether they 
have described managerial power over the board too seriously.167  
 
C.3 Can the managerial power approach fully explain executive remuneration? 
 
To examine the managerial hypothesis, Murphy assumes that incumbent 
executives use their power and influence over boards in order to extract rents 
through their own compensation arrangements. 168  The following situations 
should have been predicted if managerial power explains executive 
compensation:  
 
(1) Executive compensation will decline because of public outrage.169 Murphy 
makes a strong case that public outrage was usually high in the early 1990s and 
remained this way through the following decade, while executive remuneration 
remained sky-high during the same period.170 
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(2) Executive compensation will decline as boards become more independent.171 
As described above, if executives’ domination of their own payment process is 
the main reason for excessive compensation, then a more independent board 
should provide an important solution.172 However, boards became increasingly 
independent during the 1990s, which was a period when executive remuneration 
soared to an unachievable/unacceptable level.173  
 
(3) Increased transparency will lead to lower remuneration. 174  According to 
managerial power theory, if camouflage from the board is the main way to 
disguise high executive payments, greater transparency in pay policies should 
result in lower compensation.175 However, after the US’s new SEC disclosure 
regulation was published in 1992, requiring more transparent remuneration 
policies, executive remuneration actually rose to even higher levels.176  
 
(4) Executive directors promoted from lower positions in firms are compensated 
at a higher level than ones hired from outside.177 Again, if executive domination 
is the key to higher compensation, incumbents from within the firm should be in a 
prime position to earn higher remuneration. 178  But according to Murphy’s 
research, data shows that executives hired from outside earn substantially more 
than the ones promoted from inside.179 
 
(5) Executives are seldom terminated from their jobs, and if they are they will not 
earn higher pay.180 Under Bebchuk and Fried’s logic, the “entrenched” executives 
who always earn more than market returns through dominating their board will 
rarely leave the firm voluntarily because then they will not be able to influence 
their compensation and benefit from market returns.181 Additionally, they also 
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suggest that if executives are gaining above-market remuneration because of 
their domination, the level of this remuneration will not be the same if they are 
moving to a new board where they do not have the same managerial influence.182 
Again, however, Murphy’s data shows that total compensation is rather higher for 
executives hired from outside than for executives from within, which is not 
consistent with Bebchuk and Fried’s hypothesis.183 Also, according to research 
by Fee and Hadlock, executives who leave their old firms to go to a new one will 
always receive a pay increase.184  
 
Generally, Murphy thinks that Bebchuk and Fried’s hypothesis is not consistent 
with the most important developments in executive remuneration arrangements, 
and their prescription to focus on rent extraction in examining “the regulation and 
practice of corporate governance” is potentially misguided and diverts attention 
from more important issues.185  
 
C.4. Can managerial power explain the growth in the use of stock options?  
 
The majority of options would be issued to executives.186  
 
If, as Bebchuk and Fried have suggested, option plans are made to satisfy the 
greed of executives, then there should be a majority of options issued to 
executives.187 Conversely, however, Murphy finds that nearly 80% of options 
were granted to managers and employees whose positions in the firm were below 
the top five executives in the company in terms of pay, and since 1992 options 
granted to individuals below the top five have been generally increasing.188  
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The level of executive remuneration will decline as the executive’s tenure 
decreases.189  
 
Under managerial power theory, while executives serve on boards they tend to 
appoint their “cronies” to the board as well.190 With the tenure of executives 
decreasing, it may be inferred that this cronyism will decrease, and so will the 
influence executives have on the board.191 Therefore, executives will earn less 
remuneration. However, evidence shows the opposite; during the 1990s there 
was a dramatic decline in executive tenure, but nevertheless their compensation 
rose sharply.192  
 
Interestingly, Bebchuk and Fried responded to some of these critiques in their 
book published in 2004. Their main responses were around the increasing level 
of executive compensation during the 1990s with more independent boardrooms 
and more transparent pay reports, while according to their predictions, the pay 
should have decreased. 193  They claim that a change in the compensation 
environment will not necessarily lead to a decline of managerial influence on 
boards.194 They briefly explain that with shareholders’ growing interest in linking 
executives’ performance with pay through option plans, and in the context of the 
broader stock market boom in the 1990s, it was the directors on the boards who 
implemented the executives’ willingness to add more equity-based compensation 
into their pay packages, causing executive compensation to increase sharply.195 
Furthermore, they add that while the bullish capital market meant that 
shareholders’ outrage about executive pay declined since the 2000s, the outrage 
towards excessive remuneration has recently been re-ignited,196 and this was 
even before the financial crisis.  
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However, as Kevin Murphy has suggested, explaining the executive 
compensation issue merely by comparing the optimal contracting and managerial 
power hypotheses is not “productive” enough. 197  He suggests that the 
hypotheses are not mutually exclusive; indeed, the same institutions that have 
evolved to mitigate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders (i.e. 
optimal contracting) have simultaneously allowed executives to extract rents (i.e. 
exercise of managerial power).198 For example, the first “line of defense” against 
agency problems is the outside members of the board of directors, elected by 
shareholders and responsible for monitoring, hiring, firing and setting top 
executive compensation.199 However, these outside board members, who pay 
executives with shareholders’ money and not their own, are not perfect agents for 
the shareholders who elected them. Instead of viewing optimal contracting and 
managerial power as competing hypotheses, it is more productive to 
acknowledge that outside dominated boards mitigate agency problems between 
managers and shareholders but create agency problems between shareholders 
and non-executives.200 Rigidly adopting either extreme hypothesis that director 
incentives are fully aligned with shareholder preference or with those of 
incumbent CEOs will inevitably result in less interesting and less realistic 
conclusions.201 
 
Although there have been many debates triggered by the managerial power 
approach, one important contribution should not be ignored: the level of executive 
remuneration comes from the faulty setting of compensation structures, which is 
caused partly by social relationships and the managers’ influence over the board, 
and partly because of markets and legislation which are supposed to function well 
under agency theory. Developed from agency theory, optimal contracting theory 
has focused mostly on an ideal macroeconomic view of remuneration and less on 
the social networks inside the board, presuming that appointing non-executives 
will naturally promote independence, and thus the managerial approach can 
provide additional information from this perspective. However, the levels of 
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independence and accountability of the remuneration committee and the board 
that Bebchuk requires in managerial power theory is too perfect, and therefore it 
is reasonable for Murphy to suggest that the rigidity in the theory’s framework will 
lead to limited conclusions and neglect possible improvements in pay if efforts are 
made by these two parties. 
 
It can be concluded here that both optimal contracting theory and the managerial 
power approach are derived from agency theory, accepting the pay for 
performance rationale and suggesting that monitoring and regulating power by 
shareholders, the markets and legislation should be emphasised in pay, though 
the two approaches have different views of the influence of executive directors’ 
and the effects of stock options on pay for performance. However, what if there 
are other views besides agency theory that can explain the relationships around 
executive remuneration? 
 
V. Other Theories and Recommendations 
 
A. Other theories 
A.1. Bainbridge’s Director Primacy Model 
 
As well as the arguments suggesting that Bebchuk’s managerial power theory 
cannot satisfactorily explain the problems of executive remuneration mentioned 
above, Bainbridge proposes that pay problems cannot be solved only by 
emphasising the interests of a constituency.202 He suggests that shareholder 
wealth maximisation should be “a proper decision-making norm” in corporate 
governance rules, but setting shareholder interests as the single “normative end 
of corporate governance” is not wise.203  
 
                                            




Bainbridge’s ideas about managers’ compensation are developed from 
stewardship theory, which, along with agency theory, is among the four general 
theories in the corporate governance area.204 While agency theory regards the 
company as a nexus of contracts between shareholders and directors who, if they 
are not monitored, will maximise their own interests at the expense of the former, 
it holds that there should be certain financial incentives in directors’ pay in order 
to motivate them to perform in favour of the shareholders and prevent them from 
engaging in shirking type behaviour.205 However, building on proposals from 
organisational psychology and sociology, suggesting that managers may tend to 
contribute to the firm to exercise responsibility and authority and gain recognition 
from peers and bosses, rather than only for monetary rewards, 206  the 
stewardship theory suggests that there are also non-financial motivations 
underlying managers’ efforts to run companies, and agency theory’s assumption 
that there is a natural conflict of interest between principal and agent may be 
debatable in the corporate governance context.207  
 
The effectiveness of executive performance is not mostly governed by their 
financial incentives, but is also affected by the firm’s organisational structure. A 
good structure will facilitate the executives to formulate and implement business 
plans for higher performance.208 Moreover, it is proposed by the stewardship 
theory that CEOs should also hold the position of board chair, since compared to 
increasing the independence of the board, the CEO’s duality of role will create 
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 60 
financial incentives for the managers to work more efficiently in motivating them 
to work hard in favour of shareholder returns.209 
 
Bainbridge explains executive compensation with his own model, which he calls 
director primacy. Starting with a denial of the possibility of reuniting ownership 
and management, first, Bainbridge states that though there are several problems 
which agency theory cannot solve, and shareholders must not expand their 
control to all the business decisions in the firm.210 However, while admitting that 
institutional investors are intervening more in the running of companies compared 
with previous decades, Bainbridge nevertheless argues that situations where a 
majority of shares are held by one institution are rather rare thus the influence 
from institutional shareholders will be less than expected.211 Nonetheless, the 
level of executive remuneration has increased dramatically with more shareholder 
intervention. 
 
Secondly, Bainbridge proposes that the dispersion of ownership and control is 
crucial in corporate functioning. To explain his idea, Bainbridge borrows a 
mechanism from Kenneth Arrow, dividing the decision-making processes into two 
types: “consensus” and “authority”.212 Corporations tend to use the consensus 
decision-making process when the stakeholders with power to vote have access 
rights to the firm’s information and can claim certain interests from the firm.213 
Small companies often use the consensus mode because the agency cost of 
information collecting is rather low in firms with a small group of people and a 
closer relationship between ownership and control. Yet with public companies, 
where there will be greater information asymmetry and more conflict of interests 
among stakeholders, most public companies will prefer the authority-based 
process to settle their decisions, since doing so costs less for the firm.214  
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According to this agency cost analysis, corporate governance in public firms 
needs to adjust the balance between executive directors’ discretion and the 
requirement to ensure this discretion is used accountably.215 Thus, Bainbridge’s 
theory asks the same question as agency theory: what should companies do to 
address this balance problem?  
 
Bainbridge suggests that directors certainly cannot be held accountable without 
the firm undermining their discretionary authority. He then suggests that 
monitoring work, termed “authoritative control”, can be undertaken by the board, 
and it is the duty of corporate law to vest this ultimate control in the board rather 
than the executives. On the other hand, compared to the shareholders who will 
be hampered by the length and complexity of corporate disclosure documents, 
this monitoring authority is better vested in the board, which costs much less in 
terms of making informed decisions. On the issue of managerial influence on the 
board, Bainbridge holds that as more independent directors are appointed to the 
board, who have relatively small “investments” in the firm’s social network, it 
becomes less likely that they will risk their positions to benefit the executive 
directors. Additionally, he indicates that in practice boards rarely make decisions 
about executives without considering alternative options and the shareholders’ 
reactions. Even if the board’s decisions are proved wrong, shareholders still have 
the ex post right to remove the directors involved. However, due to information 
asymmetry which can make it difficult for investors to distinguish between 
competent and negligent management, it is not necessary to empower 
shareholders with a specific ex ante vote on the board’s decisions. 
 
It is Bainbridge’s central proposition that after ensuring the virtues of executive 
directors’ discretion, shareholders should not interfere with the board’s and the 
executives’ decision-making authority in the name of accountability. Giving 
shareholders the power to review and monitor the firm’s activities will be sufficient. 
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Although the stewardship theory and the director primacy theory hold different 
views from agency theory on the relationship between the firm and its managers, 
on executive directors’ power restraint and on the board’s absolute insulation in 
making decisions about executive remuneration, those two theories both admit 
the effects of financial incentives in executive pay in terms of motivating better 
performance (although they also suggest that other non-financial incentives work 
as well). Still, their suggestions only contradict agency theory in one of the factors 
that Jensen proposed, namely the board’s utility (as mentioned above, the other 
factors are capital markets, product markets and legislation), while providing 
another way of thinking about pay-for-performance systems. The accountability 
of boards will be discussed further in Chapter 6.  
 
A.2. Lynn Stout’s Unselfish Pro-social Behaviour 
 
The trend for arguments stating that the executives and the board may be 
trustworthy regarding the issue of executive compensation leads to many other 
constructive ideas, one of which is particularly interesting as it re-defines the 
incentives which should be used in a pay for performance system. Lynn Stout 
proposes a model of unselfish pro-social behaviour, emphasising that optimal 
contracting theory is too enthusiastic in believing that tying executives’ pay to their 
performance will improve the firm’s performance, while using monetary income 
as an incentive for executive contribution to the firm is dangerous since it may 
tempt senior managers even deeper into the selfishness abyss.216  
 
Before introducing the unselfish pro-social behaviour model, Stout suggests that 
optimal contracting theory draws a conclusion like this because it rests its 
assumptions on another theory – “the Homo Economicus theory”, which 
presumes that employers and employees will follow whatever course of action 
maximises their interests.217 Therefore, under this rationale, the incentives for 
executives to engage in better performance ought to be monetary. Thus, optimal 
contracting theory indicates that only by relying on a selfish monetary pay contract 
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can an employer trust the employee to make his best effort for the firm. However, 
this “reliable” incentive mechanism may lead to opportunistic, unethical and even 
illegal management behaviour, such as accounting fraud and excessive risk-
taking.218 
 
Stout suggests that the reason why we rarely believe that conscience is a 
common behavioural phenomenon is because it has been seldom realised, but 
according to scientific research, conscience exists.219 Through important social 
cues, such as instructions from authority, decreasing in-group bias and beliefs 
about other people’s behaviour, we can trigger conscience in society.220 More 
importantly, based on conscience studies from the behavioural sciences, 
unselfish pro-social behavioural theory may be used to explore an alternative 
way to encourage executives instead of offering financial incentives. Stout 
proposes that under the pay-for-performance system, the design of executives’ 
agency contracts with financial incentives remains a problem that can never be 
solved because of contractual uncertainty, complexity and un-observability in 
nature. Therefore, maybe the opposite approach, which provides executives with 
modest and nonmonetary incentives according to the manager’s ex post 
behaviour, might help to stimulate the conscience and thus improve executive 
performance.221  
 
This perspective finds its own support in relation to the issue of executive 
remuneration. Tyler Cowen mentions that ego, reputation and social effort norms 
motivate executives in their work, not financial incentives. 222  Bold as the 
suggestions from this theory may seem, the notion that defining incentives from 
a pro-social perspective and reconsidering the pay-for-performance system’s 
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assumptions are worthy of attention. There are certain confusions in 
implementing this perspective on remuneration design: should remuneration 
committees reward executives with cash or in other monetary ways for being 
responsible to investors and other stakeholders in the company’s pay policy? Or 
should other plans for encouraging ethical actions be designed and factored into 
pay policies for future rewards? 
 
In fact, of course, no matter how effectively these unselfish behaviours might be 
encouraged in future pay plans or rewarded in pay reports, currently pay for 
performance is still the usual strategy, measured by the financial income of firms, 
and equity options are still the main method used to motivate managers. This 
thesis will focus mainly on the financial factors and financial measurements of 
executive remuneration.  
B. Murphy’s opinions 
Bebchuk and Fried are lawyers, and they prefer to study executive remuneration 
through the procedure of a firm’s pay policy making and the social network 
surrounding it. As an economist, however, Kevin Murphy tends to investigate 
executive pay structure and its economic costs.  
 
After summarising the failures of Managerial Power Approach and Optimal 
Contracting Theory to explain and predict executive remuneration, Murphy 
suggests that we should consider another way to explain the options granted to 
executives in the 1990s, in order to find a way to develop a healthy executive pay 
situation. 223 He emphasises that when stock options (including other stock-
related arrangements such as restricted stock options and long-term incentive 
plans) are granted, both the board and the remuneration committee always value 
the options only according to the number of options that will be issued to executive 
directors, while neglecting the options’ economic costs. Under Murphy’s logic, in 
practice, when a company grants an option to an executive it bears an economic 
cost equal to the amount that an outside investor would pay for the option.224 
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However, the company bears no outlay of cash or suffers any accounting charge. 
Usually, when the option is exercised the company issues a new one to the 
executive, while receiving both the exercise price and a tax deduction for the 
difference between the stock price and the exercise price. Therefore, the 
aforementioned factors make the board’s perceived cost of an option appear to 
be much lower than the economic cost.225 So, what are the actual economic costs 
of issuing options to executives?  
 
The economic cost of an incentive option is measured by the amount that an 
outside investor would pay for this option.226 That is to say, the economic cost is 
the risk that a company takes by issuing the options to the executives, rather than 
selling them to an outside investor. Generally, the investor has the right to trade 
or sell the option, and to take actions to hedge the risk of holding the option. 
Therefore, it can be inferred that the firm risks a potential loss if the value of the 
options granted to the executive is higher than the value of his contribution to the 
firm’s performance. Also, there is a potential concern that if executives re-price 
the options to a higher level before they are exercised, there will be more damage 
to the firm and potentially also to the capital market. Therefore, although it may 
seem to be providing for incentive, even carefully structured executive 
compensation can still lead to poor performance or damage if the actual economic 
cost has been ignored.    
 
According to this analysis, Murphy indicates that both firm and public (including 
governments and investors) perceive these options to be nearly costless, which 
could explain why large quantities of options started to be granted to executives 
during the 1980s and executive remuneration rose sky-high in the 1990s.227 The 
history of international executive remuneration development will be discussed and 
analysed in detail in the following chapters.  
 
One direct solution to the perceived cost of executive pay, as suggested by 
Murphy, could be to impose an accounting charge to be paid by executives for 
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the stock options. The importance of accounting consideration in preventing the 
re-pricing of stock options before they are exercised has been shown in 
practice.228 Take US regulation as an example; before Statement 128 of the 
Financial Accounting Standards 229  came into force in 1998, requiring that 
companies that are re-pricing options must use “variable accounting” to realise 
accounting charges annually based on stock price, companies were able to grant 
new or re-priced options with an exercise price equal to the grant-date market 
price. 230  Therefore, regulation of accounting charges can help to remind 
companies of how much executives have earned and if they are worth their 
income.  
 
Murphy also suggests that government intervention in executive compensation, 
which has been largely ignored by researchers, may be a useful trend to follow in 
endeavouring to solve executive pay issues.231 “The reason political influence on 
CEO pay adds an important new dimension to the agency problem is because 
the interests of the government differ significantly from those of shareholders, 
directors, and executives.”232 The pay-for-performance system is still workable to 
solve remuneration problems, but the crucial part is how to design and regulate 




Executive remuneration, a mechanism by which agency theory seeks to solve the 
agency problem, has become a problem itself. Before investigating how to solve 
the executive remuneration problem, it is important to understand the existing 
explanations of this issue. Optimal contracting theory and the managerial power 
approach are currently the most popular explanations. However, these two 
theories cannot explain, predict and solve executive remuneration problems 
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perfectly. Invented by financial economists, optimal contracting theory relies too 
much on designing the structure of remuneration in order to provide enough 
incentives for executives to improve the firm’s performance, while ignoring the 
social networks inside firms and other non-executives’ intentions. Proposed by 
corporate lawyers, the managerial approach puts too much focus on the social 
networks between executives and the board; undue influence from the executives 
has become an overarching focus, neglecting the empirical research reflecting 
that executive behaviour can be constrained and proper influence from 
executives is tolerated.  
 
However, neither of these two theories, both developed from agency theory, has 
denied that the pay-for-performance method may still be able to solve the 
remuneration problem, even though there have been many failures in restraining 
the levels of pay and mistakes in setting pay structures ever since the 1990s. 
Moreover, other theories explaining executive compensation have come from 
different backgrounds, such as the director primacy approach proposed by 
Bainbridge and the unselfish pro-social behavioural approach developed by Stout, 
taking into account different motivations and intentions of executive managers’ 
performance. However, these approaches still rely on the pay-for-performance 
system to improve remuneration, with financial factors emphasised as the most 
workable incentives.  
 
From this chapter, it can be concluded that not only the markets and non-
executive directors have an influence on executive remuneration; regulations and 
government policies should also contribute to improving remuneration design. 
Complicated as the executive remuneration problem is, it is important to 
understand the current situation and how it has arisen. The next chapter will 
investigate how the pay-for-performance system has failed to adjust 









After having a discussion about several theories that explain executive 
remuneration and the problems it has brought in Chapter 2, it can be understood 
that problems of executive remuneration are caused by various factors: intrinsic 
causes such as elements of remuneration structure and extrinsic causes such as 
undue influence from executive directors over the board. Those factors have led 
the level of executive remuneration to an excessive level since the 1990s.  
This chapter provides a deep analysis of the levels and structure of executive 
remuneration, to explain why levels may be excessive and why structures can be 
destructive in facilitating company performance, while aiming to argue that the 
problems of executive remuneration cannot be solved simply by market forces and 
internal control by companies. This chapter will answer the first research question 
by proposing that regulation is needed in solving the problems of executive 
remuneration because of the failures of markets.  
First, several basic factors will be introduced and analysed to provide a general 
understanding of executive remuneration. The public is always concerned about 
excessive levels of executive remuneration, however, the real concern is that the 
structure of it involves greater potential for managers to manipulate their own pay. 
The structure of remuneration will be emphasised in this chapter, financial 
incentives in pay will be investigated, and the measures used to set incentives will 
be introduced. 
Second, the chapter will examine how pay design and the current remuneration 
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situation can be evaluated, scrutinising the sensitivity between executives’ pay and 
performance. According to agency theory, executive remuneration is created to 
align the interests of shareholders and managers so as to ensure that managers 
perform well and loyally; sensitivity between performance and pay is a legitimate 
and proper way by which to evaluate executive remuneration. However, sensitivity 
is a norm that is hard to understand and explain. This thesis will provide an analysis 
of this norm from the point of view of three relationships: influences from the board, 
executive share ownership, and the investors. These relationships will be drawn 
from empirical studies undertaken by financial scholars to provide scope for the 
interaction between corporate performance and executive income. 
Since this thesis focuses on the question of why should executive remuneration 
be regulated and how this should be done, it is necessary to investigate how the 
remuneration of directors has developed without regulation. In section III there is 
an examination of how market forces and corporate control have failed to control 
executive remuneration. There will entail a detailed explanation of how the four 
types of markets affect corporate governance, and also how they influence 
executive directors and their payment. These markets, though theoretically able to 
monitor executives’ and firms’ behaviour, cannot stop fraud, especially in terms of 
stock price manipulation for various purposes and arguably cannot prevent 
collapses. Therefore, control from the corporate system should provide methods 
to offset the shortcomings of market control. Unfortunately, empirical evidence has 
shown that the current corporate governance framework cannot solve these 
problems. After recognising that the current design of executive remuneration has 
failed to achieve pay for performance and the level of remuneration cannot be 
controlled efficiently by market forces and corporate internal control (such as 
remuneration committees), it will be argued that problems of executive 
remuneration cannot be overcome sufficiently without other adjustments. 
This thesis proposes that there are three levels at which we can understand 
executive remuneration: first, the problems of executive remuneration, which can 
be observed from pay levels and the structure of arrangements; second, the 
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factors that can influence pay levels and the structure of executive pay, which are 
the capital market, the product market, the labour market and corporate 
governance. Third, the legislation provided from various perspectives to regulate 
remuneration. Among all these factors, it is pay for performance that provides a 
standard to justify whether arrangements are effective or not. In this chapter, we 
will investigate how the former two factors, the design of remuneration system and 
the various markets, have failed to promote pay for performance.   
 
I. The Level and Structure of Executive Remuneration 
 
As Harwell Wells’s analysis has indicated, executive remuneration can also be 
related to “the evolution of the industrial system, corporate disclosure and privacy, 
the tax policy, the balance of power in the national political economy, international 
economic competitiveness, and a nation’s basic intuitions of fairness and justice”.1 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, influenced by various factors to do with the 
design of its procedure and policy setting, executive remuneration has many 
aspects. To understand these complicated relations, it will be useful to investigate 
pay from its most observable aspect.  
For executive remuneration per se, two factors will be used to explain how it is 
formed currently; these are the level of remuneration and the structure of 
remuneration, both of which implicate the alignment between executives’ 
performance and their payment. However, the incentivised structure of pay has 
also influenced the level of pay, which has resulted in pay failing to reflect 
managerial performance. 
A. The level of executive remuneration  
Generally, executive pay levels have increased steadily as firms have increased 
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in size over the past seven decades.2 High levels of executive pay have been 
criticised for failing to reflect wider stakeholder interests, and particularly for failing 
to engage with the social justice implications of stratospheric pay awards.3 From 
the UK perspective, the annual average pay of FTSE 100 executives rose from 
£100,000 in the early 1980s to over £1 million at the beginning of this century, and 
to £4.3 million by 2012.4 Even after the introduction of new regulations in 2013 
which empower shareholders with a binding say on pay, the average pay still 
stands at £4.5 million according to 67 FTSE company reports delivered after the 
introduction of the binding say on pay.5 This annual payment, according to the 
High Pay Commission, is still growing.6 
According to agency theory, the level of executive remuneration should be related 
to shareholder equity returns and the firm’s performance. However, history has 
shown that this is only partly reflected in reality. Taking the US as an example, the 
S&P 500 experienced inflation-adjusted total annual returns averaging around 10% 
during the decades of the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.7 In the 1990s, however, 
the average return rose to 14.7%. This increase was justified as a result of IRC 
section 162 (m), which helped to tie executive remuneration directly to share 
prices 8  (this regulation will be analysed later in Chapter 4). The 2000s are 
remembered by investors as the worst decade of equity return, showing an 
average negative 3.4% for inflation-adjusted annual returns, while executives still 
enjoyed their increasing levels of remuneration.9  
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     B.  The structure of executive remuneration 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, basic salary, annual bonuses, stock options and other 
incentive option plans make up executive remuneration packages. The use of 
options was negligible from 1970 to 1985, and did not increase rapidly until the late 
1980s.10 During that decade executives’ flow compensation was still composed of 
cash salaries and bonuses, and only 30% of CEOs were granted stock options.11 
However, according to Core and Guay’s research, by 1994 stock options had 
become a major component of executives’ compensation, with 70% of CEOs 
receiving new option grants.12 In the US the mean options granted to CEOs in 
1994 amounted to $1.2 million, while their cash salaries were $1.3m.13 During the 
decade after 1993, the fraction of stock options increased while the salary 
percentage decreased.14  
The structure of executive remuneration has improved because companies 
learned to use stock options and other option plans as incentives to increase the 
sensitivity of executive pay to the wealth of the companies, and to encourage 
executive directors to increase efforts. Agency theory suggests that stock options 
will help to align interests between executives and shareholders, while having 
more stock options will produce more financial incentives. Compared to salary and 
bonuses, setting stock options as part of pay packages may improve the 
correlation between remuneration and the firm’s share performance, although this 
also causes several problems in deconstructing pay for performance.  
C. Incentive Structure of Executive Remuneration and Valuation 
According to a summary provided by Jeffery Gordon, executive remuneration is 
designed to achieve four main goals which are not in stable relationship with one 
                                            
10 Supra, n.2, C. Fryman & R. Saks, p.2116 
11 J. E. Core, W. Guay & D. F. Larcker, “Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A 
survey” (2003) 9 Economic Policy Review 27, p.29 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid, p.30 
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another.15 The first goal is to ensure a reward for executives’ successful prior 
service; the second is to provide enough incentives for their future services; the 
third is to retain and attract managerial talent; and the final goal is to align the 
interest of managers and shareholders, which is the most important goal for current 
mandatory rules on executive remuneration.16  Overall, we can conclude that 
executive remuneration should be designed to reflect managerial performance 
while providing fair incentives in pay to motivate and retain talented executive 
directors and ensure payback to shareholders. How to plan incentives in executive 
pay is a crucial issue. Normally, incentives are determined by two factors. The first 
is how performance is measured, and the second is how the remuneration is varied 
with the measured performance.  
C.1. Annual Bonus 
When a remuneration committee drafts an executive pay package, it is not only 
the base salaries which have already been written into the employment contracts 
that they should be concerned with. The key questions are how to set bonuses 
and how many stock options should be distributed as incentives. The criteria and 
measures that the remuneration experts and committee will use are as follows. 
After the financial crisis in 2008, some scholars started realising that maybe it was 
not only the equity compensation that should receive attention; in addition, non-
equity incentive pay, paid on the basis of past short-term profits, should also be 
considered by the regulators. Compared to the equity incentive strategy, the 
setting of non-equity incentive bonuses is determined by extra factors. Under a 
typical bonus plan, as described in the previous chapter, no bonus will be paid 
unless a threshold level of performance is achieved by the executive. Generally 
speaking, the annual bonus is linked to the firm’s strategy and budgeting process.17 
                                            
15 J. Gordon, “’Say on Pay’: Cautionary Notes on the UK Experience and the Case for Muddling 
Through,” (2009) 46 Harvard Journal on Legislation 323, p.329 
16 Ibid. 
17 L. Liu & A. Stark, “Relative Performance Evaluation in Board Cash Compensation: UK 
Empirical Evidence” (2009) 41 The British Accounting Review 21, p.24. 
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C.1.1 Performance Measures 
Bonus payments are determined by a matrix of performance measures. 
Performance measures can be divided into two categories: financial measures, 
and non-financial measures. Accounting measures, such as revenues, net income, 
operating profits and economic value added, constitute the majority of the financial 
measures. 18  Non-financial measures include performance relative to pre-
established objectives, customer satisfaction, operational and strategic objectives 
which may involve increasing plant capacity, bringing new products on line in time, 
and environmental objectives.19 As mentioned in Chapter 2, this thesis will not 
discuss about non-financial measures further.  
C.1.2 Performance Criteria 
There are also two types of criteria for determining an executive’s bonus: objective 
criteria and subjective criteria.20 It is worth separating the objective criteria from 
the subjective ones, since performance-based remuneration is entirely related to 
the objective criteria, and this portion of executive income can be tax deductible 
according to various government policies, such as the US Internal Revenue Code 
Section 162(m) which will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
The objective criteria are goals set for executives whose attainments can be readily 
observed. Those criteria include budget criteria based on performance and 
measured against the company’s annual budget goals, such as budgeted-net-year 
growth or earnings objectives.21 However, according to Bebchuk, attainment of 
this criterion will hardly indicate that the executive has increased shareholder 
value.22 This is because after achieving the budget goals of the firm, executive 
                                            
18 K. Murphy, “Executive Compensation” (1999) Ashenfelter, Orley, Card & David (Eds.), 3 
Handbook of Labor Economics. Elsevier, North-Holland 2485, p. 2496 
19 Ibid, p.2497 
20 L. Bebchuk & J. Fried, Pay Without Performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive 
compensation (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2004) pp.124–5. 
21 Supra, n. 18, K. Murphy, p.2497 
22 Supra, n. 20, Bebchuk & Fried, p.126 
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bonuses will take a big fraction of this income, leaving little for the shareholders.23 
Prior-year figures are the second objective criterion, including plans based on year-
on-year growth or improvement such as increases in operating profits.24 These 
criteria may have negative effects on shareholders’ interests, since the use of past 
accounting results may enable executives to receive their bonuses even if they 
perform poorly, perhaps because the industry as a whole has improved over the 
prior year. 25  Other timeless objective criteria include plans measuring 
performance relative to a fixed standard; an example might be a 20% return on 
assets, where the 20% moves in a predetermined way independent of actual 
performance, or the cost of capital criterion, referring to performance based on the 
company’s cost of capital.26 However, these timeless criteria are not as important 
as the other criteria mentioned above.  
On the other hand, subjective criteria are based on the judgments of the board or 
the remuneration committee. Discretionary criteria relate to pay plans where 
performance targets are set subjectively by the board of directors, following a 
review of the company’s business plan, the previous year’s performance, budgeted 
performance and a subjective evaluation of the difficulty of achieving the budgeted 
performance.27 Peer group criteria include plans based on performance measured 
relative to other companies in the same industry or market, which is usually based 
on the same industry. 28  If there are subjective criteria set in the executive 
remuneration design, observers from the board, shareholders and creditors can 
reasonably disagree on whether those goals have been achieved, if they read the 
remuneration report carefully enough. 
A bonus plan, as an important incentive method, can achieve its goal of aligning 
pay and performance by using both objective and subjective criteria. Normally, 
firms will use several of the objective criteria in setting the bonus plan, since they 
                                            
23 Ibid. 
24 Supra, n. 21, K. Murphy, p.2497 
25 Supra, n. 20, Bebchuk & Fried, p.139  
26 Supra, n. 21, K. Murphy, p.2498 
27 Supra, n. 20, Bebchuk & Fried, p.126 
28 Supra, n. 21, K. Murphy, p.2498 
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are easier to use in observing improvements in executive performance.29 However, 
there are problems with only applying objective criteria, since they may cause 
dissatisfaction and revolt among managers, and the single use of rigid rules may 
decrease their passion for the company.30 The addition of subjective criteria can 
give the board a more complete and accurate picture of executive performance.31  
C.1.3 Pay-Performance Structures  
Payouts from bonus plans are determined in a variety of ways. The most common 
payout method is the “80/120” plan.32 Under such a plan, no bonus is paid unless 
performance exceeds 80% of the performance standard, and bonuses are capped 
once performance exceeds 120% of the performance standard.  
At year-end, the actual bonus pool is determined by modifying the target pool up 
or down depending on whether actual performance exceeds or falls short of the 
performance standard.33 The pool is set to zero unless threshold performance is 
reached, and the pool is capped typically at some multiple of the sum of the target 
bonuses.   
There are also other non-equity incentives in executive remuneration, such as 
acquisition bonuses, golden parachutes and golden goodbyes, and beneficial 
retirements. As these have less function in linking executive pay to performance, 
these incentives will be considered in later chapters.  
On the other hand, equity incentives, which are the most important elements of 
executive remuneration according to section I, are worthy of more discussion as 
follows.  
                                            
29 Ibid. 
30 Deloitte, “Executive Compensation: Plan, Perform and Pay, CFO Insights”, available at: 
http://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/financial-services/articles/executive-compensation-plan-
perform-pay.html last accessed, 13 July 2016 
31 Supra, n.20, Bebchuk and Fried, p.126 
32 Supra, n.21, K. Murphy, “Executive Compensation”, p.2499 
33 Ibid. 
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C.2. Equity incentives 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, stock options are contracts giving executives the right 
to buy a share of stock at a pre-specified price on a pre-specific term. Executive 
options are non-tradable for a period of time, and will typically be forfeited if the 
executives leave the firm before these options are exercisable. The equity 
incentives discussed in the following include stock options, restricted stock options, 
and long-term incentive plans.  
C.2.1 Stock options 
An executive stock option grants directors a right to buy shares at a specific price 
(usually called an exercise price or strike price) and trade them in the market during 
a certain period of time.34This right lasts until a particular date, which is usually 
called the expiration date or termination date.  
For example, an executive may be granted 1,000 shares as his stock option, with 
a grant date price of £1 per share. This option setting allows the executive to buy 
1,000 shares after three years (the vesting period) at a price of £1 per share, and 
sell these shares during the following ten years. If after the three-year vesting 
period (at the exercise point) the stock price is £51 per share, the executive can 
still buy the 1,000 shares at the price of £1 per share and sell them in cash for a 
profit of £50,000 per share. However, if the stock price is still at or below £1 at the 
exercise point, the executive cannot exercise the option for profit. Therefore, while 
potentially providing high profits, the stock option is also a risky proposition for 
directors.  
There are three features that make stock options exceptional among the other 
incentives in executive pay package, and also among the other usual options. First, 
normal trading stock options give the owner the right to purchase existing shares 
of a firm, while executive stock options are new shares that the firm creates for the 
                                            
34 Supra, n.18, K. Murphy, p.2501 
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executives when they can exercise their options.35 The second feature is that 
executive stock options are not transferrable. This feature makes a difference in 
tying the executive’s portfolio to the firm’s profit.36 Granting the options will still 
create cost and risk for the firm; if the firm chooses to shoulder this expense for its 
executives, it has to be certain of their commitment, and therefore the stock option 
cannot be transferrable.37 Third, the executive stock option has a vesting period 
after which the executive will be allowed to buy and trade the options. 38  If 
executives leave the firm before the vesting period has elapsed, they will forfeit the 
options and receive nothing. This feature will reduce the stock option’s value and 
attraction for executives, but variable as the stock market situation usually is, since 
executives can exercise their options immediately after the vesting time (which is 
usually shorter than the expiration time), this makes the stock option still a valuable 
and useful strategy.  
In calculating the value of stock options, the definition of the intrinsic value of an 
option must be introduced. The intrinsic value of an option is the difference 
between the stock price and the exercise price at a particular moment, which 
equals the profit that executives can earn from exercising the options immediately 
after the vesting period.39 Normally, if the firm is performing well the intrinsic value 
will be the excess of the firm’s stock price over the exercise price of the options. If 
the stock price is at or below the exercise price, the intrinsic value of the option will 
be zero.  
Thus, granting equity stock options can be a very powerful incentive for executives 
to create firm value, because if the price of the vesting stocks remains stagnant or 
falls the executives will have no income from these options, while if the executives’ 
                                            
35 R. W. Kolb, Too Much Is Not Enough: Incentives is executive compensation (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2012) p.18. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid, p.19 
38 Ibid. 
39 M. Conyon, “Executive Compensation and Incentives” (2006) 20 Academy of Management 
Perspectives 25, p.27 
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vesting shares increase there is still no ultimate cost to the firm.40 
C.2.2 Restricted option 
A restricted option is a commitment to grant shares depending on a certain 
condition being fulfilled. The condition can be the fulfillment of a vesting time, or 
an achievement in increasing the stock price. The executive will own full title to the 
options after a certain period of time, which is also called the vesting period, and if 
he or she leaves the firm before the shares are vested the options will be forfeited.  
The usage of restricted options causes complications in valuing the options, if the 
granting condition is that the executive should stay in the firm for a certain period 
of time. If stock prices go down during the required period, there still will be some 
income for the executive while the firm faces a loss. This situation will be discussed 
in the next section. 
C.2.3 Long-term incentive plans 
Long-term incentives are similar in structure to stock options; the only difference is 
that they have a three- to ten-year period before they are granted, while some 
stock options take only three to five years.41 The payoff of long-term plans may be 
in cash or stock grants. The restrictions of stock grants are almost the same as 
with restricted options.  
D. Pay-performance sensitivities and problems 
From the above, the alignment between executive pay and performance appears 
to be well developed. However, in practice, it is debatable whether these 
measurements and incentives work efficiently and encourage managers to 
perform well.  
                                            
40 Ibid. 
41 Supra, n.35, Kolb, p.15. 
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D.1. Alignment between pay and performance 
Three basic techniques developed from agency theory (particularly from Jensen’s 
suggestions) to attempt to control and reduce the conflicts of interests between 
executives and the company. 42  The first of these is “self-constraint” through 
judicial enforcement, which is known as fiduciary duty, and the second is to 
eliminate conflicts by internal corporate control, including the use of independent 
directors on remuneration committees and the empowerment of shareholders on 
pay policies. The third one, which was built on the assumption that executive 
directors do have an influence on boards, is the most popular device, known as 
“pay for performance”.43 This suggests that executive pay should be aligned to the 
firm’s interests by tying the wealth of the firm to their income; this technique relies 
mostly on the capital market and the product market to measure the firm’s 
performance.  
Calculating pay-performance sensitivities for options requires the exercise price 
and expiration-term information for each outstanding option grant.44 Moreover, 
among the incentive factors in the pay package mentioned above, the restricted 
stock option and the executive stock option are the most likely to vary with the 
current year’s stock market. 45  Evidence has also shown that the executive’s 
incentives to do a good job and increase the firm’s stock value are mainly related 
to equity incentives, rather than to the pay they receive in a particular year.46 
Therefore, any comprehensive design of a pay-for-performance system should 
include the remuneration awarded to the executive plus the revaluations of his 
stock and stock option holdings.47 Also, empirical research undertaken by Habib 
and Ljungqvist has demonstrated that in the finance industry it is the companies 
                                            
42 J. Hill & C. M. Yablon, “Corporate Governance and Executive Remuneration: Rediscovering 
managerial positional conflict” (2010) 25 University of New South Wales Law Journal 294, p.307  
43 Ibid. 
44 M. A. Habib & A. P. Ljungqvist, “Firm Value and Managerial Incentives: A stochastic frontier 
approach” (2003) NYU Working Paper, No. 2451/26705, p.6 
45 Supra, n.35, Kolb, p.17 
46 Ibid. 
47 B. J. Hall & J. B. Liebman, “Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?” (1998) 113 The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press 653, p.667. 
 81 
which provide the most generous financial incentives for managers that improve 
their executives’ performance the most.48  
From those economic assumptions, well-designed pay incentives can encourage 
managers to greater efforts and motivate them to stay longer in one firm to improve 
long-term productivity. However, problems arising from various factors, such as 
internal corporate management and accounting issues, can still have the ability to 
disrupt the relationship between pay and performance. From the previous section, 
it can be observed that executive bonuses are measured more by a firm’s annual 
accounting performance, while equity incentives are aligned to stock market 
performance. However, sometimes the annual accounting results may be good 
even with poor stock performance, and return from long-term executive stock 
options may be high even with poor annual stock returns.49 It is not enough to say 
that pay for performance means shareholders get richer so executives are richer 
too.  
Moreover, for an individual executive manager, there are two important factors 
concerning pay for performance. First, sometimes executive directors have little or 
no control over the results that are supposedly being achieved in their pay policy; 
Second, these performance results are more often produced by a team of 
executives or even the whole organisation. Therefore, usually an individual 
manager’s pay is linked to a group’s performance.50 This concern leads to one 
important motivational issue, namely risk.  
Generally, risk in pay appears most often in leveraged companies such as banks, 
hedge fund companies and other types of financial firms.51 The relation between 
risk and pay is derived from agency theory assumptions about the different 
                                            
48 Supra, n.44, Habib & Ljungqvist, p.25 
49 Supra, n.35, Kolb, p.89. 
50 Jay Lorsch & Rakesh Khurana, “The Pay Problem: Time for a new paradigm for executive 
compensation” (2010) Harvard Magazine, May-June, available at: 
http://harvardmagazine.com/2010/05/the-pay-problem, last check on July 13th, 2016, pp.30-5, 
51 Brookings, “Regulating Systemically Important Financial institutions That Are Not Banks,” May 
2013, available at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/05/09-regulating-financial-
institutions-elliott, last accessed,13 July 2016 
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attitudes of managers and shareholders towards risk. Executive directors are 
assumed to be risk averse and shareholders are risk neutral, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2. However, financial companies with purely monetary assets will focus 
more on financial trading, which will increase risk-taking for firms.52 
The definition of risk-taking is complicated, however. In this thesis it means a 
potential loss, or even company insolvency, that may be incurred while executives 
are trying to improve the firm’s share performance; this can influence both the 
firm’s long-term productivity and the manager’s share income.53 Normally there 
are two elements in executive pay that involve risk: the first is equity options in 
executive compensation, and the second is other cash rewards if the firm remains 
solvent, such as defined benefit pensions and deferred compensation. 54 
Executive managers may engage in risky investments such as sub-prime lending, 
over-expansion or other derivatives trading in the name of the company because 
they are compensated in a large fraction by the company’s stocks and other share 
options.55 Also, it is debatable whether risk-taking can be controlled by executive 
pay design; according to the academics who focus on shareholders, compensation 
and risk-taking are not related to governance variables but co-vary with ownership 
by institutional investors who tend to have short-term preference and the power to 
influence firm management policies.56 However, opinions like this may exaggerate 
the shareholders’ ability to affect the investments of the company and the pay 
contracts made with managers, ignoring the influence of incentive compensation 
on managers’ risk-taking. Empirical research shows that there is a positive 
relationship between incentives and firm risk. In Prendergast’s summary of studies 
on risk-taking, he found that a balance between incentives in pay and risk-taking 
                                            
52 R. Merton & A. Perold, “Theory of Risk Capital in Financial Firms,” (1993) 6 Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance 16, p.17 
53 Developed this definition from Webster Dictionary, available at: 
http://www.learnersdictionary.com/definition/risk–taking last accessed, 13 July 2016 
54 Y. Landskroner & A. Raviv, “The 2007-2009 Financial Crisis and Executive Compensation: An 
analysis and a proposal for a novel structure” (2009) NYU Working Paper No. FIN-09-003, pp.7-8 
55 A. Edmans, “Debt-Based Pay May Give Much-Needed Balance” (2010) issue No.7 IESE 
insight Fourth quarter 29, p.31 
56 I-H. Cheng, H. G. Hong, & J.A. Scheinkman, “Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Risk at 
Financial Firms” (2014), ECGI – Finance Working Paper No. 285, March 24, p.29 
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can seldom be observed:57 when greater incentives are added to pay packages 
and executives expect higher compensation, the executives are induced to 
increase efforts and thus there will be higher levels of risk taking. This conclusion 
can be verified by the 2007–09 financial crisis, with incentives included into 
executive pay packages causing excessive risk-taking behaviour in the asset 
market, and the pay for performance system even under suspicion of reducing the 
effectiveness of incentivising sustainable growth.58 
So do high financial incentives naturally improve company’s performance? 
Contrary to the assumptions underlying setting financial incentives in executive 
directors’ pay packages, such as using stock options to provide them with a large 
proportion of the shareholding, evidence has shown that there is nearly no 
correlation between managers’ ownership of shares and the firm’s performance. 
After an extensive investigation of corporate acquisition behaviour and particularly 
this relationship, Loderer and Martin found that there is no case to prove that the 
executives’ stockholdings from financial incentives provided by the firm have 
affected the decisions that they have made. This suggests that higher stock 
ownership does not necessarily drive executives to pursue high share prices.59 
Loderer and Martin conclude from their research that there is little evidence to 
suggest that agency problems in large companies can be reduced through 
“arbitrarily” forcing executives to accept more stockholdings.60 Core et al even 
point out that the ownership of executive shares has a negative correlation with 
compensation levels.61 Loderer and Martin also propose that there may be other 
factors related to the product and corporate markets that force executive directors 
                                            
57 C. Prendergast, “The Tenuous Trade-off Between Risk and Incentives” (2002) 110 Journal of 
Political Economy 1071, p.1097 
58 Columbia Business School, “Governance, Executive Compensation, and Excessive Risk in the 
Financial Industry” 27–28 March 2010, available at: http://www.fes-
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60 Ibid. 
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to improve their firms’ performance, namely to avoid restructuring and takeovers.62 
From the aforementioned studies, there may be some problems in practice that 
affect the pay for performance system in the design of incentives in executive 
remuneration policies.  
D.2 Problems around Pay for Performance 
First, a big problem with stock options and other incentives alike is not that they 
cannot provide enough incentives, but that they may lead to unexpected 
consequences. 63  Due to shareholders’ information asymmetry, directors may 
engage in some behaviour that they are not paid to engage in. Kerr has suggested 
that one error worthy of notice is that under some circumstances, shareholders 
and the board may reward a director for A while hoping for B.64 This situation may 
occur when directors are engaged in multiple tasks, 65  A is a lower level of 
accounting or equity performance of the firm, or a totally different performance 
outcome compared to B. However, when an executive director’s performance is 
just A, and not good enough for B, his payback is still the same as B.  The 
situation of paying for B while performance results in A can be corrected by a 
“relational contract”, as proposed by Gibbons, which is a contract with terms setting 
out specified situations that both principal and agent can expect while signing it, 
which nonetheless is still adaptable to new information when it becomes 
available.66  
In most practical remuneration policy, these relational contracts are made with 
some subjective criteria in the pay for performance considerations, such as 
discretionary criteria and peer group criteria from the above, which can still reward 
executives for result A within a flexible scope. This design of remuneration 
                                            
62 Supra, n. 59, Loderer & Martin, p.241 
63 Supra, n. 39, Conyon, p. 29 
64 S. Kerr, “The Folly of Rewarding A While Hoping for B” (1975) 18 Academy Management 
Journal 769, p.775 
65 B. Holmstrom & P. Milgorm, “Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset 
Ownership and Job Design” (1992) 7 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 24, p.25 
66 R. Gibbons, “Incentives Between Firms and Within” (2005) 51 Management Science 2, p.17. 
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contracts seems unreasonably generous, especially when result A is a lower level 
of performance outcome compared to B. These generous contracts may be settled 
to retain the talented on the board, although they can still lead to a great deal of 
agency cost, such as equity re-loading, which will be mentioned later in this chapter, 
and other cases of pay for underperformance in the following chapters. 
Another concern around the use of stock options to provide incentives to perform 
is that they may encourage opportunistic behaviour among directors, such as the 
manipulation of performance measures and cheating in accounting reports. 67 
CEOs with higher incentives can sometimes lead to greater earnings 
manipulations.68 What is worse, there are studies showing that the possibility of a 
company becoming the target of fraud allegations is positively related to their use 
of financial incentives. 69  This problem is even more serious than the former 
contracting issue, and will be investigated later in this chapter.  
There is a debate as to whether the pay for performance factor has been weakened 
or strengthened over time. As mentioned before, the empirical relationship 
between executive compensation and firm performance was proposed by 
influential research carried out by Jensen and Murphy in 1990.70 According to the 
rules set by Jensen and Murphy, later studies undertaken by other scholars such 
as Conyon, Main and Ferrnandes show that pay-performance sensitivities were 
low from the mid-1990s to the 2000s.71 In contrast, Hall and Liebman found that 
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this relation has stayed the same.72 Jensen and Murphy found little evidence that 
performance relative to other firms in the same industry acted as a “yardstick” for 
managerial incentives.73 On the other hand, Gibbons and Murphy found that 
performance relative to both industry and market played an important role in 
shaping executive remuneration. 74  They also established that market relative 
performance had a stronger effect than industry relative performance, with their 
research involving a large sample of 9,425 firm years over the period from 1974 to 
1984.75  
From the above, it can be concluded that it is the financial incentives in executive 
remuneration that have helped in aligning pay and performance, but these 
incentives have also led to serious problems that may destroy this link. Therefore, 
this chapter will go on to analyse why this situation has arisen, and examine the 
factors that have led to such problems. According to the remuneration regulated 
system that was defined at the beginning of this chapter, various reasons will be 
developed below from the dysfunctions of corporate governance rules, capital 
markets, labour markets and product markets in regulating executive remuneration.  
 
II. How Pay for Performance Fails 
 
Sykes suggests that the main causes of inappropriate remuneration practices are: 
the lack of independence on remuneration committees, incorrect choice of 
remuneration consultants, a mismatch between the period of remuneration 
incentives and the underlying shareholders, inappropriate earnings criteria, and 
the reinforcing nature of conflicts of interest.76 These factors can be discussed in 
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73 Ibid., B. Hall & J. Liebman 
74 R. Gibbons & K. J. Murphy, “Optimal Incentive Contracts in The Presence of Career Concerns: 
Theory and Evidence” (1990) 100 Journal of Political Economy 468, p.480  
75 Ibid, p.481 
76 A. Sykes, “Overcoming Poor Value Executive Remuneration: resolving the manifest conflicts of 
interest” (2002) 10 Corporate Governance 256, pp. 257-9.  
 87 
the context of the underlying principle of this thesis; among them, remuneration 
committees and boards are ranked at the top.  
  A. The board and remuneration committee 
The contract between firms and executive directors for their future payment is their 
pay policy, and at a company’s annual general meeting a report on how the board 
has designed an executive pay policy and implemented executive pay policy will 
be presented to shareholders. The power of the remuneration committee in terms 
of how to design and implement the pay policy, as well as reporting to the annual 
general meeting, is authorised by the articles of association of the firm. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the independence of the remuneration committee and 
the board is important to guarantee a healthy design in the company’s 
remuneration policy. However, in practice, although there are regulations 
concerning outsider directors on the board in the government’s corporate 
governance code,77 there are still difficulties in establishing independence since 
companies are often reluctant to comply with these requirements:  
“independence is inherently virtually impossible to observe, and its 
surrogate definition is a rule-based list of conditions that cannot hold if 
a director is to be deemed independent. Consequently, firms may focus 
on satisfying the rules for independent directors rather than the broader 
concept of independence, similar to situations where people focus on 
rules to specify ethical behavior instead of evaluating whether particular 
behavior is ethical.”78   
Additionally, suppose that there are enough outside non-executive directors on the 
remuneration committee; it will still be hard to maintain independence, since 
                                            
77 For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code 2016 requires that there should be at least 
three independent non-executive directors on the remuneration committees of big listed firms, 
and the SEC Dodd-Frank Act 2010 requires that all members of the remuneration committee 
should be independent. 
78 E. M. Matsumura & J. Y. Shin, “Corporate Governance Reform and CEO Compensation: 
Intended and unintended consequences” (2005) 62 Journal of Business Ethics 101, pp.108-109. 
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commonly in the dialogue between the remuneration committee and individual 
executives, it is the executive director who takes the lead in negotiating pay. As 
one of the FTSE 100 remuneration committee chairs suggested:  
“I think it’s up to the chief executive – I feel very strongly that it is 
management that should be recommending to the remuneration 
committee how they think and in particular how the chief executive 
thinks the company should best be run in terms of reward.”79 
Studies investigating the tendency towards an increasing use of the board in 
solving corporate governance issues have shown that prior to executive ownership 
of shares and the power of shareholders, the board had more influence on 
executive pay and performance.80 Research done by Core et al has shown that 
the level of executive compensation will be lower if the percentage of inside 
directors on board is increasing.81 But this level will be higher with a bigger board 
size, and an increase in the percentages of outside directors who are appointed 
by the CEO, those who are over the age of 69, or those who serve on more than 
three company boards.82 Also, their results suggest that CEO remuneration will 
be lower if there is a non-CEO internal board member or an outside stockholder 
holding at least 5% of the firm’s shares.83 Another view also contributes to the idea 
that share ownership among board members and the separation of the roles of 
chair and CEO is positively correlated with better “contemporaneous” and future 
operating performance, since directors with proper stock ownership on the board 
will have an incentive to provide effective monitoring over important corporate 
decisions.84 
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81 Ibid., J. E. Core, R. W. Holthausen & D. F. Larcker 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
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However, in contrast to policies that recommend putting more independent 
directors on boards, the study done by Core et al finds no evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that independent directors can create more effective boards than inside 
directors, and also no evidence that greater equity holdings among independent 
outside directors will contribute to better corporate performance. 85  Other 
suggestions such as board independence will definitely improve firm performance 
are probably misguided, and should only be used to discipline poor management 
if necessary, for investigation shows that board independence has a negative 
correlation with the firm’s operating performance.86  
Therefore, from the empirical evidence, there may be several concerns about the 
effectiveness of boards and remuneration committees in terms of remuneration 
and performance, and the most important is that a lack of independence will 
jeopardise pay for performance. To understand these issues, it is necessary to 
know how remuneration policies and reports are made. There is a certain 
procedure followed by remuneration committees before pay policies and reports 
are presented to shareholders in annual general meetings. From the committee’s 
review of the existing pay strategy to the final decisions and implementations, there 
are various factors that are considered by the directors on the remuneration 
committee.  
According to Kym Sheehan, the remuneration committee must engage in two kinds 
of process before arriving at the final pay policy, namely an annual review of 
remuneration and a major review of remuneration practice. During an annual 
review, the committee has to adhere to the following process:87  
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Source: K. M. Sheehan, The Regulation of Executive Compensation: Greed, accountability and 
say on pay p.134 
Annual reviews of pay are more common than major reviews of pay, but the latter 
will be carried out in more extensive detail if a huge percentage of the shareholders 
vote against the last year’s pay plan or report. For example, under the UK’s say on 
pay rule, shareholders hold an advisory vote on the remuneration implementation 
report, and if a majority of the shareholders veto this report there will be a new pay 
policy next year under the committee’s major review of pay strategy, but there will 
not be an ordinary annual review. Under the annual review every element of 
executive pay will be measured, such as individual executives’ performance 
related to their bonuses, and how much they should get paid from the bonus sector 
this year.  
The first section in the review will be an analysis of the firm’s market performance 
and the former pay policy, concerning whether there is pay for good luck and pay 
rises that are not related to the firm’s market performance. In practice these factor 
reviews will consider information from the company’s comparators.88 After former 
pay packages have been investigated there will be several dialogues with 
remuneration consultants, who will usually provide information about the market 
and the firm’s peer group’s executive pay. The role of the remuneration consultant 
is important in pay setting, not only because they have more information than a 
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single remuneration committee, but also because the committee members are not 
always experts with enough professional knowledge about financial incentives in 
pay. A detailed discussion of these consultants will be presented in Chapter 6. The 
remuneration strategy, or policy will not be necessarily renewed every year. UK 
listed firms are required to present a new pay policy every three years for 
consideration in the annual general meeting, along with an annual pay report with 
information about how the firm has implemented executive pay. Thus, in the annual 
review fixed factors such as basic salary and pensions will not be consulted on 
every single year, although bonus issues will be.89 Moreover, as mentioned above, 
normally there will be dialogue between executives and the remuneration 
committee on how to design pay strategy, and the committee members often will 
not abide by the wishes of executive managers.  
After a draft pay strategy that has been developed with the consultants has been 
presented to the board, the board chair will hold a meeting with other members in 
the company, such as the CEO and the CFO, in order to make revisions to the pay 
plan. These meetings will be rather subjective, considering the performance of 
individual executives and their efforts towards running the business. As will be 
discussed shortly, rent-seeking behaviour, option repricing and reloading 
manipulation will be taken into account during these meetings. However, for the 
board and its members, these decisions can be seen as strategies to retain key 
executives and promote future corporate success. After the chair’s sign-off, the 
new pay strategy will be presented to the shareholders for adoption.   
Since there may be unsuitable decisions made by the board and the remuneration 
committee during the executive pay setting process, is there any solution for 
monitoring this behaviour? Under most circumstances it will be the votes of 
shareholders that may function as a pre-warning and a potential correction of pay. 
The shareholders’ voting power is granted by government regulations, which will 
be discussed in the next chapter. Although firms and scholars used to think that 
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providing financial incentives was an efficient way to encourage executives to 
protect and develop the business of their companies, the perverse effects of these 
incentives on companies and even the whole economy have shown that this 
assumption was wrong. What is more, during the past decade the development of 
executive remuneration has focused on tying executive pay more directly to the 
interests of shareholders, while relying on markets and inner corporate control to 
set proper pay policies. As described in the previous section, aligning these two 
interests can be achieved by providing more incentives in executives’ pay. 
However, unfortunately there is little evidence to indicate that higher pay-
performance sensitivities will lead to higher stock-price performance.  
In terms of reasons why executive remuneration can be so excessive, lawyers tend 
to blame the failure of the market and government policies, while financial 
economists tend to lay the blame on the internal control of companies. Fryman and 
Saks concluded that using consistent methods to value pay is particularly 
important when considering stock options, which were measured differently in 
research conducted between the 1950s and the 1970s in comparison with the 
common practice of today.90 After analysing stock option problems in the history 
of the US, the lessons learned from scandals since 2000 may be noted here. 
Examples from Enron, RBS, Bear Sterns and Fannie Mae show how financial 
incentives induce executives and CEOs to play so-called “earning management 
games”.91  Executives play these games when they want to adjust the firm’s 
earning reports to release news which will be beneficial to their financial income, 
and when they fabricate stock prices concerning the date on which their options 
were issued. 
In the US Fannie Mae, as a representative of all firms involved in executive earning 
management, is famous for making “one of the largest (financial earning) 
                                            
90 Supra, n. 2, C. Fryman & R. E. Saks, pp.2106-7 
91 Supra, n. 35, Kolb, p.140. 
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restatement(s) in American corporate history.”92 Its CFO, Timothy Howard, and its 
CEO, Franklin Raines, were accused of misstating the firm’s earnings from 1998 
to 2004 by inflating them by more than $11 billion.93 The purpose of doing so 
illustrates how financial incentives drive executives to chase benefits while ignoring 
the interest of the firm. Due to IRC section 162(m)’s tax deduction rule, more than 
94% of Raines’s pay package was performance-based.94 Like the structure of 
executive remuneration discussed above, if the performance measure was not 
satisfied or the market stock performance caused a poor earnings announcement, 
the CEO’s bonus was threatened and even his equity income would be wiped out. 
Therefore, in order to keep their income at a high level, the CEO and the CFO 
would prefer to state that the firm was running very well.  
The outcome of their misstatement was serious, because the fraudulent earnings 
harmed the company and also had a significant social cost. Since Fannie Mae is 
a federal government sponsored enterprise, it received a bailout from the 
government of $103.8 billion during the financial crisis, but had not repaid anything 
by the end of 2011.95 What was outrageous and surprising was the news that the 
then CEO, Raines, still had his equity options worth $7 million at the time he left 
the company.96 Because there was a special provision in his payment contract he 
was able to retain his equity options, and he exercised these options years after 
departure (after the time when the company had poor stock prices because of 
being investigated and being required to pay a penalty).97 Even more surprisingly, 
there was no requirement from the board for a claw-back because of his failure, 
and no board to compel him to exercise his options immediately on his departure, 
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at which time he would have received a mere $215,000.  
From the above it would seem that the failure of pay for performance is partly 
because of the undue influence of executive managers on boards and the deficient 
design of remuneration policy. The other reasons that can explain why pay for 
performance fails are in terms of markets, internal control over incentive plans and 
various cultures, and they will be explained as follows. 
  B. Fallacy of Relying on Markets  
B. 1 Market problems 
There are different markets with simultaneous effects on executive remuneration: 
the capital market, the product market, the market for corporate governance, and 
the labour market. In Villiers’ view, the notion that markets can control corporate 
behaviour is a rather “sweeping” assumption, which means that simply using these 
market forces does not solve corporate problems effectively.98 Another argument 
from Stokes suggests that no empirical demonstration has proved that markets 
have any effectiveness in terms of restraining the abuse of executive discretion, 
and the idea that the markets provide a neutral fair process for participants is also 
implausible.99 Another concern of Villiers is that share prices may be affected by 
the nature of companies’ conduct, thus jeopardising the normal functions of 
markets.100 This has indeed been proved by the Enron case.  
Enron was a company “laser focused on earnings per share”, to the degree that 
during its final days the underlying business stopped doing everything except 
faking the impression of high share prices.101 This company was initially a utility, 
principally a clearing house for energy futures. However, Enron expanded its 
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business to provide intermediary market trades and other risk allocation devices, 
and these so-called “new markets” and “new corporate models” were studied by 
numerous business schools as the century’s most innovative case. However, they 
failed in the general stock market fall in the early 2000s.102 In Deakin’s opinion, it 
was not the executive directors who manipulated their sky-high payments and who 
were to blame for the failure of Enron, and neither was it the other directors on the 
board who did not do their monitoring work, for which they were paid huge 
consulting fees while donating large amounts of money to schools and hospitals. 
Deakin suggests that Enron failed because the executive managers used the 
company’s rising share price to finance their off-balance sheet transactions, 
inflating their share prices by exaggerating the firm’s earnings.103 Therefore, how 
did these markets lose their function in regulating managerial remuneration?  
Explanations for how these markets can influence executive pay will be developed, 
and intrinsic problems of market effectiveness in regulating pay will be examined, 
in the next sections. 
B.1.1 Product market 
 
Competition from the product market provides implicit incentives determining the 
setting of executive compensation, and companies will adjust the level of 
compensation explicitly to reflect this.104 Intrinsically, product competition can 
increase the sensitivity of pay for performance, since strong competition, where 
the elasticity of substitution among goods is high, provides steeper monetary 
incentives for managers to create strategies aimed at stealing market share from 
other firms.105 However, a higher level of competition can also reduce the average 
profits of firms showing poor performance, and may thus increase their likelihood 
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of bankruptcy. 106  Therefore, generally the product market can influence 
remuneration through competition, rewarding the beneficial performance of 
executives.  
 
Research by Aggarwal and Samwick has proved that within executive 
compensation contracts there is a positive connection between firm performance 
and executive pay. However, there is also a negative link between the same 
industry’s performance and an individual firm’s executive remuneration.107 In a 
competitive product market executive directors can receive higher compensation 
if executives from other companies in the same industry bring lower returns for 
their firms.108 However, this interaction between executive pay and performance 
in the imperfect competitive market has long been ignored by agency theory. 
Therefore, a potential problem is that although this interaction helps to reduce 
executive risk-taking in running businesses while not being concerned with a 
particular firm’s loss, it does provide incentives for executives to lower the whole 
industry returns.109 Although it will be nearly impossible for a few firms’ executives 
to influence a whole industry under normal circumstances, companies regularly 
have strategic competitors, and compensation contracts with interaction 
evaluations will encourage executive directors to suddenly raise the share price or 
release good news at a certain time to influence their own firms that will benefit 
their pay while they are making strategic product market decisions.110 Moreover, 
as mentioned in previous sections, there will be comparison with peer companies 
in terms of their executive compensation during a remuneration review in pay 
policy setting, and with weak governance of the board, sometimes managers with 
poor performance will still get paid at a high level to match the pay of other 
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companies in the same industry, with the purpose of encouraging the managers to 
engage in greater efforts. 
 
B.1.2 The Labour Market 
Share prices, which are always perceived as the standard of a firm’s current and 
future performance, can be used by shareholders as mechanisms for evaluating 
and monitoring the company.111 If shareholders are not satisfied with the share 
price and weak management of the board, they can choose to simply exit from the 
company by withdrawing their investment. Firms that fail or which are likely to fail 
most of their shareholder’s expectations will be subject to takeover bids or, if there 
is no third party intervention, perhaps a restructuring initiated by the existing 
management team.112 Evidence from the UK and US studied by Conyon et al. has 
suggested that job losses from redundancy can lead to a decline in compensation 
which can last several years, and such dismissals can be harmful to the firm’s 
accumulated human capital.113 
The labour market, as described by Sherwin Rosen, has three important functions 
in regulating executive directors and their performance:114 First, the labour market 
helps to ensure that control must be distributed and assigned among executive 
directors: the most talented managers are efficiently assigned to the control 
positions in the largest companies; Second, in the labour market executive 
contracts should provide enough incentives for executive directors to act in their 
shareholders’ interests; Third, the market must identify new and talented groups 
of managers and reassign control over careers and positions from older executives 
to the younger generation. Rosen’s research has also pointed out that competition 
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among executive directors for top positions and the diminishing incentive effect of 
future rewards with age implies that executive remuneration design should 
“increasingly tilt” rewards towards current performance over the course of a 
career.115 However, the skill and talent emphasis of the labour market will lead to 
huge pay gaps between top executive managers and normal employees, since 
they have different tasks and risks to face at work which will lead to fairness and 
social insurance issues; these will be discussed later.  
 
B.1.3 Capital market 
Capital market failure is the most important issue in this section. 
Option Value 
The value of an option gives a general idea of how efficient and desirable the option 
is to executives from the capital market perspective.  
Generally, there are two valuation models for stock options, the analytical Black-
Scholes model and the lattice or binomial model, which uses a dynamic method to 
analyse the value of options.116 These two valuation models  both come from a 
general financial theory, which is called the Efficient Market Hypothesis.117 This 
assumes that under an efficient market, in which there is a large amount of rational, 
profit-maximising competition and information available to all participants, 118 
security prices can fully reflect all information to satisfy both investors and firms.119 
The Black-Scholes model is more popular as it is easier to understand. However, 
since these two models involve significant mathematical calculations described by 
their specific formulae, a detailed examination is outside the scope of this thesis.  
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The factors that are worth mentioning here are key inputs that can influence the 
models in analysing option values. According to Kolb, a financial scholar, these 
factors can be defined as follows:120 (1) the stock price prevailing at the time the 
value is accounted; (2) the exercise price of the option; (3) the volatility of the 
underlying stock; (4) the risk-free rate of interest; and (5) an estimated dividend 
rate. Though the stock price on the market is likely to change, these optimal factors 
can be used to influence the intrinsic value of stock options and thereby change 
the level of an executive’s income. It is possible to use these factors to have an 
impact on executive remuneration level. It has been pointed out that the critical 
consideration with regard to stock options is the difference between the cost to the 
firm of granting the option and the value to the executives who receive it.121 
“Windfall” 
The first factor is “windfalls” from the stock market. It has been noticed that even 
when the market’s upward and downward movements and the industry sector 
levels are the same, the structure of stock options can still imply that negative 
moves will be unlikely to hurt managers as much as positive moves will benefit 
them.122 More than that, Bebchuk and Fried suggest that negative shocks to the 
market can make executives’ options worthless, but positive shocks can boost the 
value of their options to unlimited levels.123  That is to say, the possibility of 
negative market or industry shocks reduces the value of stock options, but not as 
much as the possibility of positive shocks increases them. 
However, in my opinion, Bebchuk and Fried may be too strict in criticising the stock 
option as an incentive to remuneration, since their ideal option plan is something 
near to requiring perfection. They propose that an option plan should be designed 
either to maximise incentives for the money spent, or to achieve a certain level of 
incentive at the lowest possible cost.124 Their assertion is that when executives 
                                            
120 Supra, n.35, Kolb, pp.70-1 
121 Ibid. 
122 Supra, n.20, Bebchuk & Fried, pp.138–9. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid, p.140 
 100 
are rewarded for market- and sector-wide price movements unrelated to their 
efforts, shareholders’ money is not well spent.125 As would be expected, Bebchuk 
says that executive remuneration can be more effectively targeted at generating 
incentives if changes in the stock price, which are not the result of managers’ own 
efforts, can be excluded from the compensation calculation.126  
Looking at stock prices after the vesting period according to various remuneration 
contracts, there are three ways to set the exercise price of the options: at-the-
money, in-the-money, and out-of-the-money.127 
Incentive options in executive pay provides the opportunity for executive directors 
to purchase, hold and sell shares of their company. After a certain period set by 
the pay policy, executive directors will have the right to purchase or sell these 
shares, according to the exercise price set by the contract.  
The at-the-money option is the most typical one among the three, requiring the 
exercise price of option to be the same as the stock option price at the time the 
contract is exercised. It is a general assumption that the exercise price of 
executives’ stock options should be equal to the current stock price. The in-the-
money option is the most unwelcome incentive in terms of tax rules, since this 
option’s exercise price is below the grant-date market stock price which makes the 
intrinsic value of this option much higher. Some firms have introduced an out-of-
the-money option to encourage executives to better perform, since this option has 
an exercise price higher than the grant-date stock price.  
Bebchuk and Fried point out that although it is not possible to expect every firm to 
choose the same incentive option, vesting time and exercise date, opportunities 
still exist for executives to gain unreasonably high pay because the board may 
have sought the options that will benefit the executives the most, by manipulating 
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factors within the options.128 Executives will always prefer the exercise prices of 
the options to be low, and research has shown that executives will award 
themselves with in-the-money options camouflaged as at-the-money options 
through their influence over boards and remuneration committees.129 
Even if executives cannot make their options into in-the-money ones, there are still 
ways to benefit themselves not by performing well but by influencing other factors 
which can affect the intrinsic value of the stock options. Yermack finds that 
executives always want to be granted stock options after the release of favourable 
earnings results, which helps to increase stock prices dramatically.130 Additionally, 
executives who cannot control when to have their options granted may find an 
opportunity to disclose some bad news, so as to reduce the stock price before their 
options are exercised.131 Other studies have also shown that executives will tend 
to make income-decreasing accruals before the grant date of their options in order 
to depress stock prices.132  
Research examining the executive remuneration of a sample of 572 companies, 
carried out by Aboody and Kasznik, found that executives do not only manipulate 
share prices for the purpose of increasing their financial incentive payouts, they 
also achieve this manipulation by releasing information that is unclear or confusing 
to the market and the public.133 They pointed out that before they were due to 
issue stock options, companies whose executives receive options tended to 
release less optimistic earnings forecasts than other companies with no options to 
issue.134 Also, after studying the earning announcements of those companies it 
was found that CEOs who receive stock options prior to announcements were 
                                            
128 Supra, n.20, Bebchuk & Fried, p.142 
129 D. Yermack, “Good Timing: CEO stock option awards and company news announcements” 
(1997) 52 The Journal of Finance 449, p.453 
130 Ibid, pp.457-8 
131 D. Aboody & R. Kasznik, “CEO Stock Option Awards and Corporate Voluntary Disclosures” 
(2000) 29 Journal of Accounting and Economics 73, at p.83 
132 S. Balsam, H. L. Chen & S. Sankaraguruswamy, “Earnings Management Prior to Stock 
Option Grants” (January 2003), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=378440, last 
accessed, 13 July 2016 
133 Supra, n.131, D. Aboody & R. Kasznik, p.74 
134 Ibid, p.81 
 102 
more likely to issue bad news forecasts and less likely to release good news 
beforehand, in comparison with those who would gain options after earning 
announcements have been made.135 Because of pessimistic news and the low 
level of share prices when the stock options are issued, executives will gain more 
when they exercise their options with a higher price difference. 
Repricing options 
Apart from the ways mentioned above and used by executives to benefit 
themselves, the board will sometimes voluntarily provide executives whose 
options have become out-of-the-money with repricing options by resetting prices 
to a point lower than the stock prices. In some circumstances the repricing options 
may replace the old ones to satisfy executives’ concerns about their income.  
Firms’ repricing behaviour is always controversial. Bebchuk and Fried hold the 
opinion that expectation from executives that firms will always engage in repricing 
to offset any loss can reduce the executives’ incentives to perform.136 They also 
suggest that the worst case scenario may be that executives will anticipate 
repricing and will engineer the decline the firm’s stock price in the short term to 
lower the exercise price, which will affect the interests of the shareholders.137 
However, on the other hand, financial scholars note that firms do not carry out 
option repricing arbitrarily. They suggest that firms will consider two factors in 
granting new options – incentivising retention and incentivising future 
performance.138 Kolb indicates that after realising that there is a potential loss in 
granting new options and keeping an executive in post, if the firm still wants to 
retain the executive the board will have to provide enough repriced options to keep 
him or her from moving to another company (incentivising retention).139 Moreover, 
before repricing options the board will also have to make sure that there is a 
chance of the stock price exceeding the original exercise option price in the future 
                                            
135 Ibid, p.85 
136 Supra, n. 20, Bebchuk and Fried, p.149 
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138 Supra, n. 35, Kolb, p.83. 
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(incentivising future performance).140 If these two grounds cannot be satisfied, the 
firm should consider not repricing options and in fact removing the CEO or the 
executives instead. On the whole, economists do support the repricing of options 
as a retaining function in a context of mobile executives and increasingly 
diminished stocks.141 However, supporters have to admit that repricing options do 
happen often in companies with weak governance, which again supports 
Bebchuk’s managerial power approach.142 
Reloading options 
Another way of compensating and retaining executives with more equity options is 
reloading options. When executives exercise their stock options before the 
expiration date, some firms will offer these executives the opportunity to pay the 
exercise price for new stock options. Thus, if the executives accept the offer, they 
will receive not only shares from exercising their previously owned options, but 
also new options for each share tendered.  
Reload options can encourage executives to exercise their options earlier and hold 
more shares in the company, thereby aligning them more closely with the company. 
However, opinions derived from managerial power theory hold that if the 
executives cannot sell the shares they receive on exercise, reload options will not 
necessarily guarantee the result. Bebchuk and Fried suppose that most executives 
will tend to sell the shares for cash if they are free to do so.143   
Proposed by Hill and Yablon, the “positional conflict of interest” approach even 
suggests that contrary to the pay for performance system, under which managerial 
pay is controlled by the markets, the executive directors can control the markets 
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142 Ibid, K. Murphy, p.860 
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themselves.144 They discuss managers’ “strategic superiority” within the firm, and 
the positional conflicts that may distort “goals and indicia” designed into the pay 
for performance system. Hill and Yablon propose that pay for performance, which 
was created as a way of aligning interests between the management and 
shareholders, has itself become a new cause of interest misalignment.145 In this 
analysis, the autonomy and discretion that executive directors actually have in 
releasing corporate information is the key issue, while the positional conflict 
approach assumes that executives do have significant autonomy and discretion 
regarding disclosure.146  
This section has introduced several factors that affect pay for performance: 
problems of pay inequity are caused by regulation of pay by the labour market, 
risk-taking and compensation comparison problems from the product market, and 
options repricing and reloading problems from the capital market. It can be 
concluded that influences from markets improve pay for performance, but 
manipulation from remuneration committees, boards and executive directors who 
utilise the effects of markets on remuneration can damage pay for performance. 
Thus, regulation from the markets is not effective in ensuring that executive 
remuneration is aligned to performance, as has been suggested by economists, 
and thus it cannot be relied on. It is contended that interventions from other parties, 
such as government policies and legislation, need to be introduced to deal with 
these problems.  
III. Other Factors in Pay for Performance 
 
A. The culture and psychology of executive remuneration 
Besides formal rules, such as the influence from markets mentioned above, 
financial economists have found that “informal” constraints have also influenced 
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executive remuneration. For example, according to a 2014 report from Belgium’s 
Vlerick Business School, performance is not the most important determinant in 
executive pay; instead, the size of firms is a prior metric. It has been found that 
executive directors in larger sized public companies in Germany, the Netherlands, 
France, Belgium and the UK were rewarded higher levels of remuneration and 
more loaded pensions.147 In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the 
executive compensation level, it is necessary to discuss these informal constraints. 
Nash, Patel and Bryan suggest that culture matters in executive remuneration 
structures. Their research has shown that cross-national differences in 
compensation structures are tightly related to cross-national differences in 
culture.148 They measure cultural factors by investigating social traits, such as 
individualism and uncertainty avoidance, in the contracting decisions surrounding 
executive compensation. Individualism is proposed with its comparison to 
collectivism, meaning a way of working that is done separately from other 
people.149 Uncertainty avoidance is used to a conduct which an individual would 
tend to do (mostly escape) under an assumed risky situation.150 They conclude 
that the factors affecting these decisions are significant determinants of the relative 
use of equity-based compensation.151  
Nash et al. identify several issues as cultural factors that can influence the 
structure of executives’ pay. They import ideas from Hofstede’s theory of cultural 
value dimensions, finding factors which most directly affect agency problems.152 
Hofstede concluded that a society’s individualism dimensions, while reflecting 
relations between individuals and groups, demonstrate the degree to which 
                                            
147 Vlerick Business School, “Executive Remuneration in Europe”, (2014), available at: 
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individual interests can “prevail over collective interests”.153 Thus, the higher that 
members of a society are in rank, the more inclined they are to pursue their own 
interests and the less attuned they are to the interests of the group. 154 
Individualism, they have found, is significantly positively related to the use of 
equity-based compensation in both their full sample and also a subsample made 
up only of non-US firms.155 On the other hand, a society’s level of uncertainty 
avoidance is another important cultural factor that can influence compensation 
structure. An uncertainty avoidance index is used to measure the degree to which 
people feel stressed or uncomfortable in risky situations. According to Hofstede’s 
research, societies that scored higher on this index will seek greater stability and 
are less tolerant of conflict and competition. 156  Nash et al. have found that 
uncertainty avoidance is negatively related in a significant way to the equity 
component of compensation for both their full sample and the subsample of only 
non-US firms. Additionally, Nash et al. identified other cultural elements that may 
influence the structure of executive remuneration, such as the mastery level of a 
language from Stulz and Williamson,157 religion from Kwok and Tadesse,158 and 
trust from Sapienza et al.159  
Among the theoretical approaches, both optimal contracting theory, which is 
illustrated by agency theory on the one hand, and managerial power theory on the 
other, emphasise the importance of financial incentives in aligning the interests of 
executives and firms to improve their performance, although, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, these two theories strongly oppose each other regarding how the 
system of executive remuneration works to monitor executives. However, the 
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question here is why these theories take financial incentives to be a valuable tool 
in improving executives’ performance. From this section it can be concluded that 
there are several deficiencies within the financial incentive system. First, incentives 
like equity stock options, and restricted stocks can often lead executives to 
maximise their own interests while failing to benefit or even damage those of the 
firm.160 Examples such as share repricing regarding the dividends induced by the 
non-dividend-protected character of equity option stocks can always change a 
company’s performance, while helping to increase executive income. Second, and 
more seriously, executives will always be induced to take too little risk because 
they can still gain a lot from malfeasance, which may involve ignoring beneficial 
investments, rejecting attractive mergers or not making valuable acquisitions.161 
Worst of all may be the situation where executives commit felonies in pursuit of 
personal aggrandisement,162 as in the Enron case. 
However, despite these negative effects of financial incentives on the pay for 
performance system, is there any other way to motivate the executives to perform? 
Or perhaps the question should be – do the shareholders prefer financial 
incentives? The effects of other ways to motivate executives are hard to investigate 
since there have been no other methods created since the 1930s. Nonetheless, 
research shows that shareholders do approve of financial means to compensate 
their executives.163 Studies have confirmed that shareholders tend to bid up share 
prices right before a new equity option is issued to an executive director. 164 
Therefore, since newer and better ways have not been found and shareholders 
(and society) have become used to the financial incentive system, this seems to 
leave the only practical choice of strengthening corporate governance. As 
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mentioned several times already, methods such as enhancing the independence 
of boards, improving the shareholders’ and board members’ monitoring function, 
and increasing the disclosure of pay details would help. The following section 
provides a brief analysis of how legal intervention is working to improve corporate 
governance in regulating executive remuneration.  
Since the “pay for performance” strand proposes that an executive remuneration 
plan should be created by an independent board using sufficient incentives in an 
arm’s-length bargain in order to align the interests of executives and firms, no 
matter how high the remuneration is, this strand is relevant to the structure of 
executive remuneration. On the other hand, the “social responsibility” strand is also 
relevant to the level of executive remuneration since it focuses on excessive 
managerial pay and the fairness of social wealth distribution. Under some 
circumstances, changing the structure of executive remuneration may influence 
the level of it, since an efficient pay policy may help to decrease excessive levels. 
However, with modern corporations, certainly companies practicing Anglo-
American corporate governance, developing and empowering shareholder value 
since the 1980s, political mechanisms lean more towards the “pay for performance” 
strand. Besides, the goal of the “social responsibility” strand, which is to achieve 
social justice through lowering the level of executive remuneration, is nearly 
impossible within corporate governance, and most of the policies aimed at lowering 
the level of remuneration only involve adjusting income tax rates. This fairness 
issue will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
    B. Fairness 
Plato once mentioned that if the income of those at the highest level in society is 
never more than five times that of the lowest, the system is fair.165 Maybe that is 
too old; today, due to different backgrounds and contexts, a substantial disparity 
in income has to exist. In 2010 David Cameron suggested that a 20 times 
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difference in pay between the highest and the lowest is the maximum that will be 
tolerated in the general sector in the UK.166 Nevertheless, according to the High 
Pay Centre (HPC), the 20 times figure may have reflected the pay ratio during the 
1980s, but by 1998 it had increased to 60 times167，81 times in 2009168, and in 
2012 there was a factor of 162 separating the average CEO remuneration in FTSE 
100 companies and the average pay of a full-time worker in the UK.169  
 
It has been said that : “Disparity of income is both a virtue and a vice: the virtue of 
providing rewards for effort and generating economic growth must be balanced 
against the vice of inequality’s manifest injustice.”170 However, the reason why any 
discussion of executive pay has to be included within any mention of fairness and 
pay gaps is that the high pay of managers may harm the welfare of other workers. 
Reports have shown that executive directors are rewarded with sky-high 
compensation at the expense of laying off what are regarded as low-level 
employees.171 Examples can be found in the cases of Enron and Lehman Brothers, 
in which executive directors were chasing their performance outcomes for higher 
pay by maximising share prices and taking risky decisions, without having regard 
for their employees and other stakeholders.172  
 
Pressure and outrage from the public and the media often grabs the attention of 
governments and institutions and urges them to re-think senior managers’ pay. For 
example, in the UK the 1992 Cadbury Report and the 1995 Greenbury Report both 
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reflected concerns over executive pay from the public and shareholders in relation 
to accountability and transparency.173  
 
Angel Gurria, head of the Organisation for Economic Corporation and 
Development (OECD), has mentioned that “addressing high and growing 
inequality is critical to promote strong and sustained growth”, while “contrary to 
conventional wisdom, the benefits of higher income are trickling up, not down”.174  
 
The High Pay Centre has argued that excessive levels of executive remuneration 
should be controlled and remuneration policies should be regulated more strictly, 
for three reasons. First, a high level of remuneration damages not only the 
reputation of UK companies, but also the nation: in a Eurostat report, only two of 
the UK’s nine regions enjoyed higher GDP per person than the EU average 
standard in 2013.175 Also in the OECD’s figures, the poorest fifth of the UK 
population has much lower income then the poorest fifth from other North-Western 
European countries, but the UK’s richest fifth are at the top of Europe’s most 
wealthy people.176 Second, high executive pay, according to the US experience, 
was the key driver in increasing inequality in incomes, and will increase society’s 
distrust of public companies, especially since cases such as the Royal Bank of 
Scotland and Lloyds Bank during the 2008-2009 financial crisis has and still is 
influencing the attitudes of the media and the public towards rich CEOs, although 
it is doubtful whether these so-called talented CEOs can make any difference after 
the financial crisis.177 Finally and most seriously, excessive inequality is harmful 
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to the UK economy because too much money is concentrated in the hands of a 
few wealthy people who will not spend in the productive economy, and which may 
provide fewer opportunities for others to raise their living standards. The richer 
people tend to spend money in the financial markets, which, compared to the 
product market, will have limited effects in improving the whole economy.178 The 
High Pay Centre even suggests that if there is no regulation of incentive equity 
options in executive pay packages, the UK will never recover completely from the 




Although they take contrasting approaches to explaining the executive 
remuneration issue, the managerial power approach proposed by lawyers and the 
optimal contracting theory supported by economists have never denied the role 
that financial incentives can play in aligning the interests of executives and firms, 
which is the rationale of pay for performance. However, from the time when people 
realised they could use these incentives, problems have surrounded how to design 
them and how to implement the incentive contracts. However, we must recognise 
that it is not necessary that design and implementation should be perfect, since 
nothing is perfect in practice, and contracts are always incomplete due to 
information asymmetry mentioned in Chapter 2.  
Boards and remuneration committees which are supposed to set executive 
compensation are not very accountable to shareholders in practice in terms of 
policy design and reporting, and furthermore they may use their power, along with 
managers, to utilise the influence of markets and reward under-performance 
among executives. The intrinsic effects of markets can be defeated by the extrinsic 
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 112 
power from companies to produce inappropriate levels and structures of executive 
remuneration. From studies done by Murphy, Jensen or Kolb, even financial 
economists have already admitted that issues of executive compensation are in 
great need of social and maybe other kinds of solutions to improve them, and these 
problems cannot simply be alleviated by market forces. Hence, the next chapter 
will focus on the social solutions that have been proposed to solve these problems, 







An Examination of Regulation Mechanisms for Executive 
Remuneration 
Introduction 
Chapter 3 has explained why the markets fail to solve the executive 
remuneration problem by their intrinsic influence and discussed various factors 
that can damage the pay for performance link designed for executive 
remuneration. With concluding that the markets alone cannot solve the 
problems of executive remuneration and other legal solutions shall be 
employed, Chapter 3 has answered the first research question mostly, which is 
whether executive remuneration shall be regulated. Chapter 4 will continue to 
answer the first research question and start to investigate the second research 
question, which is how remuneration shall be regulated properly. This chapter 
will explore solutions that have been produced by various governments in the 
developed countries and analyse their functions in adjusting the executive pay. 
An overview of various legislative solutions that have been applied to attempt 
to reduce the level and adjust the structure of executive remuneration will be 
introduced.  
First, a brief history will analyse how the levels and structure of executive 
remuneration have changed and been influenced since 1935, during which time 
theories of modern corporations were developed. Additionally, problems 
caused by the development of executive remuneration will be put forward and 
discussed. Interventions from the US government, such as the cap regulation 
during President Nixon’s time and the rescue solution promoted by President 
Clinton during 1992 and 1993, both characteristic US ways of providing 
remedies for the public, will be discussed and their relevant policies ascertained 
and their influence will be examined. However, as will be discussed later in this 
chapter, these solutions did not achieve their goals, with their negative effects 
always outweighing the positive results. Thus, in the context of these problems 
from US history, which are also pervasive in other developed countries, the 
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Chapter then examines what governments have done to try to regulate 
executive remuneration.  
Section II will provide solutions collected from various legislation, government 
policies and the writings of scholars on executive remuneration practice. 
Among these solutions, the Australian two-strike rule, the Netherlands’ 
regulation with increasing board independence, and Germany’s code requiring 
employee representatives to vote on the board’s decisions and especially on 
executive remuneration, will be examined, leading to a further discussion of 
remuneration legislation in the next chapter.  
 
I. A History of US Executive Remuneration  
This section will have a general review of the policies and regulations that have 
been applied in the US. Since the development of the US financial economy 
(which influences executive remuneration most directly) is representative of 
other developed countries,1 a specific examination of the history of how the US 
has addressed executive remuneration will be valuable to investigate how 
policies and regulations have influenced the executive remuneration. This 
analysis will be divided into four periods as follows: 
A. Before 1970  
Before the twentieth century, there was no discussion of executive 
remuneration because most enterprises were, comparatively, small and run by 
managers who also held shares in the firms.2 If managers were hired from 
outside the firm, they would be offered ownership interests on their recruitment 
or after the death of the firm’s owners.3 According to a study by Murphy, in the 
US between 1895 and 1904 nearly two thousand small manufacturing 
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2 J. A. Landry, “Corporate Incentives for Managers in American Industry” (1995) 24 Business 
and Economic History 13, p.215 
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companies combined to form 157 large corporations, and managers in the 
majority of these new companies shifted from being owners to being 
professional executive directors because those running companies needed to 
possess management skills.4 
Bonuses became common in the 1920s. Baker’s survey of 100 large industrial 
companies found that by 1928 64% of them paid their executives some form of 
bonus, with most of these bonuses in cash in amounts linked to the firm’s 
annual profits. According to Baker’s data, in 1929 bonuses constituted 42% of 
executives’ compensation packages from these 100 firms.5 
A.1 Lack of disclosure 
However, there is little available evidence on how executive compensation was 
set before the mid-1930s because information like this was not open to the 
public at that time.6 Remuneration reporting was not mandated and companies 
tended to treat executive remuneration as proprietary information, which was 
unavailable even to their shareholders. 7  Legal checks on executive 
remuneration in large companies were also rare, and though executive 
managers were not allowed to set their own compensation they were free to fix 
the non-executive directors’ pay, which sometimes led to a situation where 
executives could still decide on their own pay, albeit indirectly.8 In the 1930s, 
cases like that of Bethlehem Steel thrust executive pay into the spotlight and 
led to a wave of reforms transforming executive compensation. Bethlehem 
president Eugene G. Grace received over $1.6 million as compensation in 1929, 
and the firm paid other senior executives millions of dollars in bonuses during 
the late 1920s, even it did not pay its shareholders any dividend during the 
same time.9 This could occur because managers could set their own pay 
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scales and shareholders knew nothing about executive pay. Reports of Grace’s 
massively inflated income became front-page news and the shareholders of 
Bethlehem were astonished and infuriated.10 Later, in 1930, a lawsuit against 
American Tobacco revealed that the company’s president G. W. Hill was 
scheduled to receive nearly $2 million in compensation that year, mostly from 
bonuses and stocks, which the company’s shareholders knew nothing about.11 
In Rogers v Hill,12 the US Supreme Court held that this compensation bore no 
relation to the value of the services for which it was being given. Although at 
that time the court did not analyse why the level of executive compensation 
could be that high, cases like these drew the attention of the public, enough to 
push the government to implement reforms to calm the situation.   
Interestingly, in the US the initial push for executive remuneration disclosure 
was from “New Deal” politicians who were outraged at the excessive levels of 
compensation, but not from shareholders whose interests had been seriously 
jeopardized by the Wall Street Crash and the Depression.13 In 1933 Franklin 
Roosevelt became President, ushering in the New Deal to assist the country’s 
recovery from the Great Depression. 14  By mid-1933 the Federal Reserve 
began investigating executive pay in its member banks, the government’s 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation conducted a similar investigation for non-
member banks, and the Power Commission investigated pay practice at public 
utilities.15 In October 1933 the Federal Commission requested a disclosure of 
executives’ basic salaries and the bonuses paid by all companies with capital 
and assets over one million dollars.16 In December 1934 the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a permanent ruling demanding that 
corporations disclose the names of their top three directors and all the 
compensation (salary, bonuses, stock options and other incentive plans) 
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received by them.17 The SEC also warned that companies not complying with 
this regulation by June 1935 would be removed from stock exchanges.18 
A.2. During the Second World War  
The Stabilization Act of 1942, implemented during World War II, froze the 
salaries and wages of both executive managers and common employees at the 
level they were at on 15 September 1942. (In the US the Stabilization Act 
expired in 1946 but was replaced by Salary Stabilization Boards during the 
Korean War, which was established in May 1951 as part of the Defense 
Production Act of 1951. Like the following limitation on executive compensation 
that was imposed later by the Nixon administration, the Korean War Salary 
Board set a 6% limit on compensation increases for all firm’s executives, and 
these limits were lifted after the Salary Board was quietly disbanded in July 
1952.)19 
A.3. The golden age of capitalism  
During the 1950s and 1960s, the executive remuneration problems were not 
very arrestive as the US executive directors did their jobs rather well and the 
economy was improving rapidly during this period.20 On the income equity 
perspective, between 1959 and 1968 the compensation of a chief executive 
whose company with sales of $400 million or more rose 14%, compared to the 
normal manufacturing employees’ compensation rising 39%.21  
Generally, before 1970 it was a period when people started thinking about how 
executive compensation should be structured, but with little concern about the 
level of remuneration since it was not obviously excessive at that time. 
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Executive compensation began increasing at a faster rate in the mid-1970s, 
starting around 1973.22 Before this rapid rise, however, there was a freeze on 
remuneration for American executives. 
B.1 Failure of Nixon’s wage-and-price control 
In August 1971 President Nixon imposed a 90-day freeze on commodity prices 
and wages, including executive compensation.23 This was triggered by the 
economic retreat at that time: at the end of 1969 inflation had topped 6%, the 
highest level since the Korean War, while in 1970 the US suffered 
unemployment of 6%, the highest figure since 1960, and dollars were 
threatened by Deutsche marks, yen and francs as Japan and European 
countries recovered from the Second World War.24 
In December 1971, in Phase Two of the Nixon wage-and-price controls, the 
Pay Board established by the American Congress imposed an annual limit of 
5.5% for increases in executive pay levels.25 In particular, non-qualified stock 
options (which had not been exercised) were allowed only if the plan had been 
approved by the shareholders, if the aggregate number of options granted did 
not rise from the prior year, and if the price when exercised was at least 100% 
of the grant-date market price.26 Non-qualified options were treated as wages 
and salaries and were valued at 25% of the fair-market value of the shares 
underlying the option.27  
However, since the government only limited the pay rises applied to executives 
                                            
22 C. Frydman & R. E. Saks, “Executive Compensation: A New View from A Long-term 
Perspective, 1936–2005” (2010) 23 Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies 
2099, p.2106 
23 Bloomberg, Roger Lowenstein, “The Nixon Shock”, August 2011, available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/the-nixon-shock-08042011.html last accessed 13 
July 2016 
24 Ibid 
25 Wall Street Journal, Hunt, “Board Agrees on Tightening of Standards on Executive Pay, 
Increases Topping 5.5%” 17 December 1971 
26 Supra, n. 4, Murphy, p.55 
27 Wall Street Journal, Calame, “Executives’ Pay Faces Going-over by Wage Board” October 
1972 
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as a whole, but not to individual managers, companies routinely raised their 
CEO’s remuneration by deducting from the pay of lower-level executives.28 In 
August 1973, to stop CEO pay rising above the 5.5% limit, the Nixon 
administration imposed the 5.5% limit on a more narrowly defined group of 
executive directors identified in corporation proxy statements.29 These wage-
and-price controls expired in May 1974, in spite of the administration’s efforts 
to retain limits on executive compensation. After the expiration of the controls, 
CEO compensation rose significantly. 30  According to Murphy’s data, the 
median continuing CEO in the Forbes 800 got an 11.1% increase in nominal 
cash compensation in 1974, doubling the average limit under the Nixon 
controls. 31  Murphy found that from 1972 to 1979 the median cash 
compensation for CEOs in the Forbes 800 increased by 12.2% each year, 
doubling from $162,000 to $324,000 and significantly exceeding the average 
annual inflation rate of 8.5%.32 Evidence illustrates that in trying to reduce the 
level of executive remuneration, this wage-and-price control rule may have had 
the opposite effect.  
On the other hand, executive remuneration policy in the 1970s provided few 
incentives for managers to pursue value-increasing reductions in excess 
capacity and the disgorgement of excess cash. Equity-based compensation, 
most of which was in the form of stock options, composed only a small fraction 
of CEO pay and the options were often “under water”33 or expired, and were 
worthless. 34  Annual bonuses, as the dominant form of compensation 
incentives, were focused on beating annual budget targets (mentioned in 
Chapter 3) rather than creating long-term profits. 35  Performance-based 
terminations were almost non-existent and since the vast majority of CEO posts 
were filled by incumbents rather than someone hired from outside, the 
                                            
28 Supra, n.25, Wall Street Journal 
29 Wall Street Journal, “Business Groups Oppose Nixon Control Plan, Intensify Their Efforts 
to Abolish Restraints,” 1974 
30 Ibid 
31 Supra, n. 4, Murphy, p.56 
32 Ibid. 
33 Under Water meaning the trading price of executive managers’ exercisable stocks is lower 
than the price that executives are going to pay for these stocks. 
34 Supra, n. 4, Murphy, p.60 
35 Supra, n. 27, Wall Street Journal 
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managerial labour market was similarly ineffective in disciplining poor 
performance.36 Therefore, concerns derived from remuneration incentives that 
threatened the pay for performance system had already been noticed at that 
time.  
B.2. Golden parachutes 
Early studies like those carried out by Coughlan and Schmidt37 and Warner et 
al.38 concluded that there is an inverse relationship between a firm’s market 
performance and the possibility of management turnover. Unlike nowadays, 
when hostile takeovers are often successful, executive directors in the 1970s 
and 1980s vigorously and often successfully fought takeovers by adopting anti-
takeover provisions and by lobbying for political protection.39 Warner et al. 
investigated 272 firms during the period from 1963 to 1978 and found only a 
single outright dismissal of CEOs, and ten cases in which poor performance 
was used as one of the reasons for dismissal. Weisbach, who examined 286 
management changes in the period between 1974 and 1983, found only nine 
cases in which boards mentioned performance as a reason why the CEO was 
replaced.40 Huson et al. divided their research sample into four periods (1971–
76, 1977–82, 1983–88 and 1989–94), and found that frequencies of forced 
turnover and outside succession increased over time, and that internal 
monitoring by boards of directors had become more effective since the 1990s 
in spite of the decline in takeover activities.41 Therefore, it was this trend in high 
levels of hostile takeovers during the 1970s and 1980s that helped with the 
development of golden parachute payments in executive directors’ pay, with 
                                            
36 Supra, n. 25, Wall Street Journal  
37 A. Coughlam & R. Schmidt, “Executive Compensation, Management Turnover, and Firm 
Performance: An empirical investigation” (1985) 7 Journal of Accounting and Economics 43, 
p.65 
38 J. Warner, R. Watts & K. Wruck, “Stock Prices and Top Management Changes” (1988) 20 
Journal of Financial Economics 461, p.465 
39 B. Holmstrom & S. Kaplan, “Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United 
States: Making sense of the 1980s and 1990s” (2001) 15 Journal of Economics Perspectives 
121, p.123. 
40 M. Weisbach, “Outside Directors and CEO Turnover” (1988) 20 Journal of Financial 
Economics 431, p.445. 
41 M. Huson, R. Parrino & L. Starks, “The Effectiveness of Internal Monitoring Mechanisms: 
Evidence from CEO turnover between 1971 and 1994” (2001) 56 The Journal of Finance 
2265, pp. 2288-9  
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the company goal of preventing unwanted takeover while using deferred cash 
or stock options to guarantee paybacks to managers and retain talent on the 
board. Extremely high parachute fees paid to the executives became common 
during the takeover era of the 1980s, and the US government reacted positively 
to this problem.  
The American Congress attempted to reduce the use of golden parachutes by 
introducing section 280(G) and section 4999 into the tax code as part of the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.42 Section 280(G) states that, if change-in-control 
payments exceed three times the individual’s base amount, then all payments 
in excess of the base amount are nondeductible against tax for the employer. 
Additionally, section 4999 imposes a 20% excise tax on the recipient of a 
parachute payment on the amount of payment above the base amount.43 The 
base amount is typically calculated as the individual average total taxable 
compensation paid by the firm over the prior five years.44 For example, if an 
executive director with a five-year average taxable remuneration of $1 million 
receives a golden parachute payment of $2.9 million, which is less than three 
times this $1 million amount,45 the entire $2.9 million would be deductible by 
the firm, and should be taxable as ordinary income in the hands of the executive 
director.46 However, if the golden parachute was $3.1 million, more than three 
times the $1 million base amount, under section 280(G) the firm would not be 
able to deduct $2.1 million of the $3.1 million parachute as a compensation 
expense, and under section 4999 the executive would owe $420,000 in excise 
taxes (20% of $2.1 million) in addition to ordinary income taxes on the full $3.1 
million parachute.47 This tax rule has been followed until the present, and is a 
good example to be considered when looking at providing regulations on 
decreasing golden parachutes. 
B.3 Shareholder power  
                                            
42 H.R.4170 – 98th Congress (1983-1984), Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, available at: 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/98th-congress/house-bill/4170 last accessed, 13 July 2016 
43 Ibid. 
44 Supra, n. 4, Murphy, p. 67. 
45 Supra, n. 42, Deficit Reduction Act of 1984  
46 Supra, n. 4, Murphy, pp.67-8 
47 Ibid. 
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In 1985 Robert Monks founded Institutional Shareholder Services to provide 
proxy-voting services to institutional shareholders.48 In 1986 the corporate 
raider T. Boone Pickens built up the United Shareholders Association focused 
on improving governance and compensation.49 Shareholders started to realise 
that they should have more power over corporate governance, especially 
regarding boards’ decisions on executive compensation. Voices from academia 
argued that traditional compensation incentives related to company size, 
stability and accounting profitability decreased in importance, while 
shareholders proposed that executive remuneration should be tied more 
closely to company value through increases in stock options and more forms of 
equity incentives.50 These changes had an impact. After the mid-1980s, though 
non-equity-based executive compensation did not stop growing, it became a 
smaller fraction of total pay packages, and for the first time since 1950 stock 
options reemerged as the dominant form of incentive compensation.51  
As Wells has commented, whether these reforms can be said to have been 
successful depends on what their goal was. Overall, the reforms did little to stop 
the level of executive remuneration from increasing rapidly. However, while 
shareholders and firms were setting equity incentives in remuneration, these 
reforms appeared to push companies to use more performance-linked pay 
policies. Studies such as that by Frydman and Saks, which focused on 
executives’ long-term accumulation of equity and options, suggested that 
executive compensation has become increasingly sensitive to firm performance 
since 1980.52 
                                            
48 Fortune, Marc Gunther, “Investors of the World Unite”, June 2002, available at: 
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last accessed, 13 July 2016  
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51 Supra, n.4, Murphy, p.70 
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  C. 1990s–2000s 
C.1. Transparency 
Between October 13th (known as ‘Black Monday’) and October 19th 1987 the 
Dow Jones Average dropped nearly 800 points from 2508 to 1738, losing 30% 
of its value in just a week.53 Executives’ stock options, which had recently 
become a large fraction of their pay, were suddenly worth almost nothing. 
Public companies responded by re-pricing existing options or significantly 
increasing the size of their post-cash option grants.54 Although this crash was 
short-lived, since the capital market recovered quickly, it led to a populist attack 
on executive pay.55 Large manufacturing companies downsized and laid off 
many of their workers for the benefit of their shareholders, while attracting the 
ire of Congress, the labour unions and the media:56 ordinary employees with 
much lower pay were losing jobs while the executive directors kept their high 
compensation with well exercised stock options because firms re-priced these 
options after the crash. After the 1990–1991 recession, executive pay had 
become a topic of international prominence.57  
In response to growing outrage in the US, legislation was introduced in the 
House of Representatives disallowing deductions for compensation exceeding 
25 times the pay of the lowest-paid worker, and the Corporate Pay 
Responsibility Act was imposed in the Senate to give shareholders more rights 
to decide on their firms’ compensation policies.58 The Security and Exchange 
Committee (SEC) preempted the pending Senate bill in February 1992 by 
requiring public companies to include non-binding shareholder votes on 
executive pay in companies’ proxy statements. There were also new rules 
imposed by the SEC in October 1992 related to the disclosure of top executive 
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compensation in the annual proxy statement, requiring: 59  (a) a summary 
compensation table describing the major components of the compensation 
received by the CEO and other highly paid executives over the past three years; 
(b) tables describing option grants, option holdings, and options exercised in 
greater detail; (c) a chart showing the company’s stock price performance 
relative to the performance of the market and their peer group over the prior 
five fiscal years; and (d) a report by the compensation committee describing 
the company’s compensation philosophy.  
C.2 Escalation of stock options 
Core and Guay’s sample of CEOs from the period from 1992 to 1996 showed 
that options contributed approximately one third of the value of the median 
CEO’s equity portfolio, and roughly half of the median CEO’s total equity 
incentives.60 According to the evidence collected by Murphy, between 1992 
and 2001 the median pay for CEOs in S&P 500 firms more than tripled, driven 
by an explosion in the use of stock options. 61  Executive incentive 
compensation in the early 1990s could be divided evenly between options and 
accounting-based bonuses.62 By 1996 options had become the largest single 
component of CEO remuneration in S&P 500 firms, and the use of options was 
even greater in smaller companies, especially high-tech ones.63 In the year 
2000 stock options accounted for more than half of the total compensation for 
executives in S&P 500 firms.64 
Murphy concluded that there are six main factors which may help to explain the 
US escalation of stock options in the 1990s and early 2000s:65 (1) shareholder 
pressure for equity-based pay; (2) the SEC options holding rules; (3) President 
Clinton’s $1 million deductibility cap; (4) accounting rules for equity options; (5) 
SEC option disclosing rules; and (6) NYSE listing requirements. The first four 
                                            
59 Supra, n. 4, Murphy, pp.71-2 
60 J.E. Core & W.R. Guay, “Is CEO Pay Too High and Are Incentives Too Low? A Wealth-
Based Contracting Framework” (2010) 24 The Academy of Management 5, pp.9-10 
61 Supra, n. 4, Murphy, p.72 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Supra, n.22, Frydman & Saks, pp.2120-1 
65 Supra, n.4, Murphy, p.73 
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of these factors will be discussed below, while the latter two will be examined 
in the next main section of the Chapter.  
C.2.1 Pressure from institutional Shareholders on equity-based pay 
Shareholders, especially large state pension fund management firms, have 
since the 1980s, become a new breed of activists who demand increased 
alignment between executive pay and shareholder returns.66 Many of these 
shareholders have united to form large investor associations, and have been 
influenced by a famous article written by Jensen and Murphy which stated that 
“It is not how much you pay, but how that matters”;67 therefore they asked 
investee companies for more disclosure of equity incentive settings in executive 
directors’ pay packages. 68  Famous institutions such as the United 
Shareholders Association strongly suggested that boards provide more stock 
ownership and more extensive use of stock options in paying their executives.69 
However, Murphy was not satisfied with the outcome of boards’ responses to 
shareholder activities, since companies just reported to shareholders several 
generous grants of stock options on top of the already competitive pay 
packages, without any reduction in other forms of compensation and showing 
little reaction to the resulting inflation in pay levels.70 This situation, as he 
concluded, was too literally that they could not reflect the real pay outcomes.  
C.2.2 SEC Share Holding Rules 
According to the SEC rules, from the date of exercising their restricted stock 
options executives are required to hold shares for at least six months. 71 
Executives can defer taxes during this six-month holding period, but they still 
                                            
66 Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, J. 
Bacholder III, “Institutional Shareholders and Their Oversight of Executive Compensation”, 
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71 SEC, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 144, Selling Restricted and Control 
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owe tax on the gain from the exercise date, even if stock prices fall over the 
subsequent six months.72 This rule means that executives cannot claim cash 
by selling shares received from stock options in a short term (six months), thus 
executives who have held their options have to have an eye on a longer period 
of the company’s equity market performance. Before May 1991 the SEC 
defined the exercise of an option as a “stock purchase” reportable by corporate 
insiders within 10 days following the month of transaction, but after May 1st 
1991, in response to demands for more transparency of option grants, the 
exercise was defined as a reportable stock purchase.73 Consequently, the six-
month holding period required by this “short-swing” profit rule now begins when 
options are granted, not when executives acquire shares upon exercise.74 
Therefore, so long as the options are exercised more than six months after they 
are granted, the executives are free to sell shares immediately upon exercise. 
This rule significantly increased the value of the option from the standpoint of 
the recipient. Obviously, this rule did not help to lower the level of executive 
compensation, since a mere six month’s deferral will not definitely discourage 
managers from realising large amounts of cash by manipulating the share price. 
However, from the perspective of solving the problems mentioned in Chapter 3 
that executives would sell their shares immediately when they can exercise the 
options and thus push the share price to a high level, this deferred selling rule 
provides a strategy to stop this improper behaviour. The extending of the period 
after a stock option’s exercise point will be discussed in Chapter 6.   
C.2.3 Clinton’s Capping Rule 
President Bill Clinton gave a promise during the 1992 presidential campaign to 
define remuneration paid to executives above $1 million per year as 
unreasonable, and non-deductible by the employer company in its tax return.75 
However, the rule was soft. It was included as part of the 1993 Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act, section 162(m) of the Act’s tax code regulated that 
                                            
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Supra, n.4, Murphy, p.74 
75 Bill Clinton for President 1992 Campaign Brochures, available at: 
http://www.4president.org/brochures/billclinton1992brochure.htm last accessed 13 July 2016 
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compensations of public companies’ top five executives which can be defined 
as performance-based should be deductible. 76  Performance-based 
compensation, according to section 162(m), included “pay based on the 
attainment of one or more performance goals”, with the goals determined by a 
compensation committee consisting of two or more independent directors and 
pay contract terms disclosed to shareholders and approved by them before the 
pay is released.77 Murphy suggested that stock options with an exercise price 
no lower than the market price on the grant date are always considered to be 
efficient performance-based compensation.78 On the other hand, base salaries, 
restricted stock options vesting only with time and options issued with an 
exercise price below the grant date market price cannot qualify as performance-
based compensation. 79  Moreover, regarding bonuses, a bonus which has 
been approved by the shareholders based on a formula-driven objective 
performance measure can be defined as performance based, while a 
discretionary bonus based on an ex post subjective assessment is not 
considered to be performance based.80 The $1 million cap rule is supposed to 
use the tax system to target highly-paid executives and shareholders who pay 
their CEOs unreasonable salaries, and thereby to decrease the level of CEO 
pay. 
Ironically, the result of section 162(m) was a significant increase in CEO 
payments in the US since 1992. The reasons for this are obvious:81 first, 
companies tended to pay executives with a larger fraction of stock options in 
their pay packages, since stock options were generally seen as performance-
based pay; second, evidence shows that while several companies lowered their 
executive salaries which were over $1 million per year before section 162(m) 
was enacted, curiously, many other firms raised their executive salaries which 
were below $1 million before, bringing them to exactly $1 million for the purpose 
                                            
76 H.R.2264 – Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, available at: 
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79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
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of maximising the amount of stock incentives in the managers’ pay; third, 
companies changed their bonus plans from sensible discretionary bonuses to 
performance-based awards, which provided another opportunity to increase the 
bonus level and not requiring it to stay within the $1m salary cap.  
Clearly this $1 million cap in pay did not achieve the aim that it was intended to, 
just was was the case with Nixon’s capping rule. This suggest that setting direct 
requirements regarding the level of executive remuneration is not an effective 
way for regulating pay, since companies will always find a way to bend the rules. 
C.2.4. Accounting Rule 
There was a lack of accounting in relation to the valuation of stock options, 
which meant that boards and compensation committees could not report how 
much stock they should distribute to the executive pay packages.82 The US 
Financial Authority Standard Board (FASB) allowed companies to report under 
the rule, imposing an additional requirement that the value of option grants 
should be disclosed in a footnote to the financial statements. Under the soft 
accounting rules, it was not until accounting scandals broke in the early 2000s 
that a large number of companies voluntarily accounted for their options 
granted.83 In December 1998 the FASB added a new rule concerning repriced 
options.84 A treatment called “variable accounting” required firms to take an 
accounting charge every year for repriced options, based on the actual 
appreciation in the value of the option.85 Companies with underwater options 
rushed to reprice these options in the twelve-day window between December 
4th and December 15th 1998.86 Evidence collected by Carter and Lynch shows 
that there was a dramatic increase in options repricing activities during this 
short period, which meant that the general prices of stock options granted to 
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executives declined significantly during these twelve days. 87 
Though situations may vary between industries, overall, stock options and other 
performance-linked rewards became an increasingly significant element in 
executive remuneration through the1990s and into the twenty-first century. 
Despite their popularity, it is still not clear whether this use of equity incentive 
arrangements aligns executive pay more closely with firm performance. 
Moreover, as suggested by Wells, while changes in the tax code and the new 
SEC regulations may have had marginal effects on executive compensation, 
other policies attempting to lower the level of compensation largely failed.88 
Shareholder litigation proved to be of little influence on broader compensation 
trends, since courts still declined to become entangled in compensation 
disputes as long as there was no “blatant” self-dealing by executives.89 The 
Disney case mentioned in Chapter 2 is a good example. The Chairman of 
Disney, Michael Ovitz, still received a very high goodbye payment 
notwithstanding the fact that he had served less than one year as chairman and 
his time was regarded as a failure. Shareholders who want to be empowered 
through legal mechanisms want to implement legislation because of their fear 
of situations like this occurring.  
Despite improvements in the structure of executive remuneration led by 
government reforms, the level of remuneration has not stopped increasing, and 
neither has public criticism. The SEC six-month rule is far from enough to 
encourage executives to exert efforts for their companies’ long-term success, 
because six months is too short a period for the realisation time of the stock 
options. Long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) and restricted options should be 
more widely used; an efficient way of using them will be discussed in Chapter 
6.  
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  D. Scandals and solutions since 2000 
Scandals involving executive remuneration mainly concern accounting issues, 
erupting across the world in the 2000s and destroying the reputations of firms 
such as WorldCom, Lucent, Arthur Anderson, Enron and Global Crossing.90 In 
the US, the Congress quickly passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July 2002 to 
set and expand standards for accounting firms, auditors and boards of directors 
of public companies. However, the Act was primarily focused on accounting 
irregularities, not on the compensation of executives. Executive pay did not stop 
rising in the period following 2003, and continued on an upward slope until the 
financial crisis of 2008–09. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed in the wake of the 
Enron debacle, did make significant changes in respect of corporate 
governance, but it only tweaked executive compensation in terms of its 
accounting, especially in relation to the claw-back rules.91  
Finally in 2011 the Dodd-Frank Act provided shareholders with an advisory 
vote.92 Section 951 is the relevant provision, and it requires that shareholders 
will be asked to approve the company’s executive compensation plans in a non-
binding vote which occurs at least once every three years.93 Shareholders 
have the right to choose to withhold their approval in relation to the executive 
compensation and golden parachute arrangements in connection with mergers, 
tender offers or private internal transactions. Statistics show that the 
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shareholders of 98.5% of the 2532 companies reporting 2011 results by July 
2011 approved their firm’s pay plans, while over 70% of these companies 
received more than 90% favourable support.94 In 2012, shareholders of 98.2% 
of the 1875 companies reporting their results by June approved the pay policies, 
with 72% of these companies having more than 90% favourable votes. 95 
Except for companies with truly appropriate and sensible pay plan structures, 
shareholder approval did not demonstrate that the high level of pay had been 
affected by this new law. The reason why shareholder say on pay at that time 
did not stop the level of executive compensation from increasing was probably 
partly because these votes were highly correlated to company share returns, 
and partly because shareholders were not using their voting power seriously.96 
Record had shown that in 2010 the high level of shareholder support for 
executive compensation appeared commonly at financial firms that had poor 
performance during the financial crisis.97  
As far as the issue of claw-back is concerned, section 954 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act provides that companies must implement and report policies for recouping 
payments to executive directors based on financial statements that are 
subsequently restated.98 The SEC had neither adopted nor proposed rules 
regarding the recovery of executive remuneration by August 2012. However, 
Equilar (which is an organisation providing corporate governance data) reports 
that 86% of the Fortune 100 companies issuing proxy statements in 2012 had 
publicly disclosed claw-back arrangements; in half of the companies the claw-
back triggers were related to financial restatement and ethical misconduct.99 
There are also rules covering restrictions in the details related to compensation 
committee independence, information disclosure and proxy access, which are 
intended to solve the problems discussed in Chapter 2, such as remuneration 
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policy making and the lack of disclosure to shareholders in resolution voting.100  
Section 952 requires public firms to have compensation committees comprised 
purely of external independent directors, and to assess the independence of 
compensation consultants, accountants, attorneys and other advisors to the 
compensation committee, while sections 953, 955 and 972 require companies 
to report the ratio of CEO compensation to the median pay for all other company 
employees. Companies must analyse and report the relation between realised 
compensation and the firms’ financial performance, such as stock prices.101 
Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act also requires companies to disclose their 
policies and practices surrounding why the firm chooses either to separate the 
positions of chairman and CEO, or combine them. Section 971 gives 
shareholders the power to nominate their own candidate for director in the 
annual proxy statements.102 The SEC delayed the implementation of this rule 
believing that it would distract management and advance special-interest 
agendas, which was concluded by the Business Roundtable and the US 
Chamber of Commerce on the basis of evidence from lawsuits. This 
requirement did not make it into the Dodd-Frank Act.  
These new requirements show the methods that corporate governance can 
provide to regulate the design and implementation of executive pay. However, 
though aimed at lowering the level of executive remuneration, their effects 
seem to be not as obvious as might have been expected. From 2000 to 2009 
the average CEO remuneration of S&P 500 firms fell by 36% from its highest 
point of $15 million to $9.6 million, while from 2009 to 2010 their average 
compensation rose by nearly 19% from $9.6 million to $11.4 million.103 Kolb 
worries that this may have been because of the shift of restricted stock in the 
compensation structure. Thus, however detailed regulations may be, they 
cannot readily control financial incentives.104  
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In summary, the level of compensation has not always been as highly 
correlated with the average market value of firms as it has been in recent years, 
which is a sign of a shift in the market for executives towards a model of 
competitive matching for their managerial talent. On the other hand, the 
incentives that were introduced for executives in the 1930s, 1950s and 1960s 
were not significantly weaker than they were in the 1980s, which indicates that 
other aspects of the market for executives in the past may resemble the 
situation in recent years.  
Fryman and Saks employ four economic factors to explain the escalation of 
executive remuneration, namely: managerial rent extraction, the increasing 
scale of firms, the provision of incentives in pay, and the increasing return to 
general rather than specific skills.105 Therefore, if the government can provide 
policies to stop these actions from happening, which is highly unlikely and 
perhaps impossible, the level of executive remuneration may certainly be 
lowered.  
From US history, it can be seen that policies that intended to lower the level of 
executive remuneration directly usually failed to achieve their goals – for 
example, the Nixon cap and Clinton’s $1 million rule. Politicians and common 
people are concerned about high levels of pay because the level is the easiest 
factor to observe. Providing policies to influence executive compensation level 
seems more to be a campaign promise or a strategy to calm outraged middle 
level income earners, rather than a serious attempt to solve the excessive level 
problem. On the other hand, financial economists and scholars are always 
excited about changing accounting rules (which can influence the structure and 
design of executive remuneration), since they acknowledge that under market 
forces, improving and monitoring the structure of executive remuneration is the 
right way to proceed (lowering the high level of remuneration to a reasonable 
level). Perhaps, in solving executive remuneration problems it is more important 
to adjust the structure of executive remuneration to the level of the market, 
rather than waiting for the market to fix them or trying to change the market 
                                            




II. Other Legislatitive Innovations Addressing Executive 
Remuneration 
After the financial crisis of 2007-08 certain large institutions started producing 
guidance on the practice of executive remuneration. Among those from the 
most developed economic systems are the Financial Stability Board, the G20, 
the Obama administration, the European Commission and the UK Financial 
Services Authority (abolished and divided into the Financial Conduct Authority 
and the Prudential Regulation Authority now).106 Generally, the international 
reform agenda is concentrating on the alignment of executive pay and the 
interests of shareholders, still having faith in the financial incentive system. 
Taking the US as an example, three main ways have been provided by 
Congress to address pay. In July 2010 the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
the Consumer Protection Act was enacted, and several of their provisions were 
aimed at protecting public firms and regulating executive compensation. As well 
as shareholders’ advisory votes on executive compensation plans on a three-
year basis, there are also other mechanisms provided by these new regulations 
in relation to executive compensation and its incentives. First, to lower the level 
of executive pay, consumer law requires that the board should disclose the 
executive compensation and its relationship to the other employees’ 
compensation.107 Second, the Dodd-Frank Act states that all members of the 
remuneration committee should be independent directors, a measure which is 
aimed at decreasing the influence of managerial power in the process of 
compensation design and implementation.108 Third, the Act also provided the 
                                            
106 G. Ferrarini, N. Moloney & M. C. Ungureanu, “Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A critical 
assessment of reforms in Europe” (2010) 10 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 73, p.75 
107 United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, “Brief Summary 




last accessed,13 July 2016 
108 Ibid. 
 135 
SEC with rules directing the claw-back of executive remuneration.109 These 
provisions, while clearly related to the idea that executive compensation should 
be limited as a response to public investors’ outrage, are justified as being 
modest and suitable for corporate governance to improve the pay for 
performance relationship in executive compensation.110 The claw-back rule, 
requirements for the independence of boards and improving disclosure 
standards are ranked as the most adoptable trend from a worldwide 
perspective on improving pay and performance alignment.111  
A. UK regulation of executive remuneration 
Prior to the advisory voting rights given to shareholders in the UK, there were 
several rules that aimed to achieve the pay for performance goal. The Cadbury 
Report in 1992 proposed splitting the roles of chairman and CEO.112 Before 
1997, UK literature relating to equity incentive compensation is difficult to find. 
This changed after the Greenbury Report was delivered.113 Published in 1995, 
the Greenbury Report made two main recommendations,114 of which the first 
was to create a remuneration committee on the board with more independent 
directors on it to set remuneration plans for executives. The second was to 
require the disclosure of executive compensation information and firms’ pay 
policies in more specific detail. After these two suggestions were taken up by 
the London Stock Exchange’s Listing Rules, the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance, produced following the report of the Hampel Committee, 
absorbed them without substantial changes in 1999.115   
However, the Combined Code’s “comply or explain” principle did not help these 
rules to have substantive effects. Situations like escalating executive pay, pre-
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planned golden parachutes for dismissed CEOs and data from FTSE 350 
companies which showed that less than 5% of these firms had provided 
remuneration plan questions for shareholder’s vote,116 led to a proposal in 
2002 on the UK Companies Act to regulate a more detailed disclosure of 
remuneration policy and a shareholder advisory vote on it The UK was the first 
country to adopt a non-binding vote for shareholders to decide on executive 
remuneration through the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations.  
Walid Alissa describes this amendment clearly in the following way:  
“Companies publish a directors’ compensation report as a part 
of their annual reporting cycle; disclose within the report details 
of individual directors’ compensation packages, the company’s 
forward-looking statement on the compensation policy, and the 
role of the board and compensation committee in this area; and 
the compensation report to a non-binding (or advisory) 
shareholder vote at the Annual General Meeting of the quoted 
company.”117 
In 2003, the first year after the introduction of the advisory vote, shareholders 
at GlaxoSmithKline became the first to veto their firm’s remuneration report by 
a slim margin of 50.72%.118 Their shareholders also voted down the inclusion 
of an estimated $35 million golden parachute in the package of a new CEO. 
However, between 2003 and 2009 only nine FTSE 350 companies had their 
executive remuneration plans voted down.119 Most of the shareholders were in 
favour of the pay reports presented by their companies, and between 2002 and 
2007 only 64 of 596 reporting companies received more than 20% dissenting 
                                            
116 Department of Trade and Industry & Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC), “Monitoring of 
Corporate Aspects of Directors’ Remuneration”1999 
117 W. Alissa, “Board’s Response to Shareholders’ Dissatisfaction: The case of shareholder’s 
say on pay in the UK” (2015) 24 European Accounting Review 727, p.730 
118 S. Deane, “What International Markets Say on Pay: An investor perspective” (2005) 
Institutional Investors’ Services, April, p.7 
119 J. R. Delman, “Structuring Say on Pay: A Comparative Look at Global Variations in 
Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation” (2010) Columbia Business Law Review 
Issue No. 2, 583, p.614. 
 137 
votes.120   
Empirical evidence shows that, overall, this say on pay regulation was 
accompanied by positive equity price reactions in companies with controversial 
pay practices, which weaken penalties for poor performance and are consistent 
with the views of investors who perceive say on pay as a valuable governance 
mechanism.121 After comparing the major elements of CEO pay from 2000 to 
2002 with the same elements after 2002 (between 2002 and 2005), Ferri and 
Maber found no evidence of changes in the level or growth rate of CEO pay.122 
However, given that calls for less reward for failure were one of the prompting 
factors behind the advisory vote, they did find an increase in the sensitivity of 
CEO pay to poor performance, especially in companies with controversial CEO 
pay policies.123 
Studies on shareholders’ reactions suggest that shareholders dissent when pay 
and performance are mismatched. 124  Moreover, a statistically significant 
correlation between excessive remuneration and shareholder veto has been 
proved. Similarly, Carter and Zamora suggest that shareholder disapproval will 
be much higher when: (1) CEO compensation increases; (2) pay for 
performance sensitivity is lower; and (3) there is greater potential dilution from 
equity incentive compensation. 125  Additionally, Sheehan concludes that 
institutional shareholders often use their negative votes as threats to enforce 
firms’ compliance.126 
Company responses to this advisory vote are complicated. Evidence found by 
Ferri and Maber shows that firms responded to shareholder dissent by 
removing controversial provisions in pay packages such as those criticised as 
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rewards for failures.127 Moreover, Alissa’s research indicates that boards will 
reduce excessive compensation to address shareholder’s dissatisfaction, and 
if shareholder pressure is high enough boards will dismiss the CEO. 128 
However, a study by Conyon et al. shows little evidence that boards are 
responsive to shareholder dissent: they find no evidence proving that CEO 
compensation will be decreased after shareholders apply any voting 
pressure. 129  Ferri and Maber explain this situation by offering an insight 
according to which many boards will remove controversial provisions before the 
meeting and the vote to avoid a shareholder veto, which is consistent with some 
institutional shareholders’ preference for bargaining in the shadows.130 
Besides these, two additional visible effects of the non-binding vote on 
executive remuneration governance are summarised by Gorden as follows:131 
first, communication has increased between companies and large shareholders, 
especially with the leading institutional investor and with the proxy service 
companies such as Research, Recommendation and Electronic Voting (RREV). 
This communication between firms and shareholders had been changed from 
a perfunctory status to a more serious one. The second effect is the wider 
influence of the leading association of institutional investors: The Association 
of British Insurers (ABI) and the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) 
have both extended their governance influence on remuneration by using a set 
of guidelines.132 These guidelines provide the standard of best practice for 
executive pay, and are often used by shareholders to vote on pay policies.  
B. Australian regulation of executive remuneration 
Reforms related to executive remuneration in Australia provide an interesting 
model for solving pay problems. Like other developed countries, from 1993 to 
2008 executive compensation in Australia increased dramatically, showing the 
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largest growth between the mid-90s and the 2000s. 133  This growth 
demonstrated the contribution of equity incentives. In 2008–09 the 
compensation of CEOs of the top twenty companies averaged approximately 
$7.2 million in total.134 Although this remuneration was lower than a cross-
section of US and UK peer groups, it was 50% higher than the next twenty 
largest firms and equaled 110 times average pay. 135  The Australian 
government inserted section 250R(2) into the Corporations Act 2001, providing 
shareholders with a non-binding vote on the executive pay plans of all public 
companies as a response to general unease among shareholders and the 
public towards excessive executive compensation.136 After the financial crisis 
Australia’s Productivity Commission made several practical amendments after 
reviewing the history and regulatory framework of executive remuneration 
regulations. On June 20, 2011 the Corporations Amendment (Improving 
Accountability on Director and Executive Remuneration) Act was passed by the 
Senate, including substantial changes to prior provisions (especially in sections 
249 and 250).137 
These substantial changes brought new provisions for the process of executive 
remuneration policy-making, widely known as the “Two Strike Rule”. The Two 
Strike Rule provides shareholders an opportunity to “spill the board” if the 
company remuneration report receives negative reception at two consecutive 
AGMs. 138  The first strike occurs when a company decision about 
compensation policy is vetoed by 25% or more of the shareholders.139 If this 
happens, the company’s subsequent remuneration report must explain the 
board’s response and propose action or inaction.140  
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At the next year’s AGM, if there is a second veto on remuneration policy by 25% 
or more of the shareholders, the shareholders will be required to vote on a “spill 
resolution” at the same AGM.141 This spill resolution means that some directors 
on board will be subject to a vote and might be re-elected or removed. If the 
spill resolution receives 50% or more of the eligible shareholder votes cast, a 
separate spill meeting must be held within ninety days.142 The second strike 
and the spill resolution are intentionally separated to ensure that shareholders 
will not be discouraged from voting against the remuneration plan for fear of 
director removal, since they are given an opportunity to decide at another 
meeting whether to remove or not.143 Moreover, it provides a free expression 
and clear signal of shareholders’ opinions of the company’s remuneration plan. 
Notice plays an important role in this new regime.144  
To ensure the effectiveness of the spill resolution after the first strike, in a firm’s 
meeting papers for their next AGM the firm must provide notice to the directors 
of a potential spill resolution at that AGM, in case a second strike triggers such 
a resolution. 145  Additionally, following the passage of a spill resolution, a 
company must still provide the minimum notice period required by both of the 
sections in the Corporations Act and any self-imposed notice set out in the 
company constitution, to ensure that shareholders are able to nominate and 
endorse board candidates for the special re-election meeting, which is the spill 
meeting.146 At this meeting, all of the directors (except the managing director), 
who have failed to reply to shareholders with a new pay policy for resolution, 
must stand for re-election.147 Furthermore, these directors will cease to hold 
positions on the board at that time unless they are re-appointed by the 
shareholders. 148  Section 250X effectively prevents a complete board spill, 
requiring that at least the managing director and two directors who receive the 
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highest re-appointment votes at the spill meeting remain on the board.149  
If the spill meeting does not convene by the end of the ninety-day period, each 
director in office at the end of this period will be strictly liable.150 Section 249 of 
the Corporations Act empowers any director of a listed company to call a 
meeting of the company’s members, to ensure that every director has the 
practical ability to avoid spill offences. 151  Section 250U has a resetting 
mechanism within which the law only allows consideration of a spill meeting at 
every second AGM.152  
The Two Strike Rule was applied to public companies’ executive remuneration 
reports on July 1, 2011, allowing a spill resolution to be triggered only where 
both strikes occur after that day.153 One year after the enactment of the Two 
Strike Rule, twenty-eight companies from the ASX 200 and 106 ASX 
companies overall had received a first strike, making them susceptible to a 
dangerous second strike in the same proxy season. 154  These figures 
generated a wide range of responses from commentators, with investor groups 
“warmly welcoming” the new rule, although the Australian Institute of Company 
Directors described it as a “heavy-handed black letter law approach that would 
produce unnecessary red tape”. 155  Australian firms and their executive 
directors have forgone a few of their bonuses, raises and incentive 
compensations, perhaps due in some part to weak shareholder returns and fear 
of the Two Strike Rule. In some firms CEOs and boards have enforced cuts 
and freezes to fixed salaries for top executives, and other companies have 
already promised to restrain pay policies even despite their rising income.156  
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This Australian say on pay has provided a good example of increasing the 
communication between shareholders and the board. The increasing 
engagement of shareholders provided them with more opportunities to express 
their opinions, and this legislation also has forced the board to show more 
willingness to listen to investors’ concerns.  
However, in the three years following the introduction of the Two Strike rule , 
only 5% of the ASX 500 companies received a first strike, and many of these 
companies revised their remuneration policies after shareholder disapproval.157 
Sydney-based law firm Mallesons Stephen Jaques doubted the effectiveness 
of the Two Strike Rule in an annual publication drawn from their 2011 client 
director survey:  
“the reform appears to have drawn the attention of boards away from 
matters of greater strategic value to organizations and have largely 
been used as a punitive mechanism by disgruntled shareholders 
frustrated by challenging market conditions, rather than as a means 
of communicating shareholders’ assessment of executive 
remuneration.”158  
Empowering shareholders may damage the effectiveness of remuneration 
policy processing. A 2012 Melbourne Institute and Global Proxy Solicitation 
study indicated that 53.2% of shareholders were “more likely to vote against” a 
remuneration report in that year if their company had received a first strike at 
the previous AGM.159 Furthermore, 68.4% of shareholders were more likely to 
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veto the board’s re-election following the second strike.160  
Therefore, by enhancing the transparency of executive pay and increasing 
board accountability to its shareholders, the Australian Two Strike Rule it might 
be argued that it has created a good model for shareholder say on pay; any 
lack of efficiency in revising pay policies and improving the structure of pay 
cannot be ignored.  
C. Other European countries’ policies towards executive 
remuneration 
The European Union (EU)’s first two major initiatives on executive pay were the 
Commission’s 2004 Recommendation on Directors’ Remuneration and the 
2005 Recommendation on the Role of Non-Executive Directors.161 After the 
2008 financial crisis some European countries have created regulatory rules to 
amend previous recommendations. 
A new and more detailed corporate governance code was published by the 
Italian government in March 2006 specifying remuneration committee duties, 
and this code was revised in 2014. 162  In Spain the Unified Corporate 
Governance Code was proposed in 2006 to provide that a remuneration report 
should be submitted to the annual general meeting for a non-binding vote of 
shareholders, and there should be an individualised disclosure of directors’ 
compensation in the report.163  
The German government strengthened the responsibility of the supervisory 
board on management compensation issues in their 2008 amendment to 
Germany’s Corporate Governance Code.164 In 2009 Germany adopted “radical” 
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reforms in their new German Stock Corporation Act on Management Board 
Compensation.165 More will be said about the German approach later. The 
Belgian government amended their corporate governance code in 2009 to 
achieve complete transparency on executive pay policies. 166  In 2013, as 
mentioned before, the British and Swiss governments both gave shareholders 
a binding vote on executive pay policies by adding new provisions into their 
Companies Acts, which will be investigated and analysed more in the next 
chapter. 
C.1 France 
In France, public limited liability companies have the right to choose between a 
one-tier board structure and a two-tier board structure in their articles of 
association, and a great majority of companies adopt the one-tier board form. 
Under the French Commercial Code and French Company Law, it is the 
shareholders’ right to approve the directors’ total annual remuneration for a 
one-tier board and the total annual supervisory board remuneration for a two-
tier board.167 However, shareholders cannot decide on executive directors’ pay 
plans, although they can decide on non-executives’ service payments. For 
many years until 2005 French shareholder power with respect to directors’ pay 
lay in their decision over the total compensation for the board. In 2005 the 
industry-based MEDEF/AFEP Code, which is the French national corporate 
governance code incorporating the “comply or explain” principle, provided that 
shareholders must approve two parts of the executive remuneration: 
termination plans and additional retirement plans.168 The 2005 Breton Law 
regulated that any agreement or changes entered into regarding these two 
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types of payment must be subject to the same shareholder approval process. 
Any director who fails to perform cannot receive any termination fee. In the 
following year the French Corporate Governance Code issued two executive 
compensation recommendations aiming to enhance disclosure and provide 
guidelines to align remuneration with company strategy and long-term 
profits.169  
Finally, in June 2013 the Code introduced a say on pay vote for shareholders, 
although it still allows companies to choose between complying and explaining 
why they do not provide this vote for shareholders. For companies who 
introduce the say on pay, shareholders have an advisory vote to determine 
every executive director’s pay package, with information such as stock options, 
performance shares, golden parachutes, retirement benefits and other bonuses 
disclosed.170 If shareholders vote against one pay package, the board must 
discuss this plan with the remuneration committee at one of its next meetings 
while studying the implications of the shareholder vote, and publish the actions 
they intend to take to improve their pay policies.171 This say on pay power is 
weak, and needless to say there are many public companies choosing not to 
comply with this rule.  
These reforms, while having the same goals as those in the US (namely to 
increase transparency, align performance to pay and empower shareholders 
over pay policies), are intended to deepen capital market liquidity and support 
industry competitiveness. 172  Ferrarini et al. suggest that the latter were 
influenced by the EU’s 2004 and 2005 recommendations.173 
C.2 The Netherlands 
Regulations around executive remuneration in the Netherlands are unique. 
Since 2004 the Dutch Civil Code has empowered shareholders to decide on 
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new executive pay plans and big changes in existing plans.174 This unique 
regulation is that shareholders may have a binding vote to decide these issues. 
From January 1st 2013 Dutch public companies can choose between one-tier 
and two-tier boards; before that date they were forced to organise with two-tier 
boards.175 Under the two-tier board system the Dutch Corporate Governance 
Code requires the supervisory board to draft pay policies and send them to the 
employees’ council and the general meeting of shareholders. The employees 
are able to make comments to the general meeting of shareholders. New 
executive remuneration policies must have shareholder approval to be 
implemented. Additionally, if there is any amendment to policies in later years, 
shareholders have the power to veto the amendments.176  
However, these regulations are not as clear as had been expected. First, the 
law, in the Dutch Civil Code, does not indicate clearly which board should draft 
new pay policies. The Corporate Governance Code states that the supervisory 
board should create the policies, but, perhaps, unfortunately, under the “comply 
or explain” principle, companies can allow the management board to make pay 
plans for executives themselves. Second, the law contains no definition of what 
should constitute an amendment, which means it is not clear enough to 
ascertain how new changes of executive remuneration should be handed to the 
shareholders for their approval, or in what way the management board can just 
get new payments.177 Third, shareholders have the power to decide on the pay 
policy of every director, including the supervisory board members, at the 
general meeting, unless the articles of association change this power. Usually 
Dutch companies’ articles of association will delegate the power to the 
supervisory board, making it rare for the shareholders to have a binding say on 
pay.178 However, shareholders in the Netherlands tend to argue the binding 
                                            
174 Dutch Corporate Governance Code, Article 135 and Article 145 of Book Two, available at: 
http://commissiecorporategovernance.nl/dutch-corporate-governance-code last accessed,13 
July 2016 
175 Mondaq, “Netherlands: New Dutch Company Rules Effective 1 July 2013” July 2013, 
available at: 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/248594/Corporate+Governance/New+Dutch+Company+Law+Rule
s+Effective+1+July+2013  last accessed,13 July 2016 
176 L. Van Vliet, “The Netherlands-New Developments in Dutch Company Law: The Flexible 
Close Corporation” (2014) 7 Journal of Civil Law Studies, Article 8, 271, p.279  
177 Supra, n. 94, Thomas & Van Der Elst, p.702 
178 Ibid 
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vote back, especially on the remuneration policy of the managing board 
member.179 
C.3 Germany  
The German corporate governance framework provides for a two-tier system, 
with a management board and a supervisory board. It provides an example of 
having employees on the supervisory board. Different from the UK’s 
shareholder primacy regulations and one-tier board structures among its listed 
companies, Germany provides its employees with more power and 
consideration because this country has a stronger workforce through its unions. 
The Industrial Union of Metalworkers (IG-Metall), a member of the German 
Confederation of Trade Unions, is the largest trade union in Germany180 and 
also the largest European industrial union.181 Employee representatives on 
supervisory boards can be either selected from inside the firm or recommended 
from German trade unions. 182 Whether a company is public or a closed one 
(private), as long as the company has 500-2000 employees, it should have its 
supervisory board with one third of positions held by employees; and in 
companies with 2000 or more, half of the supervisory board is constituted by 
employee representatives.183 IG-Metall has expanded the presence of union 
representatives who are active non-executives on supervisory boards at 
companies such as Porsche, BMW and Siemens, in line with the “co-
determination” system.184 Not only has this union supported its representatives 
to participate in supervisory board decisions, it has also helped the workers to 
                                            
179 Ibid 
180 E. Kirschbaum, “Moderate head of powerful German union steps down unexpectedly”, 
Reuters, 8 June, 2015, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/08/germany-
union-metall-leader-
idUSL5N0YU42020150608?feedType=RSS&feedName=everything&virtualBrandChannel=11
563 last accessed,13 July 2016 
181 Reuters, H. Sackmann, “German IG Metall, employers confirm 4.3 percent wage deal” 18 
May 2012, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/19/us-germany-wages-deal-
confirmation-idUSBRE84I01N20120519 last accessed,13 July 2016 
182 Worker-Participation.eu, “Board Level Representaion”, available at: http://www.worker-
participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/Germany/Board-level-Representation 
last accessed,13 July 2016 
183 Ibid. 
184 Supra, n.182, Worker-Participation.eu 
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lobby for wage increases.185 However, in other industries, such as banking and 
consultancies, unions have never been as strong as in manufacturing sector.186 
 
The Deutsche Bank and Volkswagen (VW) supervisory boards have provided 
examples of reducing the high pay level of their CEOs. In 2011 Martin 
Winterkorn, the chief executive of VW, received €17 million as his total pay, 
which was the highest pay in Germany in that year of austerity this attracted 
significant public attention.187 In line with his pay policy, Mr Winterkorn would 
have been paid €20 million in 2013, but after a long debate between the 
supervisory board and executives, this amount was reduced to €14 million.188 
Although the executives argued that the original amount was justified according 
to the firm’s income and performance, the employees and representatives from 
trade unions thought that the ratio between his pay and that of the lowest-paid 
employees was too high, exceeding a ration of 340 to 1, which was set by Mr. 
Meine, who is a union representative at both VW and Continental, the tyre and 
car components company.189  
 
However, the reason why Mr Winterkorn would not leave VW after this 
reduction in pay was that only VW could provide a job managing a huge 
German general motor business. Cases like this will seldom happen in 
countries such as the UK and the US, since generally executives who are 
subject to a reduction in pay will not stay as there are alternative employment 
opportunities elsewhere. Also, it is not to say that having employees 
participating in executive pay decisions will effectively reduce the level and 
adjust the structure of compensation, other discussions around this situation 
will be discussed more in Chapter 6.  
                                            
185 Reuters, I. Wissenbach, “UPDATE 1-Germany's IG Metall union agrees 3.4 pct wage rise” 
24 Feb 2015, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/24/germany-wages-
igmetall-idUSL5N0VY07320150224 last accessed,13 July 2016 
186 The High Pay Centre, “Workers on Boards: Interviews with German Employee Directors” 
September 2013, available at: http://highpaycentre.org/pubs/workers-on-boards-interviews-
with-German-employee-directors p.6, last accessed,13 July 2016  
187 Bloomberg, “VW’s Winterkorn Earns $23 Million as Best-Paid German CEO” 12 March 
2012, available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-03-12/vw-s-winterkorn-
earns-23-million-as-best-paid-german-ceo last accessed,13 July 2016 
188 Supra, n.186, the High Pay Centre, p.8 
189 Ibid. 
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C.4. Analysing Innovations 
Compared to the US government’s concerns and the regulations on executive 
remuneration that it has imposed, similar rules from European countries seem 
rather immature. In Chapters 2 and 3 it was acknowledged that pay for 
performance has significant obstacles in compensation structure and practice, 
and only focusing on the level of pay is not the right way to solve problems. 
Increasing the engagement between shareholders and the board has resulted 
in some improvements because of improved scrutiny of the board and 
management, and this can help to control the level of pay, but as others often 
note regarding remuneration, the devil lies in the detail. It is the structure of 
remuneration design that should concern regulation. The US, although it has 
attempted to implement some ineffective policies related to capping pay and 
indirectly lowering basic salaries, it has provided some ideas about regulating 
pay structures and reducing rent-seeking behaviour of the board while also 
promoting better governance. Methods such as suspending executives’ equity-
holding periods and mandatory disclosure of repricing options have shown that 
the government has taken pay problems seriously and thought deeply about 
how to regulate.  
However, though various ways have been provided in different countries, 
currently the most popular trends are in two areas of corporate governance: 
increasing shareholder engagement in remuneration practice, and promoting 
the independence of the remuneration committee and the board in policy 
setting. There will probably not be a one-size-fits-all regulatory model, since 
under different cultures there will be different conditions of corporate 
governance; for example, the UK, and Switzerland, which belong to the group 
of shareholder-friendly countries, will provide more scrutiny power for their 
investors in order to attract investments, while in Germany, with large and 
powerful labour unions interfering in the business of listed firms, executive 
compensation will be retained at a reasonable level. However, it will be 
necessary to set a goal to regulate executive compensation, since besides 
cultural differences, various theories explaining remuneration, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, also provide their own approaches regarding how to ensure pay for 
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performance.  
In order to investigate how these remuneration policies and regulations have 
worked in practice, experts examined 300 of the largest listed companies from 
16 countries, 14 of which are from the EU.190 Their analysis was based on 
these companies’ annual financial statements or corporate governance reports 
for the financial year ending December 2007 or March 2008.191 This data 
should reflect firms’ compensation policies just before the financial crisis, and 
show how companies have responded to each state’s regulation of executive 
pay. Generally they found that firms tend to apply only the basic requirements 
of national practice codes or rules.192 When the requirements are on a “comply 
or explain” basis, firms tend to engage in only partial compliance.193 Firms pay 
attention mostly to basic disclosure requirements, while recommendations 
concerning detailed information relating to terms of pay contracts and 
qualitative information regarding performance links are not widely followed. 
This phenomenon, according to the experts, is because of market pressure – 
in other words, keeping commercial secrets from their competitors.194  
Due to corporate governance codes’ soft nature, 60% of the firms comply with 
the individualised disclosure and pay policy disclosure criteria.195 However, the 
remuneration committee has been proved to be the most “amenable” to 
transplantation across EU corporate governance, with over 70% of the firms 
complying with its related criteria.196 Regarding disclosure criteria, firms in the 
UK, Ireland (which are traditionally countries with dispersed ownership 
companies and jurisdictions where disclosure is required in their mandatory 
rules) and the Netherlands, give the highest levels of compliance with 
individualised disclosure requirements, averaging between 90% and 100%.197 
However, firms from Belgium (30%), Spain (20%), Austria (20%) and Greece 
(5%), which are all traditionally block-holding countries, achieved much lower 
                                            
190 Supra, n. 3, Ferrarini, Moloney & Ungureanu, p.57  
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid. p.58 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid. pp.59-60 
195 Ibid. 
196 Ibid. p.61 
197 Supra, n. 94, Thomas & Van Der Elst, p.708 
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levels of individualised disclosure.198 Germany, although a traditional block-
holding country, has firms with much higher compliance with individualised 
disclosure (60%) because of certain laws regulating this criterion.199 
C.5. Harmonisation  
Due to efforts to regulate from a financial industry perspective, legislative 
harmonisation seems to have occurred. Early in 1999 the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF) was founded by Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
from the G7 countries (Canada, the US, the UK, Japan, France, Germany and 
Italy), with the purpose of enhancing international finance cooperation and 
promoting international financial stability.200 In 2009 the FSF was transformed 
to the FSB, the Financial Stability Board, with its members boosted from the G7 
to the G20 group.201  In September 2009 a G20 leaders’ meeting stated:  
“we are committed to act together to raise capital standards, to 
implement strong international compensation standards aimed 
at ending practices that lead to excessive risk-taking, to 
improve the over-the-counter derivatives market and to create 
more powerful tools to hold large global firms to account for the 
risks they take. Standards for large global financial firms should 
be commensurate with the cost of their failure. For all these 
reforms, we have set for ourselves strict and precise 
timetables”.202  
In the US, to stop financial companies from taking unnecessary and excessive 
risks the government introduced the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
                                            
198 Ibid. pp.712-3 
199 Ibid.  
200 Financial Stability Board, “Our History”, available at: 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/history/ last accessed,13 July 2016 
201  Now including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. 
202 G20 Information Centre, “G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit” 24 to 25 
September 2009, available at: http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html 
last accessed,13 July 2016 
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in 2009203 and the Troubled Asset Relief Program.204 Moreover, the House of 
Representatives passed the 2009 Corporate and Financial Institution 
Compensation Fairness Act to improve shareholder voting rights on the pay 
and compensation structure of executives in the financial sector; although it 
was rejected by the Senate,205 the later Dodd and Frank Act amendments 
actualised the implementation of empowering shareholders on executive pay.  
The EU has provided a Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive 
(CRR/CRD IV), thereby helping to form a sounder and safer financial system in 
the EU zone,206 while additionally, the FCA in the UK, with its aim of ensuring 
alignment between executive remuneration and risk-taking to promote the long-
term profits of financial organisations, introduced the Remuneration Code for 
banks, building societies and large investment funds.207  
Not only has the world realised how important it is to introduce regulations into 
the financial industries as response to financial crisis, many countries have 
provided shareholder say on pay through their company legislation to cure 
concerns around executive compensation. It has formed a global trend of 
providing shareholders with voting power on executive pay, the form as follows 
can be used to have a general understanding of this trend: 
COUNTRY YEAR FIRMS VOTE OTHER INFORMATION 
AUSTRALIA 2005 Listed Mandatory& 
advisory 
Boards are required to explain their 
response to voting dissent higher than 
25%. There is also a Two Strike Rule, 
where the board has to stand for re-
election if dissent is higher than 25% for 
                                            
203 The Recovery Act 2009, available at: https://www.irs.gov/uac/the-american-recovery-and-
reinvestment-act-of-2009-information-center last accessed,13 July 2016  
204 The TARP, available at: http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-
Programs/Pages/default.aspx last accessed,13 July 2016 
205 H.R. 3269 (111th): Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 
2009, available at: https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr3269 last last accessed,13 
July 2016 
206 European Commission, Banking and Finance, Capital requirements regulation and 
directive – CRR/CRD IV, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/finance/bank/regcapital/legislation-
in-force/index_en.htm last accessed,13 July 2016 
207 FCA, Remuneration Code, available at: https://small-firms.fca.org.uk/remuneration last 
accessed,13 July 2016 
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two consecutive years. 
BELGIUM 2012 Listed Mandatory& 
advisory 
 
CANADA 2012 Listed Mandatory& 
advisory 
Companies have the option to ask for 
an advisory vote on remuneration 
package and policy 
DENMARK 2007 Listed Mandatory& 
binding 
 
FINLAND 2007 Listed  Mandatory& 
binding 
 
FRANCE 2014 Listed Mandatory& 
advisory 
 
GERMANY 2010 Listed  Mandatory& 
advisory 
Proposals for a binding vote were 
rejected by the German Parliament in 
2013 
ITALY 2011 Listed Mandatory& 
advisory 
Votes are binding for banks 
JAPAN 2005 Listed  Mandatory& 
binding 
 
NETHERLANDS 2004 Listed  Mandatory& 
binding 
Voting is required only when there are 
changes in the remuneration policy 
SOUTH AFRICA 2009 Listed  Mandatory& 
advisory 
 
SPAIN 2011 Listed  Mandatory& 
advisory 
 
SWEDEN  2005 Listed  Mandatory& 
binding 
 
SWITZERLAND 2007 Listed Mandatory& 
binding 
Switzerland introduced voluntary and 
advisory say-on-pay regulation in 2007. 
Following a referendum in 2013, the 
nature of the vote changed in 2015  
UK 2002 Listed Mandatory& 
binding 
The nature of the vote was mandatory 
and advisory until October 2013 
US 2011 Listed  Mandatory& 
advisory 
Introduced as part of the Dodd-Frank 
Act 2010 
Table taken from “The Importance of Shareholder Activism: The case of say-on-pay”208 
                                            
208 K. Stathopoulos & G. Voulgaris, “The Importance of Shareholder Activism: The Case of 
Say-on-Pay” (2015) 24 Corporate Governance: An International Review 359, p.362
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However, as discussed above, though shareholder say on pay is currently the 
most popular mechanism that governments have provided for excessive 
executive remuneration, there are still several deficiencies of this legislative 
design, such as reducing the efficiency of board decision process, increasing 
the pay gaps between employees and managers, and shareholder voting 
recklessly due to lack of information and professional knowledge. Concerns 
from scholars have led to contentions that, shareholder empowerment may 
increase the firm’s focus on short-term success.209 As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
because shareholders will vote on remuneration reports  according to the 
conditions of share prices and the firm’s recent performance, managers tend to 
focus more on short-term productivity and even manufacture the impression 
that the firm is running well, though these management activities will jeopardise 
the firm’s long-term success.  “Remuneration is a matter of culture within 
corporations. Cultures in which it is every man for himself are faulty. The culture 
of every man for himself wins through.”210 Nonetheless, other suggestions 
propose that shareholders, especially institutional investors, can influence 
management and firm’s decisions from their effective activities and with more 
shareholders realising their power and influence, they may vote on pay policies 
from a long-term perspective.211 
It can be observed that the phrase ‘long-term productivity’ has appeared in 
almost every reform regulating executive remuneration. Although this aim 
seems generalised and vague, certain characteristics of executive 
compensation can be aligned closely with it while pursuing the pay for 
performance standard. Whether or not shareholders can help with a firm’s long-
term success is a crucial factor in justifying the say on pay legislations.  A 
detailed analysis will be provided in Chapter 6.  
Conclusion 
Brian Cheffins has noted that “executive pay is a topic where it is much easier 
                                            
209 C. Villiers, “Executive Pay: A socially-oriented distributive justice framework” (2015) 6 
Company Lawyer 139, at p.139 
210 D. Arsalidou, “The Regulation of Executive Pay and Economic Theory” (2011) 5 Journal of 
Business Law 431, pp.449-50 
211 Supra, n.208, Stathopoulos & Voulgaris, p.361 
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to find problems than solutions.”212 What is more, solutions may be much 
easier to design in comparison with testing how the solutions are working, and 
the testing is easier compared to finding the right measures for a good 
executive pay plan. 
After analysing the history of adjusting executive remuneration and why the 
market and previous corporate governance attempts have failed to ensure that 
positive aspects are stronger in applying financial incentives, it is clear that 
existing legislation has failed to rectify problems with executive pay and it 
should be improved and new rules should be considered and introduced.  
The worldwide examples above have shown that even though enhancing 
corporate governance is supposed to be an effective way to minimise the 
negative influence of financial incentives (e.g. the regulations about claw-backs, 
shareholder advisory votes and disclosures), their contributions in lowering 
levels and adjusting the structure of executive remuneration can still be 
improved. However, with more pressure from institutional shareholders and 
increasing outrage from the public, it is not only the remuneration committees 
of listed firms that have been prompted into action to address negative 
reactions executive pay; 213  governments are also providing more rules 
regulating executive pay. While the Chapter might paint a pessimistic 
impression, Gordon has an optimistic attitude towards new regulations related 
to executive pay, stating that the battle is “half-won, not lost.”214 
This, therefore leads us to: what methods can be used further? This will be 
addressed in the next chapter. 
 
                                            
212 B. R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997) p.132 
213 PwC, T. Gosling, Our Reward Insights, available at: http://www.pwc.co.uk/human-
resource-services/executive-pay-insights.jhtml, last accessed,13 July 2016 
214 Financial Times, Sarah Gordon, “Outrage Over Executive Pay Shows the Battle Is Half-
Won, Not Lost”, 10 September 2015. 
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Chapter Five 




In previous chapters it has been established that executive remuneration 
problems, especially the deficient design of incentivised remuneration and the 
influence of executives on the practice of remuneration policy, cannot be solved 
simply by markets and inner corporate control. Therefore, various legislations 
from several developed countries have been introduced to intervene into the 
executive remuneration issues, mainly through providing binding or non-binding 
voting rights to shareholders to decide on how the pay policy should be. 
However, is the provision of a non-binding vote to shareholders an effective 
strategy to address these problems with executive remuneration? 
 
In the light of a summary in Chapter 4 drawn from an examination of US 
legislative history and other regulations, it is contended that these problems 
cannot be resolved efficiently by soft laws, judging by the continued outrage 
from the public and dissatisfaction among shareholders about excessive pay 
levels and deficient pay plan structures. This chapter will explore governments’ 
new regulations and how they have worked to change executive pay. The 
arguments will be developed as follows.  
  
In section I there will be a general evaluation of the new 2013 UK law and a 
consideration of evidence for how the shareholders’ binding vote has influenced 
governance issues and the level and structure of executive pay after a fiscal 
year. The Swiss binding say on pay will be considered as well, and several 
comparisons will be made between the UK reform and the Swiss law. The 
merits of the UK binding say on pay will be introduced and discussed. On the 
other hand, more importantly, the problems that still exist seriously after the 
enactment of the say on pay reform will be mentioned and analysed, for further 
discussion in the next chapter.   
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Section II provides an investigation as to why the UK and Swiss governments 
gave shareholders a binding say on pay. This will be embarked on from a 
political perspective, starting with a summary of how institutional investors have 
influenced the economy and their increasing power in corporate governance 
issues. As the reform did not deal with certain problems, such as stopping pay 
for underperformance and difficulties with shareholders understanding, and the 
multiple design of stock options in executive pay packages, additional 
regulations will be provided and analysed in Chapter 6. 
 
This chapter answers the first research question shall we have regulations on 
remuneration through analysing the effects of shareholder say on pay reform, 
proposing that this reform does have brought some merits in solving the 
problems of executive remuneration. Chapter 5 also helps to answer the 
second research question, by suggesting that there are also concerns left in 
the reform and space for improvements in say on pay regulations.  
 
I. The Binding Say on Pay in the UK and Switzerland 
 
A. Empowering shareholders on executive remuneration  
Generally, because of shareholders’ weaknesses in corporate governance 
issues that have been mentioned in previous chapters, such as information 
asymmetry and a lack of professional knowledge about what managers are 
doing, shareholders’ voting rights are always valued by shareholders 
themselves, for example in director elections, mergers and acquisitions, and 
the replacement of CEOs. 1  Shareholders’ concerns with executive 
remuneration levels and design has been intensified, due to a series of 
accounting scandals, or what some American scholars refer to as a financial 
                                            
1 D. Yermack, “Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance” (2010) 2 Annual Review of 
Financial Economics 103, p.115; P. Fischer, J. Gramlich, B. Miller & H. White, “Investor 
Perceptions of Board Performance: Evidence from uncontested director elections” (2009) 48 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 172, p.180; J. Cai, J. Garner & R. Walkling, “Electing 
Directors” (2009) 64 Journal of Finance 2389, p.2390.   
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crisis2 during the early 2000s,3 Since the 2000s, not only had the institutional 
investors argued for investing activism in the company’s governance, but also 
the economic and political climate had made intervening easier for active 
shareholders.4 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, from the advisory vote given to shareholders by the 
governments of Germany, the US and France, to the binding vote provided in 
the UK, Switzerland and the Netherlands, there should be a rationale that can 
be explained in empowering shareholders to solve the executive remuneration 
problems.   
 
Explanations should be started from agency theory, which we used to illustrate 
theories and problems of executive remuneration in Chapter 2. Due to the 
increasing concerns towards relationship between agent and principal, 
shareholders have had an increasing interest in controlling executives in recent 
decades, particularly in appointing and paying directors to manage their 
companies and business. Furthermore, shareholders’ participation in the 
business does have an effect on the company’s management. If companies 
have a large and dispersed shareholding structure, they will have weaker 
monitoring and thus a reduction in pay for performance sensitivity.5 On the 
other hand, in companies where shareholders have a close holding and greater 
monitoring influence over the governance, not only the level of executive pay 
will be reduced, but also several of director’s self-dealings can be prevented.6  
 
Under this understanding, the UK and Switzerland have their legislations as 
resolutions after the financial crisis to solve excessive remuneration problems. 
Both of the two countries have empowered their shareholders with binding say 
                                            
2 See articles from Cleveland, available at: 
https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/Our%20Research/Financial%20Markets%20and%20Bankin
g.aspx, last accessed, 13 July 2016  
3 S. Bhagat & R. Romano, “Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and committing to 
the long run” (2009) 374 Yale Law & Economics Research Paper, p.8.  
4 Barrons, K. Squire, “A Golden Age for Activist Investing”, February 2009, available at: 
http://www.barrons.com/articles/SB123457667407886821, last accessed, 13 July 2016.  
5 Ibid. 
6 Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, “The Decoupling of CEO Pay and Performance: An agency theory 
perspective” (1989) 34 Administrative Science Quarterly 169, p.180. 
 159 
on pay. The following will have an input into the analysis of their reforms and 
how the reforms have influenced executive remuneration. Whether the 
empowerment of shareholders will have a positive effect on the level and 
structure of executive pay will be discussed in due course.  
 
B. UK law and its implementation  
The binding shareholder say on pay is regulated as a part of the UK’s Enterprise 
and Regulation Reform Act 2013. The British government published this Act to 
encourage long-term economic growth and simplify regulations.7 This reform 
Act was supposed to boost the economy and increase Britain’s competitiveness 
and business confidence.8 Its contents include provisions on the UK Green 
Investment Bank, Employment Law and the Competition and Markets Authority, 
the abolition of the Competition Commission and the Office of Fair Trading to 
amend the Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002. The reform Act 
also makes provision for the reduction of legislative burdens, copyright, and 
payments to company executive directors.9 Sections 79 to 82 of the Act provide 
important amendments mainly to sections 226, 421, 422 and 439 of the 
Companies Act 2006 in order to regulate executive directors’ pay and its 
reporting.10  
 
Every public company should hold its annual general meeting in each period of 
six months beginning with the day following the accounting reference date.11 
According to the general rules,12 shareholders of public companies will vote on 
written resolutions on a vote per share basis, after the reports on the executive 
                                            
7 UK Government Legislation, Enterprise and Regulation Reform Act 2013, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/24/contents, last check on July 26th, 2016 
8 Hansard Common debate, available at: http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2012-
13/enterpriseandregulatoryreform/stages.html last accessed, 13 July 2016 
9 Hansard Common debate, available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm120523/debtext/120523-
0002.htm#12052368000011 last accessed, 13 July 2016 
10 UK Government Legislation, c.24, Part 6, Payments to directors of quoted companies, 
Enterprise and Regulating Reform Act 2013. Legislative amendments available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/24/part/6/crossheading/payments-to-directors-of-
quoted-companies last accessed, 13 July 2016 
11 Section 336 (1), Companies Act 2006. 
12 Section 284, Companies Act 2006. 
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directors’ remuneration have been provided by the board. Under the 2013 
reform, all quoted companies were required to put their executive remuneration 
policy to a shareholder vote at an annual general meeting in the first year after 
the Act’s enactment date, which was October 1st 2013.  
 
From this date, any director’s remuneration report must include three main 
elements: a statement made by the chair of the remuneration committee; a 
remuneration policy for the coming years, which has to be renewed at least 
every three years; and a report on how the remuneration policy has been 
implemented in the previous financial year. 13  Additionally, whenever an 
executive director is to leave the firm the board needs to publish a statement 
declaring the payments that this director has received and is to receive in the 
future.14 
 
The law applies to the same companies as the old regime, which are “UK-
incorporated companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, an EEA 
exchange, the New York Stock Exchange, or NASDAQ”. 15  Also, “non-UK 
incorporated companies listed on the London Stock Exchange” will have to 
consider to what extent and how to comply with the new regime, although in 
many cases they are already complying with it under the current directors’ pay 
disclosure rules.16  
 
According to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (“BIS”), these 
new rules are intended to promote long-term success for both public companies 
and the whole economy.17 This outcome can be achieved via a routine of 
                                            
13 BIS, Directors’ Remuneration Reforms, Frequently asked questions, March 2013, available 
at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/directors-remuneration-reforms-frequently-
asked-questions p.4, last accessed, 13 July 2016   
14 Ibid. 
15 UK Government Legislation, The Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups 
(Accounts and Reports) (Amendment) Regulations 2013, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1981/contents/made last accessed, 13 July 2016 
16 Linklaters, available at: 
http://www.linklaters.com/News/LatestNews/2013/Pages/Executive-Pay-Most-significant-
rules-directors-pay-decade-come-force-1October.aspx last accessed, 13 July 2016 
17 BIS, “Executive Pay: Consultation on enhanced shareholder voting rights, summary of 
responses” June 2012, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/executive-
pay-consultation-on-enhanced-shareholder-voting-rights p.4, last accessed, 13 July 2016 
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increasing information transparency, empowering shareholders and lowering 
monitoring costs. By March 2015 almost all the public firms in the UK had 
completed their first resolution under this new law. The following seeks to 
examine these changes, determine what they are likely to mean for 
remuneration in the UK, and assess whether they will rectify some of the 
problems that have been identified in this thesis.  
 
B.1 Reform and case 
 
Generally, a firm’s remuneration report will contain four parts: a statement from 
the chair of the remuneration committee; a brief summary of the whole 
remuneration policy; a remuneration policy for the future; and an annual report 
on the implementation of the previous policy. The provisions of the 2013 
regulation can be concluded as follows.18  
 
B.1.1 Binding vote for shareholders  
 
The proposed “forward-looking” remuneration policy, which will inform a binding 
vote for shareholders, will be included in the annual report when shareholders 
are asked to vote at the annual general meeting, and will include the matters 
raised below.19  
There must be a pay policy table setting out the key elements of directors’ 
remuneration and information regarding each element under the following 
headings: 20 
• Purpose (how each element supports the achievement of the 
company’s short and long-term strategies) 
• Operation (how each element operates, including whether claw-backs 
                                            
18 Supra, n.10, Payments to directors of quoted companies, Enterprise and Regulating 
Reform Act 2013. 
19 Ibid, c. 24, Part 6 Miscellaneous and general, article 79, section 421, section 422 A and 
section 439 A of the Companies Act 2006. 
20 Companies Act 2006, section 439A (7) (8), section 226A, explained by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), “Executive Remuneration: simple, practical proposals for 
implementing the new disclosure requirement”, available at: http://www.pwc.co.uk p.8, last 
accessed, 13 July 2016 
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or malus adjustments are possible) 
• Opportunity (maximum potential value) 
• Performance Metrics (including relative weightings and time period), 
and  
• Changes to Policy (what is proposed and why) 
Besides this, the pay policy may also include: information on executive 
employment contracts in general; scenarios showing what directors would get 
paid for performance that is above, on and below target; information on the 
percentage changes in the company’s profits and dividends and in the 
company’s overall spend on remuneration; the principles on which exit 
payments will be made, including how they will be calculated, whether the 
company will distinguish between types of departure or the circumstances of 
exit and how performance will be taken into account; and material factors that 
have been taken into account when setting the remuneration policy, specifically 
employee remuneration and shareholder views.21  
There is an obligation on the board to subject a new remuneration policy for 
each executive director to the shareholders’ approval every three years.22 If 
there is any change in the pay policy or if it is necessary to implement a new 
pay policy within three years, the board has to submit a new one to its 
shareholders for resolution. 23  However, the revised pay policy does not 
necessarily need to be presented only at AGMs: section 422A provides an 
opportunity for the board to present it for shareholder resolution between 
annual meetings.24 
 
Failure to pass the remuneration plan will leave the firm with three options: the 
first is to continue applying the last policy that shareholders approved; the 
second is to implement the last policy while making a revision to the new policy 
for shareholder approval; and third, the board may call a general meeting 
                                            
21 Ibid  




specifically for passing a new remuneration policy.25 Companies must call a 
general meeting if there is no previous pay policy after the reform.  
 
This binding regulation may help in warning the remuneration committee to be 
careful with pay policy design, and also in preventing unnecessary costs by 
seeking consultation with investors’ advisory groups before the new pay policy 
is delivered to the shareholders for voting.  
 
The BG Group provides a clear example in explaining this function of the 
binding say on pay. All of their main investor advisory bodies expressed serious 
concerns about a new pay policy formulated for BG’s future chief executive, 
Helge Lund, at the end of November 2014, and before the shareholders’ final 
voting on this policy. 26  The BG board chose to revise this pay package 
according to their previous policy that had been made and approved by 
shareholders in May 2014.27 The controversial factor in Lund’s pay package 
was his long-term incentive plan. Pressure from shareholder voting 
consultancies stopped the board from granting him shares with a value equal 
to £12 million.28 Instead, Lund had his “golden hello” reduced to £10.6 million 
in equity.29 If the firm’s performance met targets he could expect a share award 
of around £4.7 million within a year, rather than the £10 million from the new 
pay policy.30 
 
However, from another perspective, although the binding vote is designed to 
empower shareholders over decisions on executives’ income, studies have 
shown that the law and shareholders may be chasing different goals regarding 
executive pay policy. Shareholders are concerned about the firm’s substantive 
                                            
25 Section 439A (2)-(6), Companies Act 2006  
26 The Guardian, “BG Group Faces Shareholder Revolt Over £25 Pay Deal for New Boss”, 
28 November, 2014, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/nov/28/bg-
group-shareholder-revolt-pay-deal-new-boss-helge-lund-oil last accessed, 13 July 2016 
27 BG Group, BG Group Revises Chief Executive Remuneration Packages, December 2014, 
available at: http://www.bg-group.com/~/tiles/?tiletype=pressrelease&id=740 last accessed, 
13 July 2016 
28 The Guardian, “BG Group Cuts Helge Lund’s Golden Hello After Shareholder Pressure”, 1 
December, 2014, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/dec/01/bg-group-
cuts-helge-lund-golden-hello last accessed, 13 July 2016 
29 Ibid 
30 Supra, n.27, BG Group  
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historic pay practices or other policy issues in the future when deciding to vote 
in favour or against, while the spirit of the law is aimed at detailed and 
prescriptive disclosure requirements for executive remuneration reports.31 The 
UK’s 2013 reform provides a good direction on how to make up this difference 
between current say on pay regulation, by providing shareholder another voting 
right on the implementation report of executive’s pay. The implementation 
report of executive director’s pay will provide a general review of how the 
previous pay policy has been practiced in a short term, while satisfying 
shareholder’s need to understand a company’s pay practice from a historical 
aspect to some degree. This say on pay power will be discussed as follows:  
 
B.1.2 Advisory vote of shareholders on implementation report 
 
According to the summary from PwC and Report Leadership, which is a multi-
stakeholder group on corporate reporting, the following factors are required by 
legislation related to pay implementation reports for each executive director:32 
salaries and fees payable for a financial year; all taxable benefits and expense 
allowance; the full amount of annual bonuses, including bonuses that will be 
earned under certain conditions in the future; the long-term incentive plan and 
other options vested according to a certain standard of performance at the end 
of the financial year; the pension plan; and other additional content.  
 
Although the vote of shareholders does not determine the implementation 
report, if a firm fails this advisory vote in a year while the future remuneration 
policy is not provided for either, this failure will require the board to provide a 
new pay policy for the next year’s shareholder vote.33 If the implementation 
                                            
31 Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, P. Ellerman, M. Ife, G. Roberts & C. Shutkever, “Directors’ 





last accessed, 13 July 2016 
32 Supra, n.20, PwC, “Executive Remuneration: simple, practical proposals for implementing 
the new disclosure requirement”, p.33 
33 Section 226D, Companies Act 2006 
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report fails when the pay policy is passed by the shareholder vote, the pay 
policy will not need to be presented for resolution at the next annual meeting.34 
 
The requirement to revise failed implementation reports so they can be 
reviewed by the shareholders next year can certainly prevent the board from 
paying executives in a non-transparent way, and will help to satisfy 
shareholders in monitoring the compensating behaviour of the company. Also, 
since the reform has drawn significant attention to giving a binding say on pay 
to UK shareholders, the vote and review of shareholders on the implementation 
pay report is rather important. There are many uncertain factors surrounding 
new pay policies, and the flexibility and discretion in the implementation report 
reflect how far the board and remuneration committee can be trusted in drawing 
up new pay policies. The vote, one would think, enables the board and the 
remuneration committee to have an appreciation of what the shareholders are 
willing to accept. 
 
There are concerns left in relation to both of the pay policy report and the 
implementation report. The transparency and disclosure requirements not only 
increase the burden of the board in making the remuneration report, but also 
the burden of shareholders in reading the report. According to PwC’s research 
on investors’ views of the new law, “excruciating” is the word used to describe 
the shareholders’ experience in reading and commenting on executive pay 
reports.35 Based on this survey, the length of pay reports from the FTSE 100 
companies has increased by an average of 38% since 2012, with the average 
report running to twenty pages in length.36 Shareholder’s tiredness in reading 
and understanding the remuneration report may lead to a voting result that is 
not as modest as the transparency requirements have expected.  
 
Second concern, is that there is no definitive guidance on how to report the 
components in the pay policy and in the pay report. The requirements to report 
                                            
34 Ibid.  
35 PwC, “Remuneration Reporting-A year on, Considerations for 2014-2015 remuneration 
reports”, available at: http://www.pwc.co.uk/human-resource-services/issues/remuneration-
reporting-a-year-on.jhtml last accessed, 13 July 2016 
36 Ibid. 
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the maximum level for each pay component in remuneration packages have 
been tackled in various ways by different firms. Generally, in a pay policy, there 
will be several maximum requirements for each component of executive pay, 
and this is done by setting a fixed sum requiring there will be no higher amount 
paid to the director, or a maximum percentage increase in his or her incentive 
pay plan. In a pay implementation report, the factors which have influenced the 
scope and the maximum requirements will be listed and specified. Some 
companies simply avoided these requirements and did not state any maximum 
requirement set for the increase rate of executives remuneration in their pay 
policy reports, while others provided a maximum figure that was nearly 
impossible to achieve.37  
 
Thirdly, because there are no clear guidelines and shareholders cannot 
observe the alignment of pay with performance, investors tend to rely on the 
opinions of advisory groups in making their decisions at annual meetings. This 
may lead to dissatisfaction among the board and executive directors with 
company investors, since they would tend to blame shareholders for being lazy 
and reluctant to read and think carefully of the remuneration report. After taking 
advice from the ISS, the institutional shareholder service, JP Morgan’s 
institutional shareholders expressed serious dissatisfaction about the 
compensation of their CEO, Jamie Dimon.38 Dimon’s $20m, which included 
$7.2m in cash, was voted against by 38.1% of the shareholders. Although JP 
Morgan drew up their executive pay policy based mainly on ISS guidelines, the 
big proportion of dissent in the voting caused confusion for the compensation 
committee. JP Morgan’s board was concerned about their international 
shareholders “automatically” outsourcing their investigations to ISS, and Dimon 
even called the shareholders “lazy” and “irresponsible”.  
 
                                            
37 P. Ellerman, M. Ife, G. Roberts & C. Shutkever. Directors’ Remuneration Reform, 2014, 
available at Lexology: http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0285c9a2-70bc-4811-
b4f0-675b78739725, last accessed, 13 July 2016 
38 The Guardian, “JP Morgan takes advice from firm that its chief attacked” 15 June 2015, 
available at: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/15/jp-morgan-advice-jamie-
dimon-voting last accessed, 13 July 2016 
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The former UK Business Secretary Vince Cable expressed his dissatisfaction 
in excessive level of executive pay at a meeting with the biggest firms’ 
remuneration committee chairmen, criticising that these companies have 
observed the law but ignored its spirit.39 If companies and investors did not 
cooperate responsibly, Dr. Cable (now Sir Vince Cable) threatened that: “under 
such circumstances, I would consider options including stricter regulatory 
oversight of pay reports and policies, a requirement on shareholders to disclose 
how they have voted on pay, or a requirement to consult employees on pay. 
This is the time for companies, and investors, to show they can act 
responsibly.”40 However, since his Party has lost being part of the government 
and Dr. Cable is no longer a Minister, stricter regulation may now be off the 
agenda, and it is still too early to tell whether shareholders are “lazy”, since the 
new reporting requirements have not improved that much. 
 
B.1.3 New restrictions relating to unauthorised remuneration and loss of official 
payments 
 
If a company makes a payment or operates a pay policy without the approval 
of the shareholders, this payment should be held on trust by the recipient, and 
either the directors on behalf of the company or the shareholders pursuing an 
action in court may have the right to recover this payment from the recipient.41 
If recovery is not possible, the directors who authorised the payment will be 
liable for this amount of money, but the directors may be relieved of liability by 
the court if they made the payments on an honest and reasonable basis.42  
 
New restrictions are provided by the reform to ensure that the shareholder say 
on pay will be secured and the firm will not need to pay for unnecessary 
recruitments and failures. After 1st October 2013, remuneration payments and 
any monetary loss of the firm that is inconsistent with the approved 
                                            
39 International Business Times, L. Brinded, “Cable Warns FTSE 100 Firms: Curb Execs' Pay 
or We'll Do it For You”, April 2014, available at: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ftse-100-firms-pay-
bonuses-under-political-threat-1445660 last accessed, 13 July 2016 
40 Ibid. 
41 Sections 260, 226B, 226E (2), Companies Act 2006.  
42 Section 226E, Companies Act 2006.  
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remuneration policy are not lawful. 43 These restrictions are set to prohibit 
golden hellos, golden goodbyes and any compensation for executive failure. 
According to section 226B of the Companies Act 2006, public companies in the 
UK may not give any remuneration to a person who “is, or is to be or has been, 
a director of the company”, unless this payment is listed in the approved pay 
policy or this payment has been approved by a resolution of the shareholders.44 
 
However, golden goodbyes seem not so easy to eliminate. In June 2015, one 
of the UK’s leading supermarket firms, Morrisons, experienced a shareholders’ 
revolt with 35.6% of them voting against the bonus paid to the dismissed CEO 
Dalton Phillips.45 Even though Phillips was sacked in January 2015 because 
of Morrisons’ decline in sales and profits in the supermarket industry, he was 
still able to have his compensation including a £850,000 salary, a £213,000 
pension payment and other personal benefits worth £28,000.46  Morrisons’ 
chairman stated that this additional £1m bonus rejected by 35.6% of the 
shareholders was compensation for Phillips’ loss of his restricted share 
options.47 As mentioned in Chapter 3, this restricted equity option is set to 
prevent managers from losing their position in the short term. The extra bonus 
designed by the Morrisons board has made this restricted share option 
meaningless. Nonetheless, Morrisons’ shareholder revolt over this issue still 
failed to stop their former CEO from taking his bonus, because a veto by only 
one third of the shareholders, even though unusually high, was still not enough 
to make the board change its policy.  
 
Tesco, the biggest supermarket in the UK, still lawfully gave its former CEO 
nearly £10m for equity options and bonus, at its 2015 annual meeting.48 During 
                                            
43 Sections 226B, 226C, Companies Act 2006. 
44 Section 226C, Companies Act 2006. 
45 The Guardian, “Morrisons’ Shareholders Protest Over £1m Bonus for Sacked Former 
CEO” 4 June 2015, available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/04/morrisons-shareholders-protest-bonus-
sacked-chief-executive last accessed, 13 July 2016 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 CMI, “Six Bosses Who Were Rewarded for Failure” July 2015, 
http://www.managers.org.uk/insights/news/2015/july/six-bosses-who-were-rewarded-for-
failure-and-why-it-is-so-dangerous, last accessed, 13 July 2016 
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the meeting, an accounting scandal was still being investigated and the worst 
company profits in the past forty years had been reported under this CEO’s 
leadership.49 The reason why the huge amount of share payback and bonus 
could be paid for failure is the same as in the Morrisons case above – although 
shareholders were given the power to veto the pay policy, the extent of the 
revolt was not enough to stop the pay.50 According to the revised UK Corporate 
Governance Code 2016, which will be discussed later in this chapter, any pay 
policy that has gained a serious proportion of dissenting votes will require an 
explanation by the board for how they are planning to deal with the situation.51 
However, since the Code is based on “Comply or Explain”, which means that 
principles of this Code is not compulsorily applied by companies, this 
requirement applies only if it raises concern over a firm’s reputation. One 
serious outcome that may happen from a ruined reputation of the board, as 
Bebchuk described, is the “outrage cost” stemming from the devaluation of a 
firm’s reputation in the markets.52 Bebchuk suggests that the outrage cost will 
act as a warning for other managers and companies, stopping others from 
deviating from optimal pay policies that satisfy both investors and the public. 
Further effects from the shareholder engagement and board reaction 
perspectives will be mentioned later.  
 




Generally, in the first year of the binding say on pay, nearly every firm listed on 
the London Stock Exchange passed both their company’s pay policies and 
                                            
49 Ibid.  
50 The Guardian, “Tesco Faces Shareholder Unrest Over Executive Pay” 26 June, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/26/tesco-sales-drop-13-but-outperform-
market-expectations last accessed, 13 July 2016 
51 FRC, the UK Corporate Governance Code 2016, available at: https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-
Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code.aspx, last 
accessed, 13 July 2016 
52 L. Bebchuk & J. Fried, “Paying for Long-term Performance” (2010) 158 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1915, p.1940 
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implementation reports.53 Kentz, a Jersey incorporated company which was 
going to face a takeover after its 2013 annual meeting,54 suffered the very first 
shareholder defeat on an executive remuneration report among all of the FTSE 
350 companies after the implementation of the voting reform, with only 42.4% 
in favour of its executive remuneration report.55 
 
In March 2015, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (“BIS”) 
published a research paper on how the listed companies in the UK and their 
shareholders have responded to the new say-on-pay legislation in the first 
financial year since the enactment of the law. BIS based their study on the level 
of compliance with the regulation in a variety of UK incorporated public firms 
selected from listings on the London Stock Exchange.  
 
First, in terms of shareholder voting results, BIS found that generally, 
shareholders were more likely to vote against remuneration policies in 2014 
than they had been five or six years previously, except for the year of 2012, 
which was the so-called “shareholder spring”.56 Moreover, shareholders have 
shown a higher level of dissent about future remuneration policies than about 
remuneration implementation reports.  
 
On the aspect of the level of executive pay, the research shows that the 
increase in pay “radically slowed” during the years of 2013 and 2014. Evidence 
provides that, in the five years before the year 2015, the increase in the median 
level of executive pay peaked in 2010 in all of the listed companies, with figures 
                                            
53 Towers Watson and Willis, “Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation in the UK 
and Europe”, September 2014, available at: https://www.towerswatson.com/en-
GB/Insights/Newsletters/Europe/HR-matters/2014/09/Corporate-governance-and-executive-
compensation, last accessed, 13 July 2016 
54 CTV News, “Shareholders of U.K.-based Kentz say yes to SNC-Lavalin takeover deal” 
August 2014, available at: http://www.ctvnews.ca/business/shareholders-of-u-k-based-kentz-
say-yes-to-snc-lavalin-takeover-deal-1.1954894, last accessed, 13 July 2016  
55 Financial News, “Kentz suffers first-ever binding defeat on executive pay”, May 2014, 
available at: http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2014-05-16/kentz-first-ever-binding-defeat-
executive-pay-agm?ea9c8a2de0ee111045601ab04d673622 last accessed, 13 July 2016  
56 BIS, “How Companies and Shareholders Have Responded to New Requirements on the 
Reporting and Governance of Directors’ Remuneration” March 2015, Research paper No. 
208, p.8  
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varying between 8% and 15%.57 In 2013, the median executive pay level 
showed no increase at all in the FTSE 100 companies, with increases of only 
3% to 4% in AIM, Small-Cap and Mid-Cap firms.58 Additionally, BIS introduced 
research done by MM&K which referred to statistics that show that the average 
total remuneration level of the FTSE 100 companies’ executive manager fell by 
5% in 2012 and fell by 7% in 2013, however increased in the year of 2014. 59  
The MM&K report further points out that the increase in the average level of 
FTSE 100 companies’ executive pay in 2014 was because of recent share price 
improvements, which shows the alignment between pay and performance.60   
 
The third aspect of the BIS report which should be mentioned is the changes in 
the structure of executive remuneration design. According to its surveys on 
executive compensation, BIS proposes that basic salary and cash bonuses are 
increasing at an observable rate. The FTSE 100 executives’ median salaries 
and bonuses increased by between 2% and 2.7% in 2013 and 2014, compared 
to their median salaries and bonuses increasing by 7% in 2009 and 17% in 
2010, though there was a decrease of 5% in 2012.61 Among the smaller 
companies, the AIM firms show a median executive salary increase from 2% to 
nearly 4% in 2013 with no increase in bonus since 2008, while Small-Caps and 
Mid-Caps firms increased basic salary by 3% in 2014, and increased bonuses 
by 3% and 16% respectively.62 Since the increasing level of salary and bonus 
payments is low compared to the total level of median income, it is clear that 
the median level of executive pay is increasing due to the increasing level of 
financial incentives. Also, according to the BIS report, the larger the firm is, the 
larger the proportion of its long-term incentive plans (the “LTIP”) increases in 
relation to the whole remuneration. 63  However, BIS did not mention the 
increasing rate of equity incentives compared to the previous values of equity 
income. Financial options and LTIPs are measured in comparison to salaries 
in the corresponding year; for example, the FTSE 100 executives’ median 
                                            
57 Ibid. p.59 
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid. p.63 
61 Ibid, pp.60-1 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid, p.63 
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financial pay was above 200% of their salaries, but this figure reduced to 150% 
in 2013.64  
 
BIS concludes that on average the legislation on shareholders’ binding vote has 
helped the UK public companies in reducing the total value of new remuneration 
rewards to their directors over the years of 2013 and 2014.65 
 
However, there are some concerns raised from the BIS study. The figures for 
executive pay levels that BIS used to reflect the changes caused by the binding 
say on pay, and its conclusion that the value of average executive income has 
been reduced, are quite different from the figures that can be found in other 
organisations’ reports. Reports from Deloitte and KPMG both have shown that 
the executive directors of FTSE 350 companies still enjoyed their income 
increasing since the enactment binding say on pay reform, with the pay gap 
between executives and formal employees also increased.66 The methods that 
BIS used to describe changes in the level of pay and other financial incentives 
in pay, did not adequately explain why the value of equity payments and other 
long term incentive plans have been reduced since the introduction of the new 
law. Furthermore, the outcome of the survey seems too optimistic in stating that 
the reform has worked well in dealing with shareholder requirements and 
helping to promote the success of public firms. However, from the time 
perspective, it is too early to say that a binding say on pay will bring any huge 
merits on improving the structure of pay and reducing the level of pay. It is also 
too early to conclude that the new regulations will fulfill their goal of securing 
the relation between pay and performance, whatever methods the government 
may use to embellish their results. The date of this report was before Vince 
Cable stepped down as secretary of BIS, which makes it a little suspicious that 
                                            
64 Ibid 
65 Ibid. p.8 
66 Deloitte, “Your Guide: Directors’ remuneration in FTSE 100 companies”, p.10, October 
2015; “Your Guide: Directors’ remuneration in FTSE 250 companies”, October 2015, p.8, 
available at: http://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/tax/articles/executive-pay-
publications.html last accessed, 13 July 2016; KPMG, “KPMG’s Guide to Director’s 
Remuneration 2015”, p.19, available at: 
https://home.kpmg.com/uk/en/home/insights/2015/09/kpmgs-guide-to-directors-remuneration-
2015.html last accessed, 13 July 2016.  
 173 
there is nothing but positive evaluation of the new regulation which was 
proposed by Dr. Cable. 
 
B.2.2 Three Big Concerns  
 
Pay for Underperformance 
 
Collected from the reports of other consulting institutions, although the average 
pay level is not increasing rapidly, underperformance is still being rewarded, 
sometimes even richly.67 According to the Chartered Management Institute 
(CMI), in the year of 2015 nearly 30% of directors of UK listed companies were 
still paid with a high annual bonus for their underperformance, and this figure 
rose to 45% of the executive directors, with the average bonus paid to these 
executives standing at £8,873 per year and the highest of them paid £44,687.68 
Despite the general criteria set for bonus design described in Chapter 3, that 
bonus should be paid for certain performance of the firm and the manager, “the 
biggest and most significant indicator of whether someone will get a bonus this 
year is whether or not they got one last year. The longer that goes on, the more 
people come to rely on the money and the harder it is to stop paying it”.69 
 
Complicated Pay Reports 
 
From the shareholder satisfaction perspective, a study by PwC has shown that, 
despite more information provided in the pay implementation report, the quality 
of communication between shareholders and firms has declined since the link 
between director’s pay and company strategy was felt to be “poorly 
addressed”.70 Consultations among investors have shown that a summary 
                                            
67 The Guardian, “Managers’ rich rewards for poor performance” 3 June 2015, available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/03/managers-rich-rewards-for-poor-
performance last accessed, 13 July 2016 
68 CMI, “Underperforming, Yet Still Paid A Bonus: 2015 national management salary survey 
results” 2016, available at: 
http://www.managers.org.uk/insights/news/2015/june/underperforming-yet-still-paid-a-bonus-
2015-national-management-salary-survey-results last accessed, 13 July 2016 
69 Ibid.  
70 PwC, “Remuneration reporting-a year on: Considerations for 2014/15 remuneration 
reports” November 2014, p.14 
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written after the chairman’s statement, which could provide a link between pay 
and firm strategy, the pay report table and the outcomes of performance 
measures, is needed to enable better communication for shareholders, who will 
need something that is easier for them to read and understand.71 Also, as 
nearly half of the FTSE 100 companies did not have their financial targets for 
annual bonuses reviewed by shareholders on grounds of commercial sensitivity, 
from the PwC report it would seem that the shareholders felt that firms should 
put effort into more detailed disclosure of the bonus plan, while retrospective 
bonus targets are also welcomed.72  
 
Concerning the narrowing of reporting issues discussed in the binding say on 
pay, in 2012, BIS published their draft provisions for large and medium-sized 
companies in accounting and reporting regulations, requiring detailed and 
modernised reports drawn up by the board for shareholder resolution at annual 
meetings.73  This regulation aims at improving transparency and corporate 
governance through providing a more strategic report instead of various and 
complicated business reviews that were shown to the investors. Under this 
regulation the company must provide information about each director’s 
shareholding, including shares held outright, share awards and options subject 
to performance conditions, share awards and options subject to service 
conditions, and vested but not exercised options.74  
 
The Increasing Pay Gaps 
 
Several ways to regulate executive remuneration have been provided by 
various organisations concerned about different interests. The High Pay Centre 
suggests that the government should pay attention to the comparison between 
                                            
71 Ibid. p.16 
72 Ibid.  
73 UK Government Legislation, The Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups 
(Accounts and Reports) (Amendment) Regulations 2013, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2013/9780111100318/introduction last accessed, 13 July 
2016 
74 UK Government Legislation, The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ 
Report) Regulations 2013, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1970/contents/made last 
accessed, 13 July 2016 
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executives’ and employees’ pay packages. They propose that there should be 
a cap for executive compensation, set at a fixed multiple of the pay of the firm’s 
lowest-paid employee.75 According to their report, executive remuneration in 
the UK has increased from 60 times that of the average worker in the late 1990s 
to nearly 180 times, and the average level of executive pay has grown from 
£4.1 million in 2012 to 4.7 million in 2013.76 The gap between executives and 
normally paid employees continues to grow.77 For example, in the US the 
Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act 2010 requires 
a disclosure of the pay gap between the remuneration of directors and that of 
the ordinary employees in the company. Additionally, organisations including 
the Local Authority Pension Fund and the Pensions and Investment Research 
Consultants (PIRC) have expressed their opinion to the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) that many companies have failed to explain why they did not 
take the wider workforce into consideration when they set the executive 
compensation.78  
 
From all of above, the reform of binding say-on-pay has brought several 
changes in the executive remuneration design and implementation. With the 
FTSE 350 companies’ high application of the regulation towards this reform in 
reporting remuneration policy and report, shareholders are able to vote on 
these policies and reports based on a broader consideration. The binding say 
on pay has provided a warning for the remuneration committee and the board 
in setting the level and the structure of executive pay. According to the feedback 
study obtained by BIS, the increasing rate of the executive pay level in the years 
of 2013 and 2014 has been slowed down by this binding say on pay. However, 
certain problems still remain unsolved. The biggest issue among them is pay 
for failure. Despite the fact that the press is always reporting cases concerning 
                                            
75 High Pay Centre, “Reform Agenda: How to make top pay fairer” (July 2014), available at: 
http://highpaycentre.org/pubs/reform-agenda-how-to-make-top-pay-fairer last accessed, 13 
July 2016 
76 Ibid 
77 Supra, n.132, Petrin, p.204 
78 FRC, Responses to Consultations, available at: https://frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Response-to-
external-consultations.aspx last accessed, 13 July 2016 
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pay for failure in an acerbic tone, the reform is still unable to stop those golden 
goodbyes from happening.  
 
  C. The Swiss law  
C.1 Corporate Governance Background  
 
There are twenty-six states and four main governing political parties in the 
Swiss federal government. The Swiss constitution covers the majority of public 
issues, including foreign relations, the army, railways, and general legislation 
on the economy.79 Switzerland is one of the most important financial centres 
in the world, providing an ideal environment for international-based 
corporations.80 In Switzerland, listed companies have the choice of structuring 
their boards on a one-tier or two-tier basis.  
 
Before the binding say on pay was passed as a new legislative requirement for 
executive pay in Switzerland, the Swiss Code of Best Practice provided several 
general recommendations around this corporate governance issue.81 Some of 
the Code rules, such as the requirement that executive remuneration should 
include fixed and variable components concerning the medium and long-term 
sustainability of the firm, incentive plans should be reduced or eliminated if 
targets are not met, and stock options should be exercised above their market 
value on the grant date and not be subject to any retesting,82 showed no 
material difference from other European countries. 83  However, in 2013 
Switzerland became the fourth nation on the European continent to provide 
shareholders with a binding vote on executive pay, after the Netherlands (which 
implemented a binding vote in 2004), Norway and Sweden. 
                                            
79 Swiss Government, information available at: https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start.html last 
accessed, 13 July 2016 
80 Direct information from: http://swiss-economy-business.all-about-switzerland.info, whose 
information is supported by  https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start.html last accessed, 13 July 
2016 
81 Swiss Code of Best Practice, Section 4, appendix one, available at: 





With the aim of improving the Swiss economy, private property, and to protect 
their shareholders, several devices known as “Mind Initiative” or “against rip-off 
salaries” were provided under article 95 of the Swiss Constitution.84 However, 
there is a two-year period before these provisions become legislative 
enactments and are put in force: they will remain optional for public firms to 
choose from changing or remaining their pay policies in a period from January 
2014 to January 2016.85 
 
The provisions in article 95 include significant requirements around the 
independence of the board, the disclosure rules for directors’ pay, and 
shareholder approval for corporate changes, including the capital management 
of the firm.86  
 
The binding vote referred to above is primarily based on the Swiss Code of 
Obligations, which has been part of the Swiss federal law since 1911. If there 
is any conflict in applying the Code of Obligations as well as the transitional 
provisions mentioned above, it will be the transitional provisions that take 
priority. It is necessary to emphasise that the Minder Initiative rule under the 
transitional provisions requires public companies to specify prospective or 
retrospective binding shareholder votes on executive pay in their articles of 
association.87  Prospective votes concern the maximum budget payable to 
managers during the next fiscal year, while retrospective votes approve the 
levels of remuneration based on executive directors’ performance.  
 
It has been one and a half years since the enactment of the revised Code of 
Obligation and the Minder Initiative were passed, but no significant changes 
                                            
84 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation 1999, Article 95 (3): “For the protection of 
the economy, private property and shareholders, and to guarantee sustainable corporate 
governance, the law shall regulate Swiss companies limited by shares listed on stock 
exchanges in Switzerland or abroad in accordance with the following principles…” 
85 Glass, Lewis & Co., “Guidelines-2014 Proxy Season, An over view of the Glass Lewis 
approach to proxy advice”, available at: http://www.glasslewis.com last accessed, 13 July 
2016 
86 Supra, n.84, Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation  
87 Supra, n.85, Glass, Lewis & Co. 
 178 
have appeared in their implementation. According to a PwC survey, only 14% 
of the companies in their sample stated that they had fully prepared for the 
implementation of the ordinance, while nearly 75% of the companies were still 
engaging in preparatory work for the new law.88 
 
C.2 Swiss Binding Say on Pay 
 
In contrast to the UK, Swiss government chose to regulate their binding 
shareholders’ say on pay under Swiss constitutional law, specifically section 7 
(The Economy), article 95(3). Swiss law is much briefer in explaining the say 
on pay than that in the UK. There are three main factors that can be concluded 
from the provisions. 
 
First, the shareholders receive an annual binding vote on all of remuneration 
policies of the members of the board, including non-executive and executive 
directors and advisors.89 Institutional investors in pension funds must disclose 
all the information explaining how they voted and their decisions about the pay 
policies.90  
 
Second, executive directors are not allowed to be compensated in a variety of 
situations, such as bonuses earned from company purchases and sales, or 
consultant work done for other companies within the same group. Executive 
remuneration is strictly within the scope that is regulated by the articles of the 
association, while golden goodbye and golden hello agreements are 
prohibited.91  
                                            
88 PwC Switzerland, Initial Trends Regarding the Implementation of the Minder Rules, 2014, 
p.7 
89 Supra, n.84, Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation 1999, article 95 (3)(a): “the 
general meeting votes on an annual basis on the total amount of all remuneration (money and 
the value of benefits in kind) given to the board of directors, the executive board und the 
board of advisors. It elects on an annual basis the president of the board of directors, the 
individual members of the board of directors and the remuneration committee, and the 
independent representatives of voting rights…” 
90 Ibid, article 95 (3)(a): “Pension funds vote in the interests of their insured members and 
disclose how they have voted.” 
91 Ibid, article 95 (3)(b): “the governing officers may not be given severance or similar 
payments, advance payments, bonuses for company purchases and sales, additional 
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Third, article 95 (3)(d) provides the consequences of violating the above 
provisions. Any person who disobeys these regulations will receive a custodial 
sentence of less than three years, and a monetary penalty which is no larger 
than six times his/her annual remuneration. 92  This “person” maybe non-
executive director or executive director under this provision’s circumstance.  
 
There are three major differences in the Swiss binding say on pay compared to 
the UK regulations.  
 
The first is that in Switzerland shareholders are required to vote on executive 
pay policies on an annual basis, while UK shareholders only need to vote once 
in a three-year period for their binding say, and their annual voting rights on the 
pay implementation report stay at an advisory level. There are no explanations 
from either of these countries about why companies should submit their pay 
policies to shareholders for approval on a three-year or an annual basis. 
However, it is hard to know whether the binding vote may suffer from decreased 
efficiency from being held every year. Furthermore, the stricter rule in 
Switzerland might be intended to show respect to international shareholders, 
by providing the annual binding vote on remuneration policy to ease their 
concerns around executive pay. 
 
Second, it is not an offence in the UK if there is violation of any of the company 
law regulations on say on pay, but the Swiss government provides that it is an 
offence and prescribes both custodial sentences and monetary punishments 
for violation. Although directors in the UK who make an unauthorised payment 
may be held liable for this payment, their only punishment is to compensate the 
                                            
contracts as consultants to or employees of other companies in the group. The management 
of the company may not be delegated to a legal entity;”  
(3)(c): “the articles of association regulate the amount of credits, loans and pensions payable 
to governing officers, their profit-sharing and equity participation plans and the number of 
mandates they may accept outside the group, as well as the duration of employment 
contracts of members of the executive board” 
92 Ibid, article 95 (3)(d): “Persons violating the provisions under letters a-c are liable to a 
custodial sentence not exceeding three years and to a monetary penalty not exceeding six 
times their annual remuneration.” 
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firm. The Swiss regulation may have more efficient effects in warning managers 
not to disobey binding rules, and the shareholders’ power would be ensured. 
However, the possibility of introducing custodial sentences in the UK is rather 
low, since UK does not have a tradition in sentencing directors because of 
executive compensation issues and criminal prosecutions are often based on 
company’s or employee’s fraud and bribery behaviours93. This thesis will not 
have further discussions around custodial sentencing directors because of 
executive pay.  
 
Third, shareholders in Switzerland have the right to veto the remuneration not 
only of executive directors but also of non-executives, while in the UK there is 
no direct requirement regulating that remuneration of the directors other than 
executives on the board. This vague definition of whose pay can be voted on 
by shareholders has been explained by BIS in a “frequently asked questions” 
section: that shareholder’s voting on the non-executive directors’ remuneration 
policy are optional for public companies.94 Swiss regulation does a better job 
from the agency theory perspective, since the shareholders have the power to 
veto the remuneration of non-executive directors who create pay policies for 
themselves and the executives; non-executive directors will tend to be more 
cautious or else their pay policy may be rejected and their pay level may be 
lowered due to shareholders’ dissatisfaction towards their work in designing 
pay packages of the executives. In the UK, certain legislation towards other 
members on the board is needed: not only should there be regulations requiring 
that non-executive compensation should be subject to shareholder approval, 
but also the guidelines for how to incorporate a remuneration committee with 
all the members be independent non-executive directors.95 This legislation 
suggestion will be discussed further in the next chapter.  
 
                                            
93 J. Grimes, R. Niblock & L. Madden, “Corporate Criminal Liability in the UK: The introduction 
of deferred prosecution agreements, proposals for further change, and the consequences for 
officers and senior managers”, available at: http://uk.practicallaw.com/4-547-
9466?q=&qp=&qo=&qe=#a500135 last accessed, 13 July 2016 
94 Supra, n.17, BIS, p.12 
95 FRC, The UK Corporate Governance Code 2016, D.2.1: “The board should establish a 
remuneration committee of at least three, or in the case of smaller companies, two 
independent non-executive directors”. Thus,  
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Overall, because of the different political regime in Switzerland, the Constitution 
merely gives the above general requirements, with detailed regulations 
implemented by individual states within the federation.  
 
As the Swiss binding say on pay was not fully applied until the end of 2015, its 
outcome is still not very clear. A concern about the influence of strict rules on 
large financial institutions has been raised. Although Switzerland has held the 
top position in the World Economic Forum Ranking for seven years till 2015,96 
the binding say on pay will make it harder for international banks to attract, 
retain and motivate their managers, which may lead to a decrease in 
competitiveness on the financial markets in the future.97  Certain complaints 
came from some high-profile business leaders, such as the CEO of Nestle SA, 
Paul Bulcke, stating that changes in corporate governance and company law 
had given shareholders too much power, and Sergio Ermotti, the chairman of 
Switzerland’s biggest Bank, UBS, suggesting that regulations on remuneration 
and companies should be meaningful and useful and the Swiss laws are not.98 
The concern on economic competitiveness helps to explain why Swiss voters 
turned down a referendum vote to cap executive pay to under twelve times that 
of ordinary employees,99 so as not to lose the country’s global standing as an 
important financial centre.  
 
II. Behind the Regulation 
 
                                            
96 Bloomberg Business, “Switzerland Beats Singapore, U.S. in Competitiveness Ranking” 
September 2015, available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-
29/switzerland-beats-singapore-u-s-to-top-competitiveness-ranking last accessed, 13 July 
2016 
97 BreakingViews, “Minder Surprise” April 2015, http://www.breakingviews.com/swiss-say-on-
pay-bodes-ill-for-rainmaker-wallets/21192553.article last accessed, 13 July 2016 
98 BloombergBusiness, “ABB, UBS Chiefs Say Red Tape Threatens Switzerland’s Success” 
January 2016, available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-22/abb-ubs-
chiefs-say-red-tape-threatens-switzerland-s-success last accessed, 13 July 2016 
99 The Guardian, “Switzerland votes against cap on executive pay” 24 November 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/switzerland-votes-against-cap-executive-pay 
last accessed, 13 July 2016  
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A. Institutional and Overseas Shareholders in the UK 
The UK government’s shareholder primacy policy100 has been growing under 
the influence of its institutional and overseas shareholders. As Professor 
Christine Mallin concluded, in 1963, 54% of the UK public shares were in the 
hands of individual investors, but by 1989 this ratio had dropped to under 21%, 
and in 2006 it had decreased further to only 13%. Meanwhile, the fraction of 
shares owned by institutional shareholders (mainly insurance companies and 
pension funds) saw their shares rise from 17% in 1963 to 30% in 2006.101 At 
the same time, the percentage held by international shareholders grew from 7% 
in 1963 to 40% in 2006.102  
 
Banks, pension funds, insurance companies and several labour unions own 
shares in British public companies, with currently only a few FTSE 100 firms’ 
shares being held by UK’s private investors.103 According to statistics collected 
in December 2012, in general 54.5% of the FTSE 100 companies’ shares were 
held by overseas shareholders, while 36.5% of them were held by institutional 
shareholders and only 9% by individual investors.104 In 2014, data show that 
the broad fraction of share ownership in the UK stock market remains almost 
the same as it was in the end of 2012, with international shareholding increasing 
to 54% and individual shareholding growing to 12%.105 
 
With such a large percentage of shares concentrated in their hands, the power 
and influence of shareholders who are institutional and overseas cannot be 
ignored. Four important corporate governance reports 106  have shown that 
                                            
100 Hansard, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill, section 2012-13, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmpublic/enterprise/120717/pm/120717s
01.htm last accessed, 13 July 2016  
101 C. A. Mallin, Corporate Governance, 4th (Oxford, Oxford Press, 2013) p.106  
102 Ibid. 
103 E. Ndzi, “Director’s Excessive Pay and Shareholder Derivative Action” (2015) 144 
Company Lawyer 144, p.145 
104 Ibid. 
105 Office for National Statistics, “Ownership of UK Quoted Shares: 2014”, available at: 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/investmentspensionsandtrusts/bulletins/ownershipofukquote
dshares/2015-09-02#pension-funds-holdings-of-uk-shares-by-value last accessed, 13 July 
2016 
106 Cadbury Report 1992, Greenbury Report 1995, Hampel Report 1998, Myners Report 
2001. 
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these shareholders are taken seriously by the UK government, and are also 
expected to have a positive influence on the firms they have invested in.107 
Also, principles laid down by institutional shareholders themselves, such as the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the National Association of Pension 
Funds (NAPF), have provided guidelines which deal with the relationship 
between institutional shareholders and firms to ensure long-term investments 
and profits, under certain provisions of the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
Significant cooperation was achieved in 2002 when the ISC (the Institutional 
Shareholder’s Committee) (now the IIC, the Institutional Investors Committee108) 
was formed by the ABI, the NAPF and other two big institutions.109 The ISC 
provides recommendations for shareholders about how to provide clear 
statements on how firms will be monitored, how institutions will deal with any 
conflict of interests, and the circumstances under which institutions will 
intervene in the business of the investee companies.110 One of the ISC’s 
statements of principles, published in 2007, concerned voting disclosures which 
may contribute to shareholders’ reviews of voting policies on previous company 
issues. On executive remuneration issues, this voting disclosure may help to 
remind shareholders of the pay reports they have voted for or against, since 
investee public firms may choose to have their pay policies renewed for voting 
every three years, according to the new law. 
 
Institutional shareholders are powerful and important to the UK economy, the 
reason why the Government has provided a binding say on pay may not be 
simply because of the excessive remuneration level of the executives, but also 
from the concern towards the satisfaction of its institutional shareholders. If the 
                                            
107 Cadbury Report 1992: “We look to the institutions in particular, to use their influence as 
owners to ensure that the companies in which they have invested comply with the Code,” 
available at: http://cadbury.cjbs.archios.info/report, such comments also are mention in the 
other three reports. Specifically in the Myners Report published by HM Treasury, institutional 
shareholders’ trusteeship are emphasised; available at: 
http://www.icaew.com/en/library/subject-gateways/corporate-governance/codes-and-
reports/myners-report last accessed, 13 July 2016 
108 Institutional Investor Committee, http://www.iicomm.org/index.htm last accessed, 13 July 
2016 
109 These two are the AITC, the Association of Investment Trust Companies, and the IMA, 
the Investment Management Association. 
110 The ISC Code, available at: https://www.uss.co.uk/news/all-news/2014/03/uss-and-the-
new-stewardship-code last accessed, 13 July 2016 
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introduction of a binding say on pay is because of the satisfaction of 
shareholders in expressing their disagreement with remuneration policies, the 
binding vote may not help in improving the accountability of the board or pay 
practices as the law intends it to if institutional shareholders are “reluctant to 
just vote no”.111  
 
B. From Advisory to Binding: Satisfying the Shareholders? 
In the UK this binding vote is provided by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
Act 2013, which made amendments to the Companies Act 2006. There were 
concerns about this voting right at all stages of the discussion of the Bill. The 
provision for regulating executive pay while giving shareholders a binding vote 
is more like a “gesture” from the British Government to investors, especially 
institutional investors, to indicate that they are willing to provide shareholders 
with more power in governance and extend the 2012 “shareholder spring”, even 
though few foreign institutional shareholders have any general idea of UK 
corporate governance.112  
 
Before the proposal of a binding say on pay, in 2011 Dr. Vince Cable, the then 
Secretary of BIS suggested:  
 
“Britain does have some world-class executives and one of the real 
privileges of my job is dealing with them. But let’s not forget that, 
using the FTSE 100 as a benchmark, investors have barely seen a 
return since the turn of the century. For most of that time, they would 
have been better off investing in government bonds.”113  
 
He also emphasised the pay gap between managers and other 
employees: “in 2010, the average total pay for FTSE 100 chief executives 
                                            
111 K. M. Sheehan, The Regulation of Executive Compensation: Greed, Accountability and 
Say on Pay (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2012) p.29 
112 Supra, n. 103, E. Ndzi, p.147. 
113 The Telegraph, “Vince Cable attacks executive pay levels”, June 2011, available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/8592727/Vince-Cable-
attacks-executive-pay-levels.html last accessed, 13 July 2016 
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was 120 times that of the average UK employee. Back in 1998, the 
multiple was 45.”114  
 
In January 2012, Dr. Cable told the House of Commons that “we cannot 
continue to see chief executives’ pay rising at 13% a year while the 
performance of companies on the stock exchange languishes well behind.”115 
Cable said the companies would be required to publish “more informative 
remuneration reports” for shareholders, and “the Government planned to focus 
on greater transparency over pay deals, giving shareholders tougher powers, 
creating more diverse boards and remuneration committees, and sharing 
business best practice.”116 From the speeches that Cable gave in favour of 
reform in executive pay, it can be concluded that the government was seeking 
to reduce the level of executive remuneration, increase the alignment of pay 
and performance and guarantee the transparency of pay policies and reports. 
However, these three aims have not been completely fulfilled.  
 
Early in the First Reading stage of the Bill, Vince Cable promised that “the 
measures in the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill will help make Britain 
one of the most enterprise-friendly countries in the world.” 117  In an early 
resolution debate he stated that to prevent the shareholder spring from being a 
seasonal phenomenon, it would be necessary to provide a guarantee to 
investors to keep directors accountable.118 Although he mentioned fairness in 
pay as an important factor in director compensation, he implicitly ignored 
another MP’s (Simon Hughes) question about putting employee 
representatives on boards of public companies to give them power as far as a 
say on pay is concerned.119 Moreover, he did not provide any answer in relation 
                                            
114 Ibid. 
115 The Telegraph, “Vince Cable: shareholders should hold binding votes on executive pay” 
(January 2012), available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9033594/Vince-Cable-
shareholders-should-hold-binding-votes-on-executive-pay.html last accessed, 13 July 2016 
116 Ibid. 
117 UK Parliament, Bill Stages, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2012-13, available at: 
http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2012-13/enterpriseandregulatoryreform/stages.html last 
accessed, 13 July 2016 
118 Hansard, Money Resolution, 11 June 2012, Column 72, available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm120611/debtext/120611-
0002.htm#12061114000001 last accessed, 13 July 2016 
119 Ibid. 
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to how to ensure that all shareholders had adequate notice of proposals made 
by companies, in order to provide them with enough information for them to 
make decisions. It seems that for BIS and also the UK government, fairness is 
a reason for them to regulate in favour of a stricter shareholder say on pay, but 
it is not the object of this reform; there is no evidence to suggest that the binding 
vote is intended to reduce the level of excessive pay as against the earnings of 
other workers, although Cable mentioned before his proposal that there was an 
urgent need to stop executive pay from growing too rapidly. 
 
During a Commons debate, witness Katja Hall, the chief policy director of the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI), emphasised her opinion that the 
amendments surrounding executive remuneration would be a key test of the 
reform Act. They would satisfy the shareholders’ need to hold the board to 
account “without undermining the corporate governance structure in the UK”.120  
 
On 17th July 2013 the House of Commons debated the new legislative provision 
on director’s pay and the motion to have employee representatives on 
boards.121 Norman Lamb, an MP who strongly advocates employee ownership 
of public firms, suggested that “if one can find ways of engaging employees, 
and if possible giving them a stake in the enterprise where they work, there can 
be very impressive results”.122 Advocates proposed that the reason why the 
UK has no employees on board, and even past Labour government had not 
passed regulation in favour of employees, is not only because it is too difficult 
for many large public firms in the UK to select their employee representatives, 
but also because Britain only has companies with one-tier boards.123 Countries 
with employee representatives on boards, such as Germany, always have two-
tier boards, placing employees on the supervisory board. MPs agreed that it is 
not possible for employee representatives to take the full responsibilities of a 
                                            
120 Hansard, 19 June 2012, Column 4, available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmpublic/enterprise/120619/am/120619s
01.htm last accessed, 13 July 2016 
121 Hansard Common debate, 17 July 2012, available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmpublic/enterprise/120717/pm/120717s




director.124 They also agreed that it is not the government’s role to “micro-
manage” the level of pay, for it is in the company’s and the shareholders’ 
interests to make pay levels accountable.125 Therefore, after the debate they 
voted down the government’s new clause 18 on its first reading, which proposes 
that public companies should have employee representatives on board to 
participate in setting executive director’s pay plans.126  
 
In September 2013, Thomas Docherty, a Labour MP, presented a bill requiring 
that companies’ remuneration committees should have employee 
representatives. The Bill was rejected by Parliament, 127  but there was no 
surprise, since a similar bill suggesting putting employee representatives on 
boards had already failed in June 2012.128 
 
From the shareholder voting right perspective, ministers did not even raise the 
“super majority” shareholder voting rate on pay reports in the new clauses, 
simply because requiring votes from over 75% of shareholders will cause 
“gridlock” and is unnecessary.129 
 
From the above discussion around the legislative background stories, it can be 
said that the aims of governments in proposing new regulations are not aimed 
at reducing the level of executive pay and the pay gap. Rather, their first 
concerns are mostly around how to attract and satisfy the investors, for sky-
high level of executive remuneration can not only cause the outrage of the 
public, but also the dissatisfaction of the investors. It is not to say that the 
government is wrong in setting legislative priorities like this. To ease and 
overcome the public concerns during or after a bad economy period, 




127 UK Parliament, Bill Stages, Executive Pay and Remuneration Bill 2013-14, available at: 
http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2013-14/executivepayandremuneration.html last accessed, 
13 July 2016 
128 UK Parliament, Bill Stages, Executive Pay and Remuneration Bill 2012-13, available at: 
http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2012-13/executivepayandremuneration.html last accessed, 
13 July 2016 
129 Supra, n.118 
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government always tend to provide regulations to empower the investors in 
stating that the government is making efforts to solve problems.130  
 
The salaries of the normal employees and the ratio of the pay difference 
between the executive managers and the employees are an important social 
issue when the government will consider while legislating regulations. However, 
this issue is not substantial enough for the government to provide employees 
any power of say on pay. Although voices from various groups are pointing out 
the unfair income, pay inequity is not the main pressure when governments 
create policies. Sometimes, institutional shareholders and governments would 
rather increase the pay gap if executives are performing well for firms and 
helping to boost the economy. It will be helpful to observe how governments 
reacted after the financial crisis, in order to understand their aims in providing 
a binding say on pay.  
 
Moreover, the separation of the different powers of shareholders in voting on 
future pay policies and the implementation report may be another explanation 
for why governments are not concerned about pay levels. After the above 
analysis of the reform, because of the lack of observable alignment between 
pay and performance for shareholders to vote on, voting based on predictions 
from advisory bodies and trust in the remuneration committee may reduce the 
monitoring function of shareholders. Because it is not voted on every three 
years but every year, it is the implementation report on remuneration that 
influences more practical issues. However, shareholders only have an advisory 
vote on this report. A famous case from 2014 was the revolt from investors 
regarding the pay report of Burberry’s CEO, Christopher Bailey, with 52% of 
them voting no to Bailey’s £10 million annual remuneration.131 Because it was 
an advisory vote, although there was huge dissatisfaction among the 
shareholders, Mr. Bailey still got paid.  
 
                                            
130 Mises Institute, P. St. Onge, “Government Regulation and Economic Stagnation”, May 
2015, available at: https://mises.org/library/government-regulation-and-economic-stagnation, 
last accessed, 13 July 2016  
131 BBC, “Burberry shareholders vote against remuneration report” July 2014, available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-28261916 last accessed, 13 July 2016 
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According to BIS, the aim of this new say on pay is to make a contribution to 
boosting the economy, but this regulation may also have a negative impact on 
business in the UK by reducing competiveness in the labour market. Executive 
directors may find the UK a less attractive place to work,132 since having more 
disclosure and stricter requirements surrounding their pay and its relationship 
with the performance of their firms will place more pressure on executives. 
Whether stricter rules towards companies should be applied to increase board 
accountability while not reducing business competiveness will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
On the aspect of remuneration policy making process, the binding vote makes 
shareholder bear more responsibility compared to the advisory vote.133 With 
shareholder’s legal obligation strengthened in monitoring pay policy and their 
legal position emphasising in voting, there is no requirement of how they should 
perform their duties or sanction towards their failures to perform. Although the 
UK government is not providing shareholder with the binding say on pay to 
prevent investor’s potential inactivity in their monitoring role, perhaps under the 
binding say on pay, shareholders should understand their duty and the 
importance of their positive engagement in policy making. Details will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
C. The UK Corporate Governance Code 
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) announced their revised UK Corporate 
Governance Code in September 2014 to emphasise the importance of the 
board, improve transparency and prevent group thinking. 134  Specifically, 
Section D and Schedule A of the Code provide detailed guidelines on how to 
                                            
132 M. Petrin, “Executive Compensation in the UK: past, present and future” (2015) 36 
Company Lawyer 195, p.196.  
133 Y. Hausmann & E. Bechtold-Orth, “Corporate Governance: Is Switzerland Outpacing 
Europe? A Comparative Legal Analysis of Current Developments” (2013) 13 European 
Business Organization Law Review 353, p.552 
134 FRC, available at: https://www.frc.org.uk/News-and-Events/FRC-
Press/Press/2014/September/FRC-updates-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code.aspx last 
accessed, 13 July 2016 
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design executive remuneration and promote the firm’s long-term success135 
(rather than the old reasoning, which was “to attract, retain and motivate 
directors”136). New provisions were added in the general principles of Section 
D: First, the remuneration committee should make a proper comparison with 
other companies in the same industry on the issue of executives’ remuneration 
level and avoid unnecessary pay.137 Second, the committee also should pay 
attention to conflicts of interest when executive directors provide their opinions 
of the design of their compensation.138 Third, claw-back rules are introduced if 
certain performance standard has not been reached by executive directors.139 
Another interesting provision is E 2.2, which adds an explanatory duty for the 
board to explain what they intend to do next if their report is voted against by a 
significant proportion of shareholders at any general meeting.140  
 
These provisions, through requiring a comparison with other companies’ 
executive pay level, introducing claw-back rules and increasing 
communicaitons with shareholders, show a directive to stop rising salary levels 
within certain industrial groups and eliminate managerial influence over the 
board (see Chapter 2, discussion around Bebchuk and Fried’s Managerial 
Influence Approach). These new provisions in the Code have shown that the 
attitude of the government, or at least the FRC, has been aimed at satisfying 
                                            
135 Supra, n.134, FRC, Principle D.1 added with deletion of the old para: “Executive directors’ 
remuneration should be designed to promote the long-term success of the company. 
Performance related elements should be transparent, stretching and rigorously applied.” 
136 Linklaters, Companies to publish viability statements as part of the updated UK Corporate 
Governance Code, September 2014, available at: 
http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/Publication1005Newsletter/UK-Corporate-Update-25-
September-2014/Pages/Companies-publish-viability-statements-UK-Corporate-Governance-
Code.aspx last accessed, 13 July 2016 
137 Supra, n.134, FRC, Principle D.1: “The remuneration committee should judge where to 
position their company relative to other companies … and should avoid paying more than is 
necessary.” 
138 Ibid, FRC, “The remuneration committee should take care to recognise and manage 
conflicts of interest when receiving views from executive directors or senior management, or 
consulting the chief executive about its proposals.” 
139 Ibid, FRC, Principle D.1.1: “In designing schemes of performance-related for executive 
directors, the remuneration committee should follow the provisions in Schedule A to this 
Code. Schemes should include provisions that would enable the company to recover sums 
paid or withhold the payment of any sum, and specify the circumstances in which it would be 
appropriate to do so.” 
140 Ibid, FRC, Provision E.2.2: “When, in the opinion of the board, a significant proportion of 
votes have been cast against a resolution at any general meeting, the company should 
explain when announcing the results of voting what actions it intends to take to understand 
the reasons behind the vote result.” 
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investors rather than executive directors. The new code was enacted in 
October 2014, so it is not yet clear whether the changes have affected, or will 
affect, the competitiveness of UK companies in the labour market.  
 
Additionally, Schedule A of the Code has lots of revisions aimed at regulating 
the share-based portion of remuneration, suggesting that remuneration 
committees should consider cutting the amount of shares granted to executives 
and preventing pay for failure by expanding the equity options’ vesting 
periods.141 The  revised provisions provided the remuneration committee with 
stronger requirements to stop paying for underperformance, with many 
provisions concerned with compensating executives for non-financial criteria 
deleted, and new provisions added, such as the idea that annual bonuses 
should also be mentioned in implementing the pay policy. Nonetheless, cases 
such as Morrisons and Tesco mentioned above have provided that even with 
restrictions in implementing pay policy, pay for failure or underperformance 
cannot simply be ruled out. 
 
In January 2016, the FRC published its research on the developments in the 
UK regulations on corporate governance and the public companies’ compliance 
from the year of 2015.142 It states that, in 2015, nearly a quarter of FTSE 350 
companies submitted their new remuneration policy at AGMs for shareholder 
resolution, although the binding vote legislation allows them to refrain from 
submitting the revised policies until 2016.143 On the perspective of the newly 
added regulations from Section D,  Section E and schedule A, FRC is satisfied 
with the reflection from the FTSE companies and holds an optimistic view on 
the future compliance with the Code. On the compliance of Section D, it is 
reported that by the beginning of 2016, 51% of the FTSE 100 companies has 
provided their incentive remuneration policies with longer period of equity 
                                            
141 Ibid, FRC, Schedule A: “For share-based remuneration the remuneration committee 
should consider requiring directors to hold a minimum number of shares and to hold shares 
for a further period after vesting or exercise, including for a period after leaving the 
company … Longer periods may be appropriate.” 
142 FRC, “Developments in Corporate Governance and Stewardship in 2015”, 2016, available 
at: https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Corporate-
Governance-Code.aspx last accessed, 13 July 2016 
143 Ibid. 
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holding plans, in part or in whole, comparing the figures of 37% in the beginning 
of 2015 and 20% in 2013. 144  From the aspect of section E 2.2, on the 
engagement of shareholder, the report states that at the AGMs held in 2015, 
54 of the FTSE 350 companies had over 20% of their shareholders voting for 
no on the remuneration policies, while in the year of 2014, this figure was 77 
among the FTSE 350 companies.145 FRS considers the 20 percent as an 
indicative and high threshold of opposition among shareholders in the public 
companies.146  
 
Two views can be concluded from those results: First, with more shareholders 
voting for not just simply a yes on executive remuneration policy, it can be 
observed that shareholders may not always be playing a passive role in policy 
voting procedure. Shareholders are probably trying to transform their role to a 
more active one. Cases happened in 2016 from WPP and BP can provide a 
practical explanation: in WPP, 33.5% of shareholders voted for no on the chief 
executive Martin Sorrell’s pay report;147 almost 60% of shareholders of BP 
voted against the pay package of the chief executive, Bob Dudley.148 A director 
of the Institute of Director stated that, with more shareholders realising how to 
use their voting right and how much the level of executive pay is unreasonable, 
companies and their boards should be more careful with pay setting and 
increase their communication with shareholders. 149  However, since 
shareholders only have advisory voting rights on executive implementation 
remuneration report, these revolts’ effects would only be that boards revise pay 
policy and submit it for shareholder’s voting at the annual meeting next year. 
Excessive pay for the CEOs can still be implemented. Further discussions on 
shareholder’s role changing and voting power will be provided in Chapter 6.  
 




147 The Guardian, “Sir Martin Sorrell at Sharp End of Investor Revolt at WPP AGM,” 8 June 
2016, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/08/sir-martin-sorrell-pay-
deal-faces-investor-revolt-at-wpp-agm, last accessed, 13 July 2016  
148 The Guardian, “BP Shareholders’ Revolt against CEO’s £14m Pay Package,” 14 April 
2016, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/apr/14/bp-pledge-
shareholder-anger-ceo-bob-dudleypay-deal last accessed, 13 July 2016 
149 Ibid. 
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Second, with a fair compliance of the revised code and its certain provisions, 
the code is influencing executive remuneration from a good direction in 
regulating board’s behaviours and encouraging dialogue between board and 
shareholders.  
However, the “Comply or Explain” standard in regulating the public companies 
for the corporate governance code of the UK has made this code’s functions 
lean more on the reflection and reporting of the companies’ governance side, 
than on the monitoring of stewardship and controlling the companies’ 
governance side.  
 
In 2016, FRC updated the UK’s Corporate Governance Code to comply new 
EU regulations on auditing issues, 150  while regulations towards executive 
remuneration has not been changed. Certain effects of the UK Corporate 




As mentioned in Chapter 4, increasing shareholder monitoring and board 
independence are the main resolutions that corporate legislation can provide to 
help solve executive remuneration problems. In a short time from the year 2013 
the UK binding say on pay has helped in stopping executive pay levels from 
increasing dramatically as they did during the 2000s. However, on the other 
hand, several cases during these years have shown that problems such as pay 
for performance reporting and pay for underperformance still remain. Also, 
without absolute majority voting, shareholder dissatisfaction, for example even 
with 30% voting against a pay policy, have not be efficiently answered.  
 
There is a significant increasing corporate compliance with the 2013 executive 
remuneration reform and the corporate governance regulations, however, on 
the other side, specific cases surrounding the failure of the shareholder’s veto 
                                            
150 FRC, “Statement from Stephen Haddrill, Chief Executive of the Financial Reporting 
Council, regarding the implementation of the EU Audit Regulation and Directive”, June 2016, 
available at: https://www.frc.org.uk/News-and-Events/FRC-
Press/Press/2016/June/Statement-from-Stephen-Haddrill,-Chief-Executive-o.aspx, last 
accessed, 13 July 2016 
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power have shown that this compliance has not fulfilled the purpose of 
legislation on remuneration issues. Although shareholders now have a higher 
level of power over pay decisions, complicated explanations in pay strategies 
provided by the board and the extensive detail in long remuneration incentive 
reporting means that the accountability of board is to be questioned.  
 
From the background story of the UK government discussing the binding say 
on pay, it can be concluded that the primary purpose of the government in 
providing remuneration reform is to attract and satisfy investors, especially 
institutional investors. However, the results of implementing the 2013 reform 
are also obvious in showing that shareholder power is not that workable as pay 
for underperformance still largely exists. Also, the complexity of remuneration 
reporting did not make the engagement of shareholders quite easy, and 
shareholders are not satisfied with the accountability of board. Therefore, what 
would be appropriate adjustments provided for shareholders within corporate 
governance and company law to solve executive remuneration issues? 
Questions waiting to be solved by Chapter 6.  
 
The third concern left by the 2013 reform is the increasing pay gap. It has been 
suggested that empowering investors with regard to executive pay may be the 
wrong direction for promoting pay for performance, pursuing better firm 
performance and social justice.151 As an alternative, Charlotte Villiers suggests 
that employees should be given the same opportunity as shareholders to be 
involved in board and remuneration committee decisions for the purpose of 
monitoring the level of executive pay. 152  In Kent Greenfield’s analysis, 
empowering shareholders to have a say in executive remuneration simply 
makes companies focus on short-term benefits. According to Greenfield: 
 
“Executive compensation has become the carrot that shareholders 
use to entice management to focus primarily on shareholder value 
(and consequently to disregard other stakeholders). When 
                                            
151 C. Villiers, “Controlling Executive Pay: Institutional Investors or Distributive Justice?” 
(2010) 10 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 309, p.311 
152 Ibid. 
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executives are called on to justify their high salaries, they point not 
to the value of the company in creating jobs or providing useful 
goods and services, but to shareholder gain.”153  
 
On the other hand, Greenfield suggests that government support for 
shareholder primacy will lead to deeper income and wealth inequalities.154 
Regulations only set for the interests of shareholders will benefit those who are 
already financially well-off, partly since capital wealth is controlled by a tiny 
fraction of the population, and partly because it encourages cost-cutting and 
downsizing, usually at the expense of employees lower down the corporate 
hierarchy.155 Therefore, questions such as whether to set a ratio between 
executive pay and employees’ pay or whether an absolute shareholder binding 
vote on the design of executive remuneration should be mandatory in law will 
be discussed later in this thesis.  
 
                                            
153 K. Greenfield, “Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age” (2008) 2 Harvard Law & 
Policy Review 1, p.14. 
154 Ibid.  
155 Supra n.151, Villiers, p.335 
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Chapter Six 




From Chapters 4 and 5, it can be concluded that the aims of governments in 
reforming executive remuneration practice are to promote long-term success 
for their public companies and economies, using the method of providing 
shareholders with stronger powers in terms of scrutiny of pay for executives. 
To empower shareholders with a say on pay has become a global trend as an 
attempt to solve executive remuneration problems. Is shareholder 
empowerment in terms of a say on pay able to assure long-term productivity? 
If the empowerment is not as useful as governments think, are there any other 
methods that may be provided by corporate governance to make sure of pay 
for performance? Will the accountability of the board to shareholders in terms 
of executive pay be enough to improve pay design? These questions will be 
analysed and answered in this chapter, on the basis of which suggestions on 
how to regulate remuneration will be provided later.  
 
What could be a good design for executive remuneration will be discussed in a 
normative way in this chapter. In Chapter 2, agency theory and managerial 
theory were discussed to prove that pay for performance is the final goal of 
setting executive managers’ remuneration. How to achieve this goal will also 
be discussed in this chapter. The requirements for forming a good remuneration 
system will be provided from several perspectives, such as the vesting period 
design of long-term incentive plans, the balance between motivation and 
punishment, and non-financial incentives in executive pay.  
 
Chapter 6 will consider the central relationships that emerge from practical 
factors and which have existed between executive pay and shareholder 
intervention, board accountability and shareholder participation. Good pay 
practices should be analysed from several perspectives, including the 
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perspectives of the shareholders, the executive directors, the board and normal 
employees.  
 
Section I will emphasise the rationale for having a shareholder say on pay. It 
will suggest that having shareholder power over remuneration policy making 
will not be harmful to the firm’s long-term productivity. Certain arguments will 
be made and propose that, shareholders, as a whole, are a separate group in 
corporate governance that tends to focus on the firm’s long-term success. The 
advantages and disadvantages of shareholder empowerment will be 
summarised from the say on pay experiences of the UK and the US. This 
section will prove that shareholder intervention has a positive influence over 
issues of executive remuneration. This section will also provide several 
suggestions for shareholders about how to improve their intervention.  
 
Section II will provide a discussion about the need for board accountability. 
Contrary to shareholder empowerment, director primacy suggests that 
executive remuneration should not have much, if any, interference from 
shareholders. This section will prove that without regulatory intervention, board 
accountability is not enough to solve remuneration problems and to promote a 
firm’s long-term success. Problems and good examples for how to solve these 
issues will be investigated, following which several suggestions will be provided 
for how to improve accountability. Along with the suggestions provided in 
Section I, several principles will be put forward for how to improve the board’s 
service when making remuneration reports.  
 
After these discussions, Section III will provide some proposals for how to 
improve executive remuneration pay plans. Based on the spirit of company law 
and empirical evidence that has been used to explain the current situation of 
executive remuneration, a summary of regulatory suggestions will provide 
guidance for how to adjust the pay structure to align pay and performance.  
 
Additionally, fairness issues in pay will be investigated. There will be a 
discussion around employees participating in executive pay design and 
practice. The shareholders’ say on pay, as a comparatively more practical 
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method to monitor executive pay, has not been recognised as the only way to 
solve compensation problems. The notion of having an employee say on pay 
has been mentioned by many scholars, although a workable method is difficult 
to find. In Section IV there will be some suggestions for how to have a broader 
scope of say on pay. 
 
This chapter will answer the second research question by figuring out what kind 
of regulations should be used to solve executive remuneration problems. After 
the introduction of the UK’s binding say on pay reform that discussed in Chapter 
5, there are still three concerns left on the executive remuneration issue: pay 
for underperformance of executives, shareholder’s difficulties in understanding 
of pay reports and pay gaps increasing between executives and formal 
employees. Sections in this chapter will have a further analysis on these 
concerns and provide solutions in detail.  
 
Before the discussion, it will be helpful to mention that this thesis is not setting 
out to emphasise that shareholder primacy is the theoretical value we should 
utilise in terms of executive remuneration. This thesis does not mean to say 
that remuneration issues should be regulated by shareholder value. It is all 
about how to use shareholder power granted by legislation to affect 
remuneration decisions. Also, this is not to say that directors cannot be trusted 
at all on remuneration issues, but rather, to reflect on how they could improve 
their accountability under current legislative conditions.  
 
I. Shareholder Say on Pay 
 
A. Shareholder Power and Long-Term Success  
Shareholder empowerment has long been recognized as a tool that legislation 
can provide for investors in monitoring management issues in firms. A rationale 
should stand behind various regulations that have been discussed in Chapters 
4 and 5 in empowering the shareholders in developing managers’ pay policies, 
and in the following it will be analysed from an empirical perspective. 
 199 
 
A book called Developing a Winning Partnership, written by Paul Myners, has 
proposed that although in 1995 institutional shareholders had claimed the 
predominant place in the UK, these investors were still reluctant to intervene in 
their investee companies even when the firms were underperforming. 1 
However, Myners later suggests that, if shareholders were given the power to 
intervene in decisions about managers’ pay, they would be capable of making 
decisions and how to make the best of situations. 2  Under Myners’ logic, 
shareholders can be active in voting and making decisions for the companies if 
they are empowered with a proper design of intervention. Is this hypothesis of 
shareholder intervention workable?  
 
The efficiency of shareholder intervention in firms can be debatable. Evidence 
from the financial crisis period during 2007 to 2009 has shown that 
shareholders in the UK’s public firms were provided with a greater scope of 
power under company law and corporate governance than in the US, while 
stock prices fell faster than they did in the US during 2008, which led to a 
banking crisis in the UK as serious as that in the US.3 In terms of the history of 
UK company legislation, it would be misleading to say that the basic features 
of modern firms, such as their separate personality, concentralised 
management, limited liability, and free transfer of shares, have evolved together 
to form today’s corporate model.4 Nonetheless, these basic features were 
generated by law in different times and adjusted to later environments.5  
 
Normally, there are two ways created by legislation that shareholders can use 
to intervene in the firm’s management: the exit channel and the voting channel.6 
In public firms, shareholders can show their dissatisfaction and try to have 
                                            
1 Department of Trade and Industry, P. Myners, “Developing a Winning Partnership: How 
Companies and Institutional Investors are Working Together”, 1996, p28. 
2 P. Myners, Myners Review of Institutional Investment for HM Treasury, 2001, p.11 
3 B. Cheffins, “Did Corporate Governance “Fail” during the 2008-9 Stock Market Meltdown?”, 
(2009), ECGI Law Working Paper, No. 124/2009, p.6  
4 S. Deakin, “Corporate Governance and Financial Crisis in the Long Run” (December 2010), 
CBR Research Programme on Corporate Governance, p.6 
5 Ibid., S. Deakin. 
6 K. Stathopoulos & G. Voulgaris, “The Impact of Shareholder Activism: The case of say-on-
pay” (2015) 24 Corporate Governance: An International Review 359, p.360.  
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impact on managerial decisions by threatening to sell their shares, which will 
cause the stock price to drop. This may not only make the managers concerned 
about their incentive equity compensation, but also have negative effects on 
the reputation of the company, 7  and ultimately on the reputations of the 
managers. The other way provided for shareholder intervention is to express 
their opinions by voting against certain board decisions or directors at 
shareholders’ meetings.8 The shareholders’ say on pay is one factor in the 
second channel.  
 
Why are shareholders provided with these two ways to intervene? How can 
shareholders influence public companies and even the whole economy using 
these two channels?  
 
Deakin proposed that it is not only agency theory that adjusts corporate 
governance and company law; also the high liquidity of capital markets can 
have a huge impact.9 The financial crisis, which began in 2007 and emerged 
during 2008–09, caused large concerns that the increasing liquidity of capital 
markets had already changed the ownership of public firms from family 
members to institutional shareholders through widely diversified pension funds 
and mutual funds.10 Also, there is a trend for shares to be held in short-term 
ownership, such as by hedge funds, share lending and securitized 
instruments. 11  With the rapid increase of equity liquidation, the use of 
shareholder power can become complicated. Since their investments will stay 
for a shorter time in one company, will shareholders focus on the firm’s long-
term profits while they vote on corporate policies, or sell their shares to 
terminate their interest in the company?  
                                            
7 A. Edmans, “Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia” (2009) 64 
The Journal of Finance 2481, p.2493; A.R. Admati & P. Pfleiderer, “The Wall Street Walk and 
Shareholder Activism: Exit as a form of voice” (2009) 22 Review of Financial Studies 2445, 
pp.2476–77. 
8 R. Ashraf, N. Jayaraman & H.E. Ryan. Jr. “Do Pension-related Business Ties Influence 
Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive 
Compensation” (2012) 47 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 567, p.573.  
9 Supra, n.5, S. Deakin, p.8 
10 Ibid. 
11 L. Hannah, “The Divorce of Ownership from Control 1900: Re-calibrating Imagined Global 
Historical Trends” (2007) 49 Business History 404, p.411  
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It was mentioned in Chapter 4 that say on pay reforms, which enhanced 
shareholders’ power to improve directors’ accountability in the 1970s and the 
early 1990s, have already conferred too much power on the shareholders. It 
has been suggested that these reforms may be erroneous in regulating 
shareholder power, because even institutional shareholders tend to see their 
contribution of equity capital to the firm’s finance declining during financial 
crises, and providing them with more powers for intervention in management 
may cause other problems12 such as short-term rent-seeking behaviours and 
sudden extractions. 
 
Nonetheless, none of these concerns should stop regulations from developing 
shareholder powers to influence public companies. This can be explained in 
terms of the ways shareholders can intervene in the management of firms.  
 
Though shareholder empowerment has been questioned in terms of whether it 
can be used to promote long-term productivity, it is accepted that if it can be 
improved, shareholder engagement can be helpful in preventing firms from 
pursuing short-term success. In the words of Roger Barker, from the Institute 
of Directors of Corporate Governance (IoD), in terms of the new 2014 EU 
proposals on shareholders’ rights13 he mentioned that: “while we may not 
agree with every aspect of the proposal, the IoD shares the commission’s 
overall objective of enhancing long-term, constructive engagement of 
institutional investors with listed companies”.14 
 
Long-term success or long-term productivity is an interesting phrase that 
appears in almost every reform document on executive compensation. 15 
                                            
12 Supra, n. 4, Deakin, p.9 
13 European Commission, “European Commission proposes to strengthen shareholder 
engagement and introduce a “say on pay” for Europe’s largest companies”, April 2014, 
available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-396_en.htm?locale=en last accessed, 
26 July 2016 
14 IoD, “Shareholder say on pay is vital for long-term success of companies-says IoD”, April 
2014, available at: http://www.iod.com/influencing/press-office/press-releases/shareholder-
say-on-pay-is-vital-for-long-term-success-of-companies last accessed, 26 July 2016 
15 Such as the UK BIS’s regulation draft and revision paper, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/directors-pay-revised-remuneration-reporting-
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According to the World Economic Forum, in a healthy market, a public 
company’s long-term success is defined as meaning that can be invested with 
the expectation of “holding an asset for an indefinite period of time by an 
investor with the capability to do so.” 16  It is also the main reason why 
governments choose to give shareholders the power of say on pay. Although 
in Chapter 5 it was acknowledged that the UK binding say on pay was provided 
because of pressure from institutional investors and the outrage of the public, 
nevertheless the long-term success of public companies and the equity market 
still relies in the first place on all the factors which influence the regulations, and 
also the same goals that governments and shareholders are expecting.  
 
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, the goal of long-term success is why executive 
remuneration has been defined as equity based. If the managers are given a 
fixed compensation, such as their basic salary plus an annual bonus, they will 
focus on short-term success since they only need to ensure that they can have 
their pay continued. However, compared to directors, shareholders are more 
long-term focused. A survey done by Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal suggested 
that to attract more investments, 78% of executives would sacrifice the firm’s 
long-term success to meet short-term earning targets.17 “A chief executive may 
run the show for a few years; but a shareholder has an interest in the full lifetime 
of the company, since today’s share price is in principle determined by the 
discounted value of all future profits.”18 Even for those shareholders who are 
relatively short-termist, such as hedge fund investors who hold shares for a 
period of one or two years, their perspective is still focused on the long-term 
profits of the company, since they only buy shares when they are priced 
cheaply.19  
                                            
regulations; https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/executive-pay-consultation-on-
enhanced-shareholder-voting-rights ; and the US SEC recent CEO pay ratio rule: 
http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-on-open-meeting-on-pay-ratio-aguilar.html last 
accessed, 26 July 2016 
16 World Economic Forum, Global Agenda Councils, Long-term Investing, 2012, available at: 
http://reports.weforum.org/global-agenda-council-2012/councils/long-term-investing/ last 
accessed, 26 July 2016 
17 D. Graham, C. Harvey & S. Rajgopal, “The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial 
Reporting” (2005) 40 Journal of Accounting and Economics 3, p.4.  
18 Financial Times, Opinions, S. Mallaby. “Shortsighted Complaints about Short-Term 
Capitalism”, 6 August 2015.  
19 Ibid  
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Shareholders who focus on the long-term productivity of firms will help to 
increase the firm’s value. In Edmans’ paper, he notes that shareholders with a 
considerable holding of shares can influence a public firm’s management 
through market efficiency. Contrary to the traditional view of corporate 
governance, he proposes that shareholders can improve firm value even by 
threatening to sell their shares, though they have no other channels to intervene 
in management.20 For shareholders, especially shareholders with a relatively 
larger holding of shares (the “blockholders”, as Edmans refers to them in his 
paper), a large holding of shares increases their intervention and monitoring 
incentives. In his paper Edmans provides a new way of thinking about 
shareholders, studying them as informed traders but not as controlling entities. 
Such shareholders would like to gather more information about firms from the 
markets and from inside the firms.21 The more information they have, the more 
accurate are their opinions about firm value. If the firms ignore their voice at 
meetings or keep decreasing value, shareholders will trade in their shares. 
Having several blockholders trade their shares together can be dangerous for 
firms, since the share price will drop quickly and other shareholders holding a 
smaller fraction of shares may sell theirs as well, which will harm the firm’s 
value.22 Pressure like this will force the board to listen to shareholders and may 
help to increase the firm’s value indirectly.  
 
Moreover, this difference in short-term and long-term focus between directors 
and shareholders leads to agency costs.23 To stop the directors, especially 
executive directors, from using the firm to satisfy their own interests, which may 
be harmful to the company, firms need to make sure that those directors are 
paid with equities that align their interests with those of the shareholders. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, to design incentive equity plans and other various 
elements in managers’ pay to align pay for performance, companies need to 
                                            
20 Supra, n.7, Edmans, p.2438.  
21 X. Yan & Z. Zhang, “Institutional Investors and Equity Returns: Are short-term institutions 
better informed?” (2009) 22 Review of Financial Study 893, p.897 
22 A. Edmans, “Bolckholders and Corporate Governance” (2014) 6 Annual Review of 
Financial Economy 23, p.30. 
23 Ibid. 
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pay for the costs of hiring compensation consultants and other members of the 
remuneration committee, which should come from shareholders’ income. On 
the other hand, the shareholders need to use their voting power on executive 
remuneration, which will also cost their payout if they have to obtain expertise 
from professional institutions to understand remuneration reports and make 
decisions.  
 
Deakin provides two reasons why current reforms are empowering 
shareholders on corporate governance issues, though their  contributions to 
firms’ financing might be now declining:24 first, because agency theory has 
been justified by reforms in corporate governance since the 1990s, it is now the 
shareholder’s right and also their duty to ensure that executives are making the 
right decisions as far as the firm’s cash flow is concerned, while the 
shareholders’ standard of capital returns is usually stricter than the board’s 
when they are monitoring projects to make sure the firm reaps the benefits and 
can provide stable employment; second, shareholders may have a “rent-
seeking” purpose, tending to use the liquidity of capital under their disposal to 
“extract” benefits from the firm’s business. Similar to directors’ rent-seeking 
behaviours, shareholder rent-seeking, such as that undertaken by hedge fund 
managers, may destroy a company’s long-term success and be detrimental to 
other constituencies.  
 
Even if we disregard the first concerns around short-term shareholding 
influences on investors in corporate policy making, the second important 
question is, are these shareholders interested in interfering in executive 
remuneration? Also, there is always a concern about shareholders intervening 
in management policies because of information asymmetry problems. It has 
been suggested that shareholders are reluctant to intervene in management 
issues, and while voting outcomes are ignored by board and CEOs, 
shareholders will put little effort into change these policies.25 
                                            
24 Supra, n.4, S. Deakin, p.8 
25 Flip Chart Fairy Tales, “Will Shareholder Empowerment Curb the Executive Pay?” Feb 
2012, available at: https://flipchartfairytales.wordpress.com/2012/02/02/will-shareholder-
empowerment-curb-executive-pay/ last accessed, 26 July 2016 
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Therefore, in the context of these problems concerning shareholder 
empowerment, should the regulation still hold its direction in providing 
shareholders with the right to interfere in remuneration policy, and moreover, 
can the use of shareholder voting be beneficial for the company’s long-term 
productivity? These questions will be analysed next. 
 
Sheehan has mentioned that “there is an iterative process in the regulation of 
executive remuneration practice and thus the potential for evolution in 
executive remuneration practice influenced by evolutions in the activities of 
disclosure, engagement and voting.”26 Also, in the Impact of Assessment of 
Improvement of Transparency of Executive Remuneration, there is the 
following statement:  
 
“shareholder empowerment lies at the heart of the UK’s corporate 
governance framework and the proposed reforms are consistent 
with that approach. Shareholders will be in a stronger position to 
promote a clearer link between pay and performance, ensuring that 
companies act in the best interests of their ultimate owners and 
contributing to a better functioning corporate sector more 
generally.”27  
 
In October 2014 the BIS published a report on the implementation of the Kay 
Review, mainly concerning how to build a good environment for long-term 
equity investment in the UK. From the perspectives of encouraging effective 
engagement and stewardship, improving narrative reporting, forming trust-
based relationships between investors and companies and fixing the 
misalignment of incentives that would undermine this trust, this report aims at 
                                            
26 K. Sheehan, “The Regulatory Framework for Executive Remuneration in Australia”(2009) 
31 Sydney Law Review 273, p.278 
27 BIS, “Impact Assessment (IA), Improved Transparency of Executive Remuneration 
Reporting”, June 2012, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/improved-
transparency-of-executive-remuneration-reporting-impact-assessment, p.7, last accessed, 26 
July 2016 
 206 
increasing shareholder involvement in company issues.28 In addition, the FRC 
offered their Stewardship Code to improve institutional shareholders’ 
stewardship responsibilities and their monitoring activities.29 It is a new age for 
corporate governance, especially from the perspective of shareholder 
intervention. Investors, especially institutional shareholders, tend to focus more 
on the companies’ long-term business. Institutional shareholders are also 
agencies for the other entities.  
 
In the remuneration principles set out by the National Association of Pension 
Funds (NAPF), Hermes Equity Ownership Services, the BT Pension Scheme, 
RPMI Railpen Investment and USS Investment Management, these giant 
investors suggest that management should make a material long-term 
investment in the shareholders of the businesses they manage, and the best 
way to align the interests of shareholders and executives is the ownership of 
shares over the long-term, with “ownership obligations increasing with 
seniority”.30  
 
Thus, with realizations from both of the investors and the government, the 
following will argue that from the perspective of executive remuneration, the 
empowerment of shareholders in voting will promote the healthier development 
of pay practice and the firm’s long-term success. 
 
The first reason why shareholders are always provided with power over 
executive pay is that one important purpose of setting remuneration is to align 
the interests of principal and agent, while decreasing the risks of investors’ 
shareholdings. There are reasons to be suspicious of shareholders’ influence 
                                            
28 BIS, Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making: Implementation 
progress report, 27 October 2014, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/kay-review-of-uk-equity-markets-and-long-term-
decision-making-implementation-progress-report p.8, last accessed, 26 July 2016 
29 FRC, UK Stewardship Code, available at: https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-
Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Stewardship-Code.aspx last accessed, 26 July 2016 
30 Remuneration Principles for Building and Reinforcing Long-term Business Success, 
published by Hermes, NAPF et al, Feb 2013, available at: 
http://www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary/0351_remuneration_principles_fo
r_building_and_reinforcing%20_longterm_business_success_nov2013.aspx last accessed, 
26 July 2016 
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on long-term productivity, as mentioned previously. Institutional shareholdings 
such as mutual funds, which pool money from investors and entrust this wealth 
to an asset company while the investing contracts are made by investors, 
mutual fund managers and the company, will have few incentives to rein in any 
excessive risks that executive managers may take (for the purpose of 
increasing directors’ pay);31 in voting on the resolutions of the company, they 
are “reluctant activists.”32 Investors like this have no direct relationship with the 
investing company and therefore will not initiate proposals as regularly as other 
shareholders. On the other hand, the goal of fund managers is rather short-
term, since the performance valuation of the fund is based on annual 
comparison with peer groups, and thus they seldom have incentives to interfere 
in corporate governance issues, let alone the executive remuneration policy, of 
the investing company. 33  Nonetheless, this indirect relation does not stop 
investors like this having more power over voting, and intervening in executive 
pay policy and reports. Bebchuk proposes that although mutual funds are not 
a good basis for investors and fund managers to initiate management of the 
firm, the other large institutional shareholders will provide a trend of voting on 
resolutions for these investors to follow.34 From another perspective, generally 
speaking, shareholders are not that dissatisfied about current executive 
remuneration design, which contains bonuses, equity options, pensions and 
other benefits for managers.  
 
Moreover, evidence has shown that contrary to what scholars have suggested, 
shareholders pay attention to remuneration policy making and reporting, and 
with certain perspectives developing from this attention, they can promote the 
firm’s long-term profits.  
 
                                            
31 J. C. Coffee, “Liquidity Verses Control: The institutional investors as corporate monitor”, 
(1991) 91 Columbia Law Review 1277, p.1334 
32 R.C. Pozen, “Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists”, (1994) Harvard Business 
Review, Jan-Feb Issue 140, p.148 
33 E. E. Avgouleas, Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A legal and economic 
analysis (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005) p.78 
34 L.A. Bebchuk, “Letting Shareholders Set the Rules”, (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 
1784, p.1796  
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Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), an international shareholders’ voting 
agency which provides services to nearly 1,600 institutions globally, is “a 
leading provider of proxy advisory and corporate governance solutions to 
financial market participants”.35 In their 2014 survey of pay for performance 
alignment opinions among 105 institutional shareholders from the UK, the US, 
continental Europe, Canada and the Asia-Pacific region, ISS revealed some of 
the shareholder’s opinions when they vote on executive pay reports.36 Their 
survey focuses on issues of company performance goal setting, executive pay 
level, investors’ say on pay and managers’ income comparison in the same 
industries.  
 
According to this report, in terms of the level of executive pay, 60% of the 
shareholders would still be concerned about the firm’s report on pay levels even 
if the company’s performance was better than the other peer firms in the same 
industry, 19% of them would prefer an absolute limit on the pay level, and 14% 
would support proportional limits on remuneration in relation to the firm’s 
absolute performance.37 As for the say on pay issue, 63% of the shareholder 
respondents indicated that if there were positive changes in the implementation 
of pay policy in the second and third years, they would be less concerned and 
more enthusiastic towards the policy they have voted for.38 With respect to 
European institution respondents, 83% of the respondents expressed their 
interest in peer group pay level comparison.39 
 
The following table was made for their survey report and shows the 
shareholders’ and companies’ attitudes towards firms’ business goals and 
remuneration design. 43% of the shareholders thought that if the directors’ 
performance targets were lowered their compensation levels should change 
with performance targets, and only 19% of shareholders were willing to pass 
                                            
35 ISS, 2014-2015 Policy Survey Summary of Results, available at: 
http://www.issgovernance.com/iss-releases-results-annual-global-voting-policy-survey/ last 
accessed, 26 July 2016 
36 Ibid, p.3 
37 Ibid, p.4 
38 Ibid, p.5 
39 Ibid. 
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pay packages without performance linked to them to attract talented 
executives.40  
 
Form from ISS, 2014-2015 Policy Survey Summary of Results 
 
The ISS report does not give their conclusion and comments on this survey, 
but from these statistics, a large proportion of institutional shareholders from 
various countries have indicated their concern with the level of pay, the 
alignment between pay and performance, the implementation of pay policy, and 
also comparison in terms of pay levels within peer groups. Although these 
concerns are presented on a general scale, the guidelines drawn up by large 
institutional shareholders to promote best practice in terms of executive 
compensation will be analysed later. With the influence from this large 
proportion of shareholders whose attitude to compensation is sympathetic to 
promoting pay for performance, even though other short-term shareholding 
investors might hold voting opinions differently on remuneration reports before 
annual meetings, Bebchuk’s previous assumption that voting ideas of several 
active institutional shareholders can influence the other shareholders and 
change their ideas in voting may be achieved. Thus, emphasising investor 
                                            
40 Ibid. p.9 
 
Q: Which of the following best reflects your institution’s idea 
of the relationship between goal setting and award values? 
Shareholder Board 
1. If performance goals are significantly reduced, target 
award levels should be commensurately modified to reflect 
the expected lower level of performance. 
43% 3% 
2. Performance goals should be set independently of target 
awards, which must be maintained at competitive levels in 
order to attract and retain top quality executives 
19% 25% 
3. The compensation committee should have broad 
discretion to set both goals and target awards at levels 
deemed to be appropriate under the circumstances 
26% 67% 
4. Other 12% 5% 
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power in pay policy making and reporting can be a trustworthy method of 
improving compensation governance. 
 
The second reason for empowering shareholders in terms of executive pay is 
that legislation is an easier route to provide shareholders with power, while it is 
hard to ensure board accountability on executive remuneration. Also, the 
details of remuneration reports and policies which are presented for resolution 
must be emphasised, which reflects the general requirements of various 
regulations on compensation and transparency. Although there are always 
concerns over whether shareholders will be qualified by the law to make 
decisions for the company’s governance, Bebchuk suggests that the legislative 
choice is always between giving shareholders power to influence the running 
of the firm, or leaving the boardroom to maintain its “indefinite” control over 
governance, with executives having managerial influence over the board.41 
 
In this thesis, the former should be considered as the choice for legislation on 
executive remuneration. Empirical evidence to be explored in the following will 
illustrate that allowing shareholders to engage in remuneration policy making 
will help to improve the previously described situation. Additionally, problems 
of shareholders’ say on pay in practice will be summarised to allow for further 
discussion.  
 
B. Shareholders and Executive Remuneration 
-----Experience of the UK and the US in applying advisory votes 
 
Generally speaking, investors in UK listed companies perceived the say on pay 
as a valuable monitoring mechanism and have successfully used this power to 
stop executive remuneration levels from growing rapidly while increasing the 
sensitivity of pay to poor performance.42 With the international trend towards 
                                            
41 Supra, n.34, Bebchuk, p.1790 
42 F. Ferri & D. A. Maber, “Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the 
UK” (2013) 17 Review of Finance 527, p.559 
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empowering shareholders in terms of managers’ remuneration issues that was 
discussed in Chapter 4 and the globalised flow of capital, this shareholder 
voting influence on executive compensation shows a general similarity among 
developed countries.43  
 
In 2009, Conyon and Sadler published a report on how shareholders reacted 
to the UK’s regulatory shareholders’ non-binding vote, investigating a large 
sample from nearly 50,000 voting resolutions of quoted firms during the period 
from 2002 to 2007.44 According to their research, it is rare among shareholders 
to show absolute dissent to executive remuneration reports, with only 7% to 10% 
total dissent across those five years.45 Shareholders in the UK were satisfied 
with companies’ pay policies; over 90% of them voted for the reports, and 
moreover this approval increased over this period.46 Nonetheless, compared 
to other proposals such as nomination and non-pay policies proposed by the 
board, shareholders show a higher level of dissent in relation to remuneration 
reports.47  
 
Evidence from other scholars, which was discussed in Chapter 3, found a 
negative relation between shareholders voting in favour and the level of 
executive remuneration. 48  Research proposed that after the UK advisory 
shareholder say-on-pay was enacted in 2002, boards reacted quickly to 
shareholder dissent about provisions such as rewards for failure. More 
significantly, poor performance of executive managers was more highly 
correlated with steep penalties.49 Additionally, however, boards responded to 
shareholders’ dissatisfaction by adjusting the total level of executive pay, but 
                                            
43 N. Fernandes, M. Ferreira, P. Matos & K. Murphy, “Are US CEOs Paid More? New 
International Evidence” (2013) 26 Review of Financial Studies 323, p.325 
44 M. J. Conyon & G.V. Sadler, “Shareholder Voting and Director’s Remuneration Report 
Legislation: Say On Pay in the UK”, (2009) Compensation Research Institute, p.5, available 
at: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cri/2 last accessed, 26 July 2016 
45 Ibid. p.23 
46 Ibid, p.21 
47 Ibid, p.22 
48 M.E. Carter & V.L. Zamora, “Shareholder Remuneration Votes and CEO Compensation 
Design”, (November, 2007), AAA 2008 MAS Meeting Paper, p.24; W. Alissa, “Boards' 
Response to Shareholders' Dissatisfaction: The Case of Shareholders' Say on Pay in the UK” 
(2015) 24 European Accounting Review 727, p.750 
49 Supra, n.42, Ferri and Maber, p.534 
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not the structure of it,50 which still remains a potentially threatening issue since 
the level will influence one year’s pay while the structure, especially the equity 
pay design, will affect pay over a longer term. 
 
In Ferri and Maber’s research on shareholder advisory votes, they investigated 
seventy-five public companies that experienced a more than 20% shareholder 
veto on executive pay reports.51 The boards of these firms provided their 
revised pay policies, within which changes were mainly in two areas: the 
existing executive contract’s notice periods, and executive pay’s performance-
based conditions. 52  After the shareholders showed their dissatisfaction 
towards the pay plan, sixteen firms reduced the executives’ notice period from 
twenty-four months to twelve months, while managers’ golden goodbyes were 
reduced to nearly half of the original amount.53 This research has confirmed in 
an empirical way that boards tend to reduce the level and other obvious factors 
in pay plans if there is strong dissatisfaction among shareholders.  
 
Although shareholders’ voting activities show an optimistic attitude towards 
most companies’ pay plans since the 2002 advisory vote was introduced, the 
financial crisis which began in 2008 definitely raised the alarm for shareholders 
and governments, not only reminding them of nonfeasance of boards, but also 
hastening legislation to provide an efficient solution. 
 
In the US, except of several provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that would 
definitely come into force in 2011, the impact of the remaining areas was 
uncertain. “Many companies are hedging their bets and will respond in more 
detail once the SEC confirms the rules,” said Gregg Passin, a partner in 
Mercer’s Executive Rewards team in the US. 54  Meanwhile, institutional 
shareholders continue to “exert a strong influence on pay discussions but with 
around 98 percent of US companies having passed their say-on-pay 
                                            
50 Supra, n.48, Alissa, p.728 
51 Supra, n.42, Ferri and Maber, p.536 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 The HR Director, “Shareholder Spring Goes Global”, 12 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.thehrdirector.com/features/miscellaneous/shareholder-spring-goes-global/ last 
accessed, 26 July 2016 
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resolutions in 2011 and 2012, it is fair to say that progress is being made.”55 
Moreover, Mark Hoble, a partner in Mercer’s Executive Rewards team in the 
UK, commented that : 
 
“companies are considering the appropriateness of their historic pay 
decisions through the lenses of current public perception and 
economic performance. We are seeing companies undertake 
scenario modeling for their planned pay policies. This is an essential 
and sensible part of corporate risk and reputation management.”56 
 
Although the advisory say-on-pay was not implemented until 2010 in the US, 
shareholder proposals for transparency in executive pay, especially from 
institutional shareholders, had already increased significantly. Research has 
shown that from 2002 to 2007, 134 firms whose shareholders voted no to the 
boards’ executive pay proposals in their annual general meetings had their 
CEOs’ pay reduced by $7.3 million in total.57 Optimistically, concerns about the 
structure and equity design component of executive pay from institutional 
shareholders were also revealed, even before the introduction of the Dodd-
Frank Act.58 One goal of the US say on pay regulation is to foster more 
transparent executive compensation and better alignment of CEO incentives 
with the interests of shareholders.  
 
Studies show that say on pay has helped with this goal. According to Kronlund 
and Sandy’s research, having a say on pay vote can make firms change how 
they pay executives. 59  However, despite the law’s intention to improve 
executive pay practices, the say on pay mandate has not “unambiguously” 
                                            
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Y. Ertimur, F. Ferri & V. Muslu, “Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay”, (2009) 24 Review of 
Financial Studies 535, pp.544-5 
58 F. Ferr & T. Sandino, “The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Financial Reporting and 
Compensation: The case of employee options expensing”, (2009) 84 The Account Review 
433, p.453   
59 M. Kronlund & S. Sandy, “Does Shareholder Scrutiny Affect Executive Compensation? 
Evidence from say-on-pay voting”, (October 2014), available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2358696 p.3, last accessed, 26 July 2016 
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resulted in more reasonable CEO compensation.60 Contrary to the goal of the 
say on pay regulation to reduce executive pay, the net result of these changes 
may be to raise, not lower, the total compensation. The fact that firms change 
pay practices between years, with or without shareholders voting again, is 
evidence that pay practices are not always perfectly optimal. If they were, 
whether a vote is held or not should be irrelevant for pay. 
 
In the US, the shareholders of 2,173 public companies “overwhelmingly” 
approved their firms’ compensation reports in 2013.61 97% of the US public 
firms received shareholder votes affirming the CEOs’ pay, while only 57 
companies experienced a shareholder advisory veto on their pay proposals.62  
 
Evidence from the US advisory vote has shown that when there is increased 
shareholder scrutiny, the board does alter executive pay policies: salaries are 
lower while grants of restricted stock are higher.63 Compensation practices that 
are opposed by activist investors, such as golden parachutes, are reduced or 
eliminated. These changes are consistent with improving the transparency of 
pay and complying with proxy advisory firms’ guidelines, which may help firms 
to ensure that the say on pay vote passes. However, despite these changes, 
the net effect of these changes is a higher overall level of pay. Additionally, 
companies make greater use of less scrutinized forms of executive pay, such 
as pensions and golden goodbyes, if there is increased shareholder 
monitoring.64  
 
Say on pay is not a complete panacea. For instance, in the US there is a crucial 
shortcoming in the say on pay legislation. The Dodd-Frank rule requires firms 
to have a shareholder vote on pay policies in every second or third year, but it 
also enables firms to “strategically shift pay” across years to keep 
compensating executives in the same way that they used to while also gaining 
                                            
60 Ibid. 
61 J. Carney, “Why Say on Pay Failed and Why That’s a Good Thing”, July 2013, available at: 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100860959# last accessed, 26 July 2016 
62 Ibid. 
63 Supra, n.59, M. Kronlund & S. Sandy, p.10 
64 Ibid., p.19 
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shareholder support, thereby potentially undermining the goals of the regulation 
to decrease the level of executive pay.65  
 
Therefore, from above it can be concluded that overall the advisory say on pay 
regulations in the UK and the US have brought several good changes in 
executive remuneration, not only in the boards’ reaction to shareholder 
dissatisfaction but also in the general level of it, although the particular 
structural design of pay is still in great need of improvement and scrutiny.  
 
From the shareholder’s perspective, although regulations have given a say on 
pay to improve board accountability to shareholders, the board or the 
remuneration committee can still find opportunities to undermine shareholder 
engagement. As mentioned above and in Chapter 3, shareholders’ negative 
responses to a pay policy will be delivered before this policy is taken to 
resolution, but under most circumstances these negative responses may not 
be turned into revisions because of game-playing between these two parties. 
The concern from the US say on pay experience would be that more 
engagement and increased transparency in pay will not definitely lead to 
improvements in board accountability and shareholder diligence to influence a 
change in the pay policy.66  
 
Providing shareholders with voting power to decide on executive pay policy has 
been accepted and implemented as a useful tool by governments as a warning 
and monitoring mechanism, while empirical evidence has shown that this voting 
power has several effects in improving the practice of managers’ compensation 
plans and reporting. However, certain shortcomings described above, which 
have also been discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, are that: (1) shareholders tend 
to be dissatisfied when boards change the level of executive remuneration, but 
they always ignore the structure of pay plans, and sometimes it is difficult for 
shareholders to understand the pay structure; (2) shareholders’ voting powers 
have not stopped pay for failure, and golden goodbyes and golden hellos can 
                                            
65 Ibid.  
66 K. Sheehan, The Regulation of Executive Compensation: Greed, Accountability and say on 
pay, (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, UK Remuneration Practice, 2012) p.76 
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be camouflaged in other ways by the board; (3) too often the government has 
focused on the voting power of the shareholders, neglecting to examine how to 
increase the engagement of shareholders in the pay setting progress, and how 
to enhance conversations between shareholders and boards. The following 
suggestions will deal with these problems. 
 
C. How to improve shareholder intervention  
It is always easy to regulate listed companies and their boards to act in certain 
ways to serve their shareholders, with few regulations requiring or encouraging 
shareholders to do anything. However, from the perspective of executive 
remuneration, shareholders may need some instruction from the regulations. 
From the discussion above, shareholders would like to pay more attention to 
remuneration reports at AGMs because they are about how the payouts of the 
firm are set, which could have been their money if it was not paid to the 
managers.  
 
To encourage shareholders to participate better in remuneration decisions with 
firms and to improve boards’ accountability to their shareholders, current 
legislation and corporate codes from various governments have paid significant 
attention to regulating pay transparency and the disclosure of details in pay 
policy. From the pay policy disclosure and the shareholder understanding of 
problems discussed in Chapter 5, it is perhaps not the time to emphasise the 
quantity of pay transparency, but rather the quality of such transparency. From 
the shareholders’ perspective, they will be responsible for understanding pay 
structures and single elements of each pay plan, and engaging better in 
discussions with firms.  
 
From the above, it can be seen that it is time for the development of stewardship 
codes, which regulate what shareholders how they approach their roles in 
corporate governance. Except for remuneration guidelines drawn up by several 
institutional shareholder groups mentioned above, organisations such as the 
FRC in the UK and the ICGN (International Corporate Governance Network) 
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based in the US have provided their stewardship codes to guide institutional 
shareholders in relation to how to participate better in corporate issues.67 
Feedback and improvement of these codes have been ongoing; details will be 
discussed in the following.  
 
C.1. Participation and Understanding 
 
It is really difficult for most individual investors to understand or even read the 
remuneration reports. Even many chief executives and other managers 
struggle to understand their pay packages containing equity plans, long- and 
short-term targets and earning per shares to total shareholder returns. 68 
Shareholders, especially small group investors, should be more active in 
reading remuneration reports and communicating with directors. Institutional 
shareholders who have their own experts analysing remuneration reports and 
providing advice, such as the GC100 group, the ABI and NAPF, always renew 
their guidelines for executive pay reporting. These guidelines provide details of 
how the remuneration reports should be formed and what contents should be 
used to explain every element of directors’ pay packages. Individual investors 
should be encouraged to read these guidelines if they have difficulty 
understanding remuneration reports.   
 
There are various forms and data in the remuneration reports, and 
shareholders should use their discretion to determine whether the pay policy or 
the implementation report is fair and reasonable. With the help of the ISS and 
other consultancies, institutional shareholders can easily arrive at a general 
understanding of executive pay plans and reports.  
 
From the voting perspective, stewardship codes have provided a good 
foundation to encourage institutional investors to share their voting policies and 
results, letting the other shareholders have a general understanding of how 
                                            
67 FRC, Stewardship Code, available at: https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-
Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Stewardship-Code.aspx ; ICGN, Global Stewardship 
Code, available at: https://www.icgn.org/policy/stewardship-codes last accessed, 26 July 
2016 
68 Financial Times, Executive Pay: The battle to align risks and rewards, 30 April 2015. 
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better informed and more expert shareholders consider the pay plan and vote 
on it. The ICGN’s Global Stewardship Code suggests that institutional investors 
should disclose and develop their actual voting policies and records, seeking to 
explain to companies the reasons underlying why they voted against any pay 
policies before the shareholders’ meeting. 69  Also, this stewardship code 
contains an innovative but maybe not very practical idea, proposing that 
investors should be open to joining and collaborating with other investors from 
both domestic and overseas arenas to leverage the voice of minority 
shareholders and exert influence over the corporate decisions.70 This is a good 
idea to improve relationships and communication among various shareholders. 
Concerns can be left from this idea: timing is a huge issue, since not all 
shareholders are able or willing to have discussions about decisions before the 
resolution at a firm’s AGM. Also, the cost of gathering the shareholders are 
considerable, with agency cost increasing from a new perspective. However, 
compared to the influence of shareholders’ misunderstanding upon 
remuneration reports, perhaps the time and costs might be undermined.  
 
This thesis proposes that in order for a majority of shareholders to have a better 
understanding of the remuneration plan and report, shareholders should have 
a meeting before the resolution and voting on any executive pay report.  
 
Another issue comes from the institutional shareholders. Institutional 
shareholders, e.g. pension fund managers, banks, insurance companies and 
so on, are also companies built upon the interests of their beneficiaries. The 
UK Stewardship Code suggests that institutional investors should report 
periodically on their stewardship and voting activities to their clients or 
beneficiaries as to how they have discharged their responsibilities. 71  In a 
meeting held by the ICGN, Professor Stout proposed that pressure from 
beneficiaries can make institutional investors concerned about their investment, 
and under certain circumstances they may hold shares in firms for a rather short 
                                            
69 Supra, n.67, ICGN, Global Stewardship Code, principle 4, Exercising voting rights in an 
informed and responsible manner. 
70 Ibid., principle 5, Engaging companies and collaborating with other investors. 
71 Supra, n.67, FRC, Stewardship Code, principle 7. 
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period and sell them in a liquid market, though institutional shareholders are 
supposed to be long-term focused.72 Although institutional shareholders have 
great influence over public firms’ governance (as mentioned above), the fact is 
that concern about their clients’ benefits and paybacks will decrease their 
impact as valuable investors providing good guidance for small shareholders. 
However, this question is not within the scope of stewardship, but in the scope 
of corporate governance codes and company law. It is for the board of investee 
companies to provide certain methods to retain their institutional shareholders 
in the long term, such as increasing their voting power or paybacks according 
to their length of investment in the company.  
 
These methods, which are called time-weighted voting or time-weighted 
dividends, have been proved to be effective in attracting investors to keep their 
investment in a firm for a long time and lead them to focus on the firm’s long-
term interest. A recent study suggests that time-weighted voting, which 
provides shareholder with more votes per share if they invest in the firm for 
longer than three years, can empower long-term investors and may improve 
the firm’s value.73 The empirical evidence shows that compared to the dual-
class shareholding which lets investors hold two different classes of shares to 
vote, time-weighted voting is a better choice for the companies and 
shareholders to prevent “myopic” or short-term focused behaviour among 
managers.74  
 
As mentioned above, from a shareholder’s perspective, if companies can 
provide efficient methods to retain their investment or help them to focus on a 
long-term view, shareholders may be able to influence companies positively 
and use their two intervention channels to help companies to create 
remuneration policies and reports reflecting long-term value.  
 
                                            
72 ICGN, Share Ownership in A Global Context-Is stewardship working? Available at: 
https://www.icgn.org/share-ownership-global-context-stewardship-working-0 last accessed, 
26 July 2016 
73 L. L. Dallas & J. M. Barry, “Long-term Shareholders and Time-phased Voting” (2015) 40 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 541, pp.552–3. 




This thesis provides that from aspect of shareholder empowerment on 
executive pay, promoting long-term investment and better engagement of 
shareholders should be emphasised.  
 
Taking the UK Stewardship Code as an example, it is not enough to require 
that institutional shareholders should disclose their voting policy and records, 
or be willing to act collectively with other investors.75 With the improvement of 
transparency in various reports at AGMs, especially in remuneration reports, 
shareholders need more time to analyse and understand the reports. Absorbing 
opinions from each other is important. Thus, principle 5 of this code should 
perhaps be written as: “Institutional investors should be willing to meet with 
other investors before resolution and act collectively with other investors where 
appropriate.” 
 
In promoting the long-term success of the company, the UK Corporate 
Governance Code provides in the first section that it is the board’s role to 
provide effective controls and methods to ensure this objective.76 However, 
none of the other sections provide specifically how this should be done. In 
section E, the Code requires that the board should ensure a satisfactory 
dialogue with shareholders.77 Perhaps in this section, there should be a section 
E.3, proposing a new method for how to retain shareholders’ investment for 
long-term periods.  
 
Again, improving the shareholder monitoring function during the creation of 
executive remuneration policies and reports does not necessarily mean that 
shareholder primacy or shareholder maximisation is the only goal while setting 
managers’ pay. Boards may also take other issues into consideration when 
planning and implementing pay policies. These factors will be discussed further 
in section IV.  
                                            
75 Supra, n.76, FRC, Stewardship Code, principle 5&6.  
76 FRC, Corporate Governance Code 2016, section A.1.  
77 Supra, section E.1.  
 221 
 
II. Remuneration Practice and Board Accountability 
 
From the history of executive remuneration, as examined in Chapter 4, it can 
be seen that with the development of modern corporate theories, shareholders 
have long been seen as passive, or even irrelevant to the running of 
companies. 78  Shareholder value was even neglected during the middle 
decades of the twentieth century, since what shareholders did to exercise their 
ownership was vote at AGMs which were mostly formalities, while the board 
had the power to delegate management to executives who were professionals 
but had no stocks in the company. 79  However, other arguments around 
shareholder empowerment also suggest that increasing shareholder 
involvement will shift the balance between the board’s authority and its 
accountability. It is easy for the shareholders to set guidelines on what an 
effective remuneration policy should be. However, the shareholders are not 
efficiently informed about what is happening in the boardroom. 
 
Since the Greenbury Report proposed in 1995 that executive pay should 
comprise more long-term incentives to promote pay for performance, the 
percentage of equity incentives in pay packages, such as restricted equity 
options and long-term incentive plans, have been increasing, until in 2015 the 
average of the FTSE 100 CEOs’ equity options value was 240% of their salary 
level. In 2014 this figure was 210%.80 
 
However, emphasising long-term incentives and more equity options in pay 
packages cannot efficiently accomplish the perfect dream of agency theory, i.e. 
pay for performance. As mentioned in Chapter 2, normally equity options are 
set to align the interests of shareholders and executives, and to retain and 
motivate managers to provide good performance. The reason why 
                                            
78 S. Deakin, “Corporate Governance and Financial Crisis in the Long Run” (December 2010) 
Center for Business Research, University of Cambridge, No. 417, p.3 
79 Ibid., Deakin, pp. 3-4 
80 PwC, “Raising the Bar: The state of executive pay in 2015,” April 2015, p.5, available at: 
http://www.pwc.co.uk/services/human-resource-services/insights/raising-the-bar-the-state-of-
executive-pay-in-2015.html last accessed, 26 July 2016 
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remuneration practice cannot achieve this alignment is that the board and the 
design of equity options in executive pay may sometimes be harmful to the 
firm’s long-term success.81 As discussed in Chapter 3, executive directors will 
use their managerial power to influence the board and its members, such as 
using the power of promotion and awarding independent directors who are 
executives in another firm with non-executive posts and/or hiring these 
executives as members of their remuneration committee. Under this 
managerial influence, boards and remuneration committees may show some 
rent-seeking behaviours in using explicit influence of capital markets and 
products on executives’ equity holdings and bonuses to increase the final 
rewards of executive directors. Mechanisms to stop this from happening are 
now considered.  
 
A. Board Primacy? 
The director primacy approach proposes that with a centralised authority and 
good use of accountability, there is no need for shareholders to approve certain 
detailed resolutions, since generally they are not able to make informed 
decisions. Interestingly, other arguments, either from supporters of director 
primacy who suggest that the board is reliable in making decisions, or from 
proponents of having employees on the board in order to make executive pay 
fairer, are both against the idea of using shareholder voting rights to solve 
executive remuneration problems. Early in the 1990s, Professor Villiers already 
pointed out that because of information asymmetry, shareholders face various 
obstacles if they wish to interfere in corporate management and accounting 
reports, 82  such as a lack of information concerning comparative groups’ 
income from remuneration consultants, or confusion about the criteria that 
remuneration committees write into the pay report relating pay to performance. 
According to conclusions in Chapter 3, there may be various long-term 
incentive plans with different conditions in a single executive’s pay package. 
                                            
81 J. K. McClendon, “Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulation Executive Compensation to 
Realign Management and Shareholders’ Interest and Promote Corporate Long-Term 
Productivity” (2004) 39 Wake Forest Law Review 971, p.994 
82 C. Villiers, “Executive Pay: Beyond Control?” (1995) 15 Legal Studies 260, p.271 
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Bainbridge states that empowering shareholders in the corporate decision-
making process might disrupt the vesting of authoritative control from the board 
in their firms.83 
 
Moreover, Bernard Sharfman even proposes that empowering shareholders 
will not enhance decision making, but will instead increase errors and lead to 
“a shift of agency costs from management to shareholders that overcomes 
whatever benefit is received from a reduction in management agency costs”.84 
Even worse, the more successful shareholder activities are, the more damaging 
those activities are likely to be to the economy.85  
 
From the director primacy point of view, some proponents even suggest that 
the rapidly growing executive remuneration is not a problem at all. According to 
Professor Bainbridge’s understanding of the capital market, investors will not 
purchase stocks from companies which provide executives with excessive 
remuneration, and creditors also will not lend money to such companies if they 
have knowledge of their lack of executive director accountability.86 Therefore, 
the cost of issuing stocks will rise for these companies while their income will 
fall. As a result, firms like this will be more vulnerable to hostile takeovers and 
management reconstruction,87 which will bring more instability to both firms 
and shareholders. This will mean that managers are removed and not readily 
employed elsewhere.  
 
The reason why Bainbridge underestimates the problems of executive 
remuneration is because he thinks that the key point of effective corporate 
governance requires the decision making authority to be vested in a small, 
discrete central agency, rather than in a large diffuse electorate.88 He does not 
think the idea of board accountability can sustain. And he even proposes that, 
                                            
83 S. Bainbridge, “Is ‘Say on Pay’ Justified?” (2009) 32 Regulation: Corporate Governance 
42, p.46 
84 B. Sharfman, “What’s Wrong with Shareholder Empowerment?” (2012) 37 Journal of 
Corporate Law 903, p.907 
85 Ibid., p.908 
86 Supra, Bainbridge, p.46 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid., p.47 
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if shareholders are intelligent enough to realize how much it will cost for them 
to get hold of adequate information and how serious the problems will be if they 
interfere for no good reason, they will keep their distance and refrain from 
making every decision themselves, leaving most issues to the board. Thus, do 
we need to emphasise the board’s accountability on executive remuneration 
issues?  
 
Details of the board’s function should be studied before director primacy is 
admitted. As discussed before, there are three main functions of board 
members: the first is a monitoring role, which requires them to select, 
compensate, and make decisions about the retention of chief managers while 
overseeing the process of accounting, financial reporting and auditing, to help 
shareholders with these disclosures in order for them to make assessments of 
the company.89 The second function is a protective/restorative role, meaning 
that the board should assist the company in claiming and protecting its 
resources. The third function of the board is to formulate strategy under the 
direction of senior managers in order to serve the shareholders in their interests 
with more information. 90  It can be understood clearly that executive 
remuneration design is within the first, monitoring function. Nonetheless, the 
third function, related to the board’s accountability to shareholders, should also 
be emphasised when considering remuneration issues.  
 
The board can develop its monitoring work in three ways: employing structure 
(different committees, such as remuneration or nomination committees, in one 
boardroom), composition (having expertise on different committees and 
independent directors to ensure unbiased decisions), and practice (concerning 
how to manage the firm to establish the board’s role).91 Research has proven 
that regulation has relatively little to do with the evolution of the board’s 
structure and practice; rather, it is the market and social forces that improve 
                                            
89 D. Langevoort, “The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms and the Unintended 
Consequences of Independence and Accountability”(2000) Georgetown University Law 
Centre, Working Paper in Business, Economics and Regulatory Law, No. 241402, p.5 
90 Ibid., Langevoort, p.6 
91 L. Dallas, “Development in US Boards of Directors and the Multiple Roles of Corporate 
Boards” (2003) 40 San Diego Law Review, p.20 
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these elements.92 Thus, a more appropriate way for legislation to improve the 
board’s accountability and the monitoring function of the board is from the 
composition aspect, by putting more independent directors into functional 
committees. Under Langevoort’s analysis, it is the law which should continue 
to insist, or should insist more rigorously, on increasing the independence of 
boards to solve conflicts between agent and owner. However, Langevoort has 
also pointed out that if the law becomes too aggressive it will ruin the social 
dynamic of the board and result in a less effective working group. 93  As 
discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, having more independent directors on 
executive committees will not have much influence on executive pay design; 
this is explained as follows. 
 
Delegation of various power to the committees of board does not function well. 
Mitchell has concluded that the board’s problems have existed from the very 
beginning, since the time boards were created to solve agency problems.94 
Although the board was designed to fulfill a monitoring function with periodic 
intervention by experts as a means of allowing outsiders, i.e. independent 
directors, to monitor aspects such as nomination, compensation and auditing, 
it has developed primarily for the purpose of shielding executive managers from 
liabilities,95 since there is only a direct norm from legislation to indicate what is 
right and what is possible in practical activities.96 As lawyers are usually the 
ones who interpret law to companies, the directors’ understanding of legislative 
norms is second- or even third-hand, 97  not to mention that lawyers may 
sometimes deliver information after being influenced by executives, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2.  
 
                                            
92 M. Eisenberg, “Corporate Law and Social Norms” (1999) 99 Columbia Law Review 1253, 
p.1267; E. Rock & M. Wachter, “Islands of Conscious Power: Norms and the Self-governing 
Corporation” (2001) 149 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1619, p.1623  
93 Supra, n.89, Langevoort, p.8 
94 L. E. Mitchell, “The Trouble with Boards”, (2005) GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
159, pp.6-7   
95 Ibid., Mitchell. 
96 Supra, n.89, Langevoort, p.11  
97 Ibid. 
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However, several scholars have noted that the companies that failed during the 
2007–09 financial crisis, despite being defined as having inadequate 
governance, did have independent boards, separate positions of chair and 
CEO, and enough defence against hostile takeovers.98 If legislation is still 
deficient in regulating the practice of boards, maybe shareholder empowerment 
will constitute an appropriate remedy in a corporate governance context. 
Although scholars such as Bainbridge and Sharfman are in favour of directors 
running corporations and minimizing shareholder intervention, director primacy 
is not the most suitable approach when dealing with executive remuneration 
issues. Bebchuk and Fried, whose book was introduced in Chapter 2 to explain 
how executive managers use their influence in the boardroom to gain excessive 
compensation, have fully explained how executives and board members can 
benefit each other through remuneration practice. It is also one aspect of 
Chapter 3’s conclusion that without intervention or regulation, the 
independence of boards and remuneration committees cannot be trusted while 
making remuneration policies and reports.  
 
Therefore, from the above arguments two points can be concluded: (1) director 
primacy is not perfect in dealing with executive remuneration issues, because 
merely employing more independent directors to improve board accountability 
is not enough; and (2) there should be other ways to improve the board’s 
accountability within its monitoring and strategic functions. Shareholder 
empowerment is used through the say on pay to influence the pay practice 
indirectly, but it is the remuneration committee and the board who have the 
most direct impact on pay. Hence, how should they be guided to improve their 
accountability? 
 
B. Practice in order to Improve Accountability? 
Guidelines, principles and various codes of conduct have been created for 
directors and remuneration committees to promote and ensure their function in 
                                            
98 Supra, n.3, Cheffins, p.6 
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remuneration design and implementation. However, as Cullen argues, the 
traditional and non-descript language characteristics of these codes and 
guidelines rely to a large extent on executives and other directors working 
towards the overarching goal of shareholder value by using words such as 
“structure”, “performance objectives” and “disclosures”. 99  However, these 
terms are too general and do not provide explicit requirements.  
 
In fact, the GC100 and Investor Group guidance, published in 2013 and 
amended in 2014,100 shows that guidelines from institutional shareholders are 
sometimes not as general as some financial scholars have thought. These are 
detailed requirements, regulating the aims of remuneration committees in 
designing executive pay, the design of various financial incentives criteria and 
reporting structures, and even how the committee will communicate with 
shareholders if they have concerns about the pay policy. Nevertheless, 
guidelines cannot guarantee full compliance, not to mention following the best 
practice of remuneration design. However, the GC100 principles have made a 
good start in improving guidelines from shareholders and ways to promote the 
accountability of remuneration committees. Further discussion will be provided 
later in this chapter.  
 
Remuneration committees, as noted in Chapter 3, do not need to have expert 
knowledge about how to design pay. Instead they need to negotiate with 
remuneration consultants and make decisions using informed judgment. As 
Professor Keay notes, with shareholders having more power to influence 
remuneration policy, the board, especially the remuneration committee, must 
increase their accountability while being required to justify their decisions.101 
The IoD, whose members are directors from various business sectors and even 
CEOs from large organisations, provides a detailed introduction of the regular 
                                            
99 J. Cullen, Executive Compensation in Imperfect Financial Markets, (Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar, 2014) p.202 
100 GC100 and Investor Group, “Directors’ Remuneration Reporting Guidance”, 2013&2014, 
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work of remuneration committees in setting pay policy.102 First, they have to 
have a good knowledge of the business their company is running so as to 
ensure the compensation is set at the right level of basic salary in comparison 
with peer companies; second, they need to think of financial factors and the 
markets, which will help them with setting pay for performance criteria 
associated with shareholder returns, including annual bonuses and incentive 
plans; and third, the company’s culture must be taken into account, since 
remuneration may reflect the organisation’s value and culture, and the 
remuneration committee members, especially the independent directors, need 
to recognise the values that are related to successful performance and avoid 
cutting bonuses and risking the firm’s competitiveness. 
 
Therefore, how do these considerations work in practice? 
 
B.1. The power of the advisory vote 
 
Based on previous chapters, governments tend to provide shareholders with a 
say on pay to intervene in remuneration practice by improving board and 
remuneration committee accountability. Under the principles produced by 
NAPF and other institutional investors on remuneration report, there is a full 
explanation of the pay plan, a deeper analysis of company performance and a 
well debated decision based on a broader comparison with peer companies, 
which will help to build trust between investors and the remuneration 
committee.103 
 
However, only in some circumstances may the remuneration committee 
respond to a negative vote result, but a few cases have shown that the 
remuneration outcome may be affected by the voting alone.104 Nonetheless, 
institutional shareholders should and have already shown interest in seeing 
                                            
102 IoD: “The Remuneration Committee Role”, March 2015, available at: 
http://www.iod.com/guidance/briefings/cgbis-the-role-of-the-remuneration-committee last 
accessed, 26 July 2016 
103 Supra, n.30, NAPF, Hermes et al., “Remuneration principles for building and reinforcing 
long-term business success”, p.3 
104 Supra, n.66, Sheehan, p.83 
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remuneration committees build their authority while negotiating pay, and 
improve their will to undertake difficult tasks to punish underperformance 
among executives.105  
 
The cases of Burberry in 2014 and BG Group in 2015 are worth analyzing to 
investigate the remuneration committee’s accountability. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, the Burberry remuneration committee provided their CEO with £28 
million for his first year compensation, which precipitated a high level of revolt 
from their shareholders, with 52% of them voting against. This was at the time 
the highest veto figure in UK company history.106 On the other hand, the board 
of BG Group voluntarily gave up their £25 million pay deal for the new CEO 
after shareholders showed their strong disapproval before the resolution day.107 
The different decisions of these two boards and remuneration committees are 
interesting.  
 
At Burberry the golden hello, which was worth £7.5m in shares for the new CEO, 
had already received a veto from 18% of their shareholders’ in 2014,108 whose 
concerns were not unreasonable: the new CEO, Christopher Baily, a designer 
who had previously held the position of Burberry’s chief creative officer, was 
new to the CEO post. In 2015, the big fall in retailing caused the share price to 
fall by 4%, slashing the board’s pay decision and Mr. Baily’s high bonus, golden 
hello and incentive stock pay.109   
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Because of the high level of veto on the 2014’s remuneration of the CEO, which 
was the highest pay among the FTSE 100 companies that year, the board 
provided a new pay policy in the following year.110 With 92.8% of shareholder 
voting for yes, the revised pay in 2015 meant a reduction in Mr. Baily’s income 
to £7.9m.111 High satisfaction among the shareholders was due to the board’s 
efforts in discussing executive pay plans with the majority of their fifty biggest 
investors after the previous year’s huge revolt.112 Thus, though there were also 
other problems with the executive remuneration policy in Burberry, such as 
several unexplainable vested equity options in the pay structure for Christopher 
Bailey which were set before he held the chief executive position, the lesson to 
be learned here is that the regulation can be used to warn boards and it should 
be used to improve the board’s accountability. Remuneration committees and 
boards should always show a voluntary willingness to increase communication 
with shareholders on remuneration issues. The case of the BG Group also 
provides a good example of having a conversation with investors before a vote 
on pay policy to avoid embarrassment. Transparency in executive pay is not 
only about putting cold statistics in front of the shareholders at the annual 
meeting, which may increase misunderstanding between the board and 
shareholders. A process of negotiating and exchange of opinions will improve 
the board’s accountability and enable there to be a transparent executive 
remuneration process. 
 
The UK 2013 reform of executive remuneration design divides the firm’s pay 
implementation report from the firm’s future remuneration policy. As mentioned 
in Chapter 5, if the previous year’s pay implementation report was rejected by 
a majority of shareholders this year, the board and remuneration committee 
should present a new pay policy in the next year’s annual meeting for 
shareholders to vote and their vote is binding. This regulation is valuable to 
corporate governance since it helps to increase the engagement of 
shareholders in policy making and urges boards to enhance their 
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communication with investors, especially institutional investors, and thereby 
improve their accountability. The process of how a board might carry out a 




Obtained from Sheehan “The Regulation of Executive Compensation” p.91 
 
It was discussed in Chapter 5 that remuneration committees should engage in 
a regular review of executive pay implementation reports, and major reviews of 
any new remuneration policy. As shown above, after a failure to pass the 
shareholders’ advisory vote on a remuneration report, the remuneration 
committee will examine the terms of the previous policy, collect data from a 
wider perspective and re-value the equity holdings of executives to provide a 
new calculation of the executive rewards. More importantly, they will increase 
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the pre-voting negotiation opportunities with shareholders in case this policy 
also faces a revolt because the previous rejected remuneration report may 
have made a bad impression on investors. The UK Corporate Governance 
Code requires that “the chairman of the board should ensure that the committee 
chairman maintains contact as required with its principal shareholder about 
remuneration.”114 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the voting procedure would not 
be the only opportunity for shareholders to express their opinion on executive 
pay policy; negotiations before or after shareholder voting on pay can increase 
the quality of the board’s accountability 
 
How to balance the needs of shareholders and executive managers is always 
a central question for board. In the current legislation environment, the board 
can use various regulations as good opportunities to communicate with 
shareholders and managers. The importance of dialogue between the board 
and executive directors about their pay will be discussed in the following.  
 
B.2. Independence and Negotiation with Executives 
 
From a board independence perspective, there is no regulation that can directly 
influence this independence. From the discussion in previous chapters, we can 
see that the independence of the board is influenced by the relationship 
between non-executives and executive directors. Although personal factors will 
have a good deal of influence over the remuneration committee’s judgement, 
independence can still be built upon these non-executives’ analysis of the 
executives’ behaviour and the non-executives’ pursuit of decisions which may 
benefit both the firm and the executives.115 However, regarding the executive 
remuneration issue, the accountability of the board is not sufficient; “the 
directors on remuneration committees also need to be competent.”116 Under 
most circumstances, executive remuneration policy is primarily the outcome of 
negotiations between boards and their executive managers, or managers-to-
                                            
114 FRC, UK Corporate Governance Code 2016, D.2 Disclosure, Supporting Principles. 
115 Supra, n.66, Sheehan, The Regulation of Executive Compensation, p.94 
116 Ibid., Sheehan. 
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be.117 Before the negotiation with shareholders mentioned above, the pay 
policy has already been drawn up under the guidance of the managers. Thus, 
how to develop the dialogue with managers in order to arrive at a rational pay 
policy is very important for boards and remuneration committees.  
 
The Yahoo case in 2016 is helpful to explain how this negotiation can occur in 
practice. In 2012, soon after Marissa Mayer, the former vice-president of 
Google, was hired as Yahoo’s CEO, she was contacted by another Google 
president, Henrique de Castro.118 Ms. Mayer told the board of Yahoo that she 
was negotiating with a talented person who would fit the position of COO (chief 
operating officer) perfectly, but she needed an attractive pay package in order 
to negotiate.119 However, the board of Yahoo had no idea who was this person 
because Ms. Mayer did not identify him.120 The new CEO provided Yahoo’s 
remuneration committee with a pay plan for the new COO herself, and after just 
one day she had a meeting with the committee.121 In a meeting lasting half an 
hour the committee agreed to this pay plan, but stipulated that if any material 
change was made to this plan, only the committee had the authority to approve 
the change.122  After this meeting the Yahoo board suspected that Mr. de 
Castro was the person with whom their CEO was negotiating.123 After one 
month Mr. de Castro was hired as the new COO at Yahoo; many changes had 
been made to his pay plan without the consent of the remuneration committee, 
but the remuneration committee did not take any action.124 After Mr. de Castro 
was terminated from his position at Yahoo due to underperformance in 2014, 
he took his severance pay, valued at nearly $60 million, with $40 million of this 
in cash.125 Nonetheless, the equity options he chose to exercise before his 
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departure were only worth $51 million at the time he left the company.126  
 
It is no longer shocking to see underperforming executives take away huge 
amounts of money after they have resigned or been terminated. However, it is 
shocking that the independence of boards and remuneration committees has 
always been emphasised by various legislation globally, but it is still being so 
deficient in practice. Perhaps Yahoo was just an extreme case where the board 
ignored the negotiation process, but it does raise questions about why big firms 
like Yahoo are so eager to attract directors on big salaries. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, one of the reasons why executives may receive unreasonably high 
levels of pay can be explained by the labour market of senior managers. First, 
executive managers have a general idea themselves about what level of pay 
they can expect, based on comparison with their peers working in the same 
industry. Second, the higher a management position is in a public firm, the 
smaller the pool of talented and skilled candidates from which the firm can hire 
and choose within one industry. The firm has to offer an attractive pay plan to 
hire new managers and retain existing ones. Thus, another issue that may be 
worthy of consideration by boards and remuneration committees is a peer 
group pay analysis and for the committee to hear from the remuneration 
consultants who carry out this analysis.  
 
On the subject of remuneration consultants, according to Chapter 2, it is their 
duty to provide market data from peer group companies. Generally there is no 
exclusive requirement for the accuracy of their market advice, but rather in 
terms of their independence and care; these consultants should provide 
opinions to the remuneration committee fairly and responsibly.127  The UK 
provides a good example of coordinating consultants’ services, creating a 
remuneration consulting group in 2009 and producing a Code of Conduct in 
2011. Revised in 2014, this Code of Conduct aims at clarifying the role of 
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remuneration consultants in providing information, analysis and advice on the 
level and structure of executive pay, ensuring they are making the most 
informed decisions according to an organisation’s strategy, financial situation 
and pay philosophy.128  
 
With general regulations in the Anglo-American system paying too much 
attention to conflicts of interest between consultants and firms, 129  other 
practical concerns should also be considered in setting standards for selecting 
comparative peer groups, the selection of equity incentive measures, and 
benchmarking for bonuses. Regulation and other rules for these consultants 
have only defined their roles and the nature of their services; the independence 




From the above, there are three concerns in relation to the accountability of 
boards and remuneration committees. First, with legislative requirements for 
the transparency of pay increasing over the years, boards and remuneration 
committees must ensure that various data will not be difficult to understand and 
leave investors confused. Second, the shortcomings of pay policy design are 
still obvious, and pay for underperformance and even failure still exists in 
various industries. Third, with the help of legislation, boards and remuneration 
committees should learn how to negotiate better with both shareholders and 
directors with regard to pay design.  
 
C.1. Reporting  
 
                                            
128 Voluntary Code of Conduct in Relation to Executive Remuneration Consulting in the 
United Kingdom, January 2014, available at: http://www.remunerationconsultantsgroup.com 
last accessed, 26 July 2016 
129 B. Cadman, M. Carver & S. Hillegeist, “The Incentives of Compensation Consultants and 
CEO Pay” (2010) 49 Journal of Accounting and Economics 263, p.265; K. Murphy & T. 
Sandino, “Executive Pay and Independent Compensation Consultants” (2010) 49 Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 247, pp.249–50. 
130 Supra, n.66, Sheehan, The regulation of executive compensation, p.76 
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As mentioned in Chapter 5, with the fraction of equity incentives increasing 
significantly in executives’ total pay and structure, the complexity of the pay 
policy always leaves shareholders confused, and makes them rely more heavily 
on advisory groups for their voting decisions. This phenomenon not only has 
brought inconvenience to the shareholders, but has also allowed directors to 
form the opinion that shareholders are voting irresponsibly, such as in the JP 
Morgan case. 131  A good pay plan or pay report should ensure that 
shareholders have sufficient information to vote upon, knowing what to expect 
in the following year and avoiding the risk of unexpected outcomes in future pay 
reports. 132  In the UK Corporate Governance code, it is the board’s 
responsibility to present “fair, balanced and understandable” reports to 
shareholders and other stakeholders.133 However, in practice, the guidelines 
made by NAPF et al. suggest that although many listed firms have long-term 
incentive plans and deferred bonuses designed for their executives, since there 
are usually several kinds of financial incentive appearing in the remuneration 
policy and report, with various different performance conditions set for them, 
shareholders are not able to read and understand the multiple equity options 
and bonus schemes.134  
 
Tesco’s 2015 remuneration report provides an example of this. It had several 
shortcomings. First, in its single total figure for each executive director’s 
remuneration, though it provides every element of pay clearly in a table, the 
report shows no data on how many shares each executive has been granted.135 
Even though these long-term share options are still vested to be claimed after 
a proper period, shareholders need to have a general view of the quantities of 
shares that may be held by executives, together with their salaries, bonuses 
                                            
131 Guardian, “JP Morgan takes advice from firm that its chief attacked”, 15 June 2015, 
available at: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/15/jp-morgan-advice-jamie-
dimon-voting last accessed, 26 July 2016 
132 Supra, n.67, GC100 and Investor Group, “Directors’ Remuneration Reporting Guidance”, 
p.5 
133 FRC, UK Corporate Governance Code 2016, Section C, Accountability, C.1 Main 
Principle, “The board should present a fair, balanced and understandable assessment of the 
company’s position and prospects” 
134 Supra, n.30, NAPF, Hermes, et al., “Remuneration principles for building and reinforcing 
long-term business success”, p.4 
135 Tesco PLC Annual Report and Financial Statements 2015, p.50, available at: 
https://www.tescoplc.com last accessed, 26 July 2016 
 237 
and other figures. This then provides an overall picture. Second, in the loss of 
company section (also called “the loss of office”), there is no form to explain 
how much in total the firm is going to pay its departing executives, with only a 
few paragraphs explaining why its former CEO would be granted various 
payments and benefits.136 Compared to the 2013–2014 remuneration report 
which received only a 1.38% revolt from its shareholders, this 2014–2015 
implementation report led to nearly 19% of the shareholders to vote no.137 
Besides shareholders’ dissatisfaction about Tesco’s share price drop during 
2014 and 2015, part of the reason for this revolt was that the implementation 
report was not able to persuade the shareholders. 138   Deficiencies in 
remuneration reports have not only caused confusion and dissatisfaction 
among investors, but also led to concerns on boards about future remuneration 
policy making and the reputation of the company.  
 
Apart from the regulating procedure of remuneration practice, it would be better 
if there were some requirements, or at least guidelines, from the government 
about how to draft remuneration reports.  
 
Take the UK Corporate Governance Code for example: in section D 
Remuneration, there should probably be a subsection (D.3 Conciseness) to set 
out how the board and remuneration committee should explain their pay policy 
and its implementation. This is a way to explain the policy and show how 
managers are paid. This would help shareholders to be able to understand to 
know how to vote. Presently reports tend only to achieve the cold and rigid 




In the cases of Morrisons and Tesco, mentioned in Chapter 5, in which departed 
CEOs were still highly paid for their underperformance, the remuneration 
                                            
136 Ibid., p.55. 
137 Guardian, Tesco faces shareholder unrest over executive pay, 26 June 2015, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/26/tesco-sales-drop-13-but-outperform-
market-expectations, last accessed, 26 July 2016 
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committee should also have paid attention to the flexibility of the pay policy 
design. Boards need to ensure that their pay policy arranges various elements 
of remuneration subject to appropriate adjustments at the discretion of the 
remuneration committee.139 Although shareholders have an advisory vote on 
the compensation implementation report, this power is not able to stop pay for 
failure. In 2016, cases from BP, JPMorgan, Citibank and Volkswagen have 
again emphasised the importance of how the remuneration design is 
implemented in practice. For example, BP’s CEO Bob Dudley had his pay 
increased by 20% in 2016 for his performance in 2015, although BP 
experienced the worst loss in the oil industry in 2015.140 The main rise in his 
remuneration was from his pension savings, which increased due to a change 
in retirement benefits, and his annual bonus which increased by 40% according 
to the bonus target set by his remuneration policy, even though BP made a loss 
of $5.2 billion in 2015.141  
 
To stop pay for failure, shareholders should have a binding vote on pay for 
executives who leave the company in the next fiscal year after the AGM. It is 
creative and wise of the UK 2013 remuneration reform to separate the power 
of shareholder say on pay on between remuneration policy and the 
remuneration implementation report. However, as mentioned in Chapter 5, the 
implementation of the policy for executives leaving for poor performance and 
loss of company may need more attention.  
 
Another country is considering adding a similarly flexible method of shareholder 
voting. In France, recent public outrage towards the motor giant Renault’s 
ignorance of their shareholders’ revolt over the compensation of the firm’s CEO 
Carlos Ghosn has reached the French government. On 10 June 2016 France’s 
lower house of parliament passed the Finance Minister’s measure providing a 
stricter and binding shareholders’ say on pay for the remuneration of chief 
                                            
139 Supra, n.67, GC100 and Investor Group, “Directors’ Remuneration Reporting Guidance” 
p.5  
140 Financial Times, BP Revives Investor Fury on Executive Pay, oil company faces 
questions about its handling of shareholder revolt, and how it responds, 14 April 2016  
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executives in public companies.142 The reason why the French government 
reacted so quickly and decisively to the Renault situation was partly because 
the French state has a considerable shareholding (20%) in this company, and 
the state voted no to the CEO’s pay.143 It seems emotional for the French 
government to propose new legislation against public companies’ ignorance of 
shareholder power in such a short term. However, this reflects a significant 
corporate issue. The intrinsic reason here was the lack of accountability of the 
board, disregarding 54% of the shareholders’ veto over this pay deal.144 The 
French government is proposing to move further on shareholders’ say on pay 
than the UK reform, requiring that shareholders have the power to vote on the 
remuneration implementation reports every year, on a binding basis. 145 
Surprisingly, this reform has been supported by some French institutions and 
proxy groups, who were against legislation providing too much power to the 
shareholders.146 It seems that the current excessive pay for failure really has 
caused serious concerns. 
 
Remuneration policy is important, because it will influence how the 
remuneration will be set in the future and how to align pay for performance. 
Perhaps that is why shareholders are given voting powers globally on this issue, 
making them feel that they are making decisions for companies over the next 
three years or so. On the other hand, however, implementation reports must 
not be underestimated. From a practical view, it is the implementation report 
which finally decides how much executives are to be paid. Shareholders will 
not be satisfied with a merely advisory vote on this report, and it is crucially 
important from the point of view of board accountability that the board feels 
obliged to hear the shareholders’ voice in implementing directors’ pay, 
                                            
142 Financial Times, ‘French Shareholders Win Say on Executive Pay, Legislation follows 
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143 Guardian, ‘Why the revolt against executive pay is not going away’, 22 May 2016, 
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especially departing executives who have had oversight over a loss to the 
company. Although it is strict and tough for remuneration committees and 
boards to design the variable factors in executive pay every year, this French 
proposal confirms the direction for legislation in other countries in relation to a 
way to stop pay for underperformance.  
 
The revised section 430 (2B) of the UK Companies Act 2006, which was 
introduced in the 2016 reform, provides: 
 
“If a person ceases to be a director of a quoted company, the 
company must ensure that the following information is made 
available on the website on which its annual accounts and reports 
are made available – (a) the name of the person concerned, (b) 
particulars of any remuneration payment (within the meaning of 
Chapter 4A of Part 10) made or to be made to the person after 
ceasing to be a director, including its amount and how it was 
calculated, and (c) particulars of any payment for loss of office 
(within the meaning of that Chapter) made or to be made to the 
person, including its amount and how it was calculated.”  
 
This provision requires that public companies should post on the internet a 
statement of any director leaving office, including how to calculate this director’s 
remuneration according to her pre-agreed pay policy before the loss of office 
payment. This transparency requirement, together with other requirements in 
relation to loss of office payments from section 226, is quite helpful for 
shareholders to obtain general information about the departing director. 
However, a symbolic non-binding vote does not provide shareholders with 
enough power to stop pay for failure.   
 
C. 3. Negotiation and Responsibility 
 
From the shareholders’ perspective, as summarised above, the way that the 
UK reform separates the power of the shareholders’ say on pay should be noted 
by other legislative regimes and governments. The binding vote on the future 
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remuneration policy, as discussed in Chapter 5, did have some effects in 
slowing the rapidly increasing trend of executive pay. However, due to different 
political, economic and cultural backgrounds, a binding say on pay might not 
be suitable for every country – for example Germany, which already has strong 
trade union representation on the supervisory boards of large firms to monitor 
managers and their pay.  
 
The design of the UK advisory vote on remuneration implementation reports 
increases communication between shareholders, and improves the 
accountability of the board towards their shareholders. As mentioned above, if 
boards and remuneration committees in the UK do not wish to provide another 
remuneration policy within a three-year period, they must have discussions with 
shareholders, especially large institutional shareholders, before resolution, to 
gain a general idea of how they will vote on the implementation report. This 
positive communication between boards and shareholders may improve the 
quality of shareholder engagement and the efficiency of remuneration reporting. 
An efficient legislative directive may be better than a straightforward but not 
very effective requirement in the corporate governance code, such as “the 
chairman of the board should ensure that the committee chairman maintains 
contact as required with its principal shareholder about remuneration.”147 The 
reason why several large UK companies upset their shareholders in relation to 
their implementation report for executive remuneration was because the 
directors were leaving their companies and their future pay policy would not be 
revised in the next fiscal year. This is also another reason for introducing a 
binding say on pay for departing managers as mentioned above, to stop pay 
for failure.  
 
Learning from the Yahoo case, and other empirical evidence about board 
independence from CEOs and other executive managers as discussed in 
previous chapters, there are still improvements we can make to the 
negotiations between boards and executive directors. It may be said that 
negotiations between boards and managers are easy, compared to those 
                                            
147 FRC, the UK Corporate Governance Code 2016, Section D.2: Procedure   
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between boards and shareholders, but it is hard for boards and remuneration 
committees to keep their independence during this negotiation. According to 
the managerial power approach, Bebchuk and Fried suggest that executive 
managers are able to increase their own remuneration by using their 
considerable power over boards and other independent directors on the 
remuneration committee. Especially when companies are running well, these 
non-executive directors usually choose to cooperate with management teams 
within their social networks. 148  Even though various countries’ corporate 
government codes require non-executive directors on the remuneration 
committee, evidence from Chapters 3 and 4 shows that there is barely any 
possibility for remuneration committees to obtain independence from executive 
directors as they are intended to. Moreover, a study collecting data from FTSE 
350 companies between 1996 and 2005 has shown that the composition of 
remuneration committees has no statistical impact on the level of executive pay; 
the independence of the remuneration committee cannot guarantee that 
executive remuneration remains at a reasonable level.149 
 
Perhaps it is time to emphasise the responsibility of the chairman of the board 
and the head of the remuneration committee. Legislations may provide for 
appraisals for every director of a remuneration committee in order to evaluate 




Suggestions for legislation regulating remuneration committees and boards can 
be summarised as follows: 
 
1. Provide guidelines for corporate governance, encouraging companies to 
provide concise remuneration reports to increase the efficiency of 
shareholder voting and the board’s work; 
                                            
148 L. Bebchuk, J. Fried & D. Walker, “Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation” (2002) 69 The University of Chicago Law Review 751, p.784. 
149 I. Gregory-Smith, “Chief Executive Pay and Remuneration Committee Independence” 
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2. Make the shareholders’ vote on the remuneration report for departing 
executive managers binding in order to prevent pay for failure; 
3. Pursue the responsibility of the members of the board and remuneration 
committee for any lack of negotiation during the creation of the 
remuneration policy and report.  
 
 
III. Remuneration Design: How to improve pay for performance 
 
In relation to the Australian provisions on pay it has been said that : “A variety 
of legal persons are targeted by the regulation: listed companies, boards of 
directors, remuneration committees, individual executives/directors, 
institutional investors and shareholders.”150 According to Sheehan, the law 
does not provide a sufficient description of what a good remuneration outcome 
looks like, but instead gives guidelines for progress which executive managers 
and the board can easily hide behind. Thus, attention is still needed in terms of 
remuneration policy design.  
 
The International Corporate Governance Network, which was proposed in 2006, 
suggests that there should be three factors to test executive remuneration 
practice: transparency, accountability, and pay for performance. Transparency 
means that shareholders and the public are able to obtain detailed information 
and monitoring rights with regard to the remuneration of executive directors, a 
matter discussed in the first section in this chapter. Accountability of the board 
and remuneration committee to shareholders on the practice of executive 
compensation, which should be improved, was analysed in the second section. 
However, these former factors are both set to achieve the third goal, which is 
pay for performance.  
 
As shown in Chapter 2, pay for performance is the ultimate goal of executive 
remuneration practices under various theories that have been proposed to 
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explain remuneration. In Chapter 3, the reasons behind pay for performance 
systems were investigated, suggesting that the markets alone are not able to 
solve these problems. The following will analyse briefly how pay is aligned to 
performance in practice, and summarise the difficulties of regulating pay for 
performance from a legislative perspective.  
 
A. Pay setting for Performance 
Normally, most executive pay policies are set on an ex ante basis, where the 
level and structure of managers’ compensation packages are influenced by 
business conditions and the size of firms. It has been suggested that executive 
remuneration levels and firm performance may be conditional on the firm’s 
investment opportunities. 151  Because managers’ actions are seldom 
observable to shareholders, shareholders have to make investments or offer to 
hire executive directors based on measures they can observe, aligned to firm 
performance. Normally, with the ability to observe executives’ actions 
decreasing, incentive compensation, which indicates market performance, 
increases.152 Developing from these empirical investigations, a study by Baber 
et al. found that shareholders’ investments are associated with the firm’s 
market-based performance, rather than its accounting-based performance, 
while the executive directors’ stock incentive compensation is a crucial 
consideration in the investors’ judgements.153 Because shareholders invest in 
the firm based on information about its managers’ stock income, there may be 
situations where executives increase their pay level or manipulate share prices 
to attract investment opportunities. Baber et al. infer from their research that 
the influence of market-based performance factors on shareholders’ investment 
will encourage cynical executive action to attract shareholder interest.154 
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Interference from legislation and government, as mentioned above, may 
provide several methods to solve or at least reduce situations such as this. If 
there is little legislative intervention endowing shareholders with voting rights 
and regulating an independent remuneration committee, there may be certain 
misalignments between executive compensation and performance. Klapper 
and Love engaged in a study of 495 public companies from various countries 
across twenty-five emerging markets and eighteen sectors with the purpose of 
investigating the relation between country-level shareholder rights and the 
nation’s judicial efficiency. The researchers found that firms in countries with 
weak legal systems normally have lower governance rankings in the 
international data, and under those weak legislative situations, a firm’s good 
performance is more positively correlated with better market-based 
performance and accounting performance.155 As discussed in Chapters 2 and 
3, with weak regulations and poor governance, directors’ managerial power can 
easily influence pay policy, leading to a misalignment of pay and performance. 
 
However, there is little guidance from legislation about how to evaluate 
remuneration policy design. Regulations about managers’ compensation 
should also consider the influence of both market-based performance and 
accounting-based performance standards for executive remuneration policy. 
Market-based performance is measured according to the firm’s stock market 
return, while accounting-based performance is about the accounting return on 
the firm’s equities. Executives’ income is explicitly tied to stock-price 
performance through performance-related changes according to the value of 
their stockholdings, restricted stock options and long-term stock options. As 
analysed in Chapter 3, pay-performance sensitivities represent the executives’ 
share of the value that they have created. When shareholders’ wealth increases 
by £1, the value of the executives’ restricted and unrestricted stockholdings will 
increase by the executives’ ownership of their firm’s shares.156 Additionally, 
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these two performance standards do influence each other. Executive income is 
indirectly tied to stock-price performance through accounting based bonuses, 
which reflecting the correlation between accounting returns and stock-price 
performance, and also through annual adjustments of salary levels and target 
bonuses. 157 
 
Earlier studies have confirmed theoretical assumptions that there is a linear 
relationship between executive compensation and performance from market 
and accounting perspectives. 158  In Lambert and Larcker’s comparative 
research, they propose that cash remuneration exhibits a stronger positive 
time-series relation with accounting-based performance, while market-based 
performance only has a modest time-series influence on cash pay.159 They 
also suggest that firms that are developing quickly tend to place relatively more 
emphasis on the executives’ market-based performance than their accounting-
based performance.160  
 
It has been proposed that apart from executive directors’ management 
behaviour, other factors which are uncontrollable will decrease the relative 
weight that these two performance factors have on executive compensation 
levels.161 Such uncontrollable factors can be illustrated under two perspectives: 
(1) under the force of the stock market, calculating pay-performance 
sensitivities from the executives’ option holdings aspect is more difficult than 
for stock holdings, since option values do not change dollar-for-dollar with 
changes in share prices; 162  (2) financial incentives in pay are created 
depending on various factors, including the executive’s portfolio and the firm’s 
future risk preference.163 Argarwal and Samwich suggest that the level of firm 
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risk, which is also known as the firm return variance, is an important 
determinant of the level of remuneration for executives, and it is “robust” across 
the other measures of firm risk.164 According to these financial studies, failure 
to allocate firm risk to compensation incentives will underestimate the real pay 
for performance relation.165  
 
In terms of the above, even with regulations providing shareholders with voting 
rights and requiring the independence of boards and remuneration committees, 
previous situations such as excessive pay for failures and wrongful incentive 
design to encourage executives to take unreasonable risks, as discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5, can be all explained according to these two uncontrollable 
factors which are always ignored by regulations. Therefore, in this section these 
situations will be investigated and various methods that legislation can utilise 
will be discussed.  
 
    B. Pay Structure 
B.1. Long-term Equity Option Vesting Period 
 
The most serious problem with the realisation of executive directors’ equity 
options, especially with long-term incentive plans (LTIPs), is that there are no 
requirements in law about how long the post-exercise period will be. 166 
According to the discussion in Chapter 3, there are several issues in relation to 
long-term equity options that remuneration committees should pay attention to: 
a long vesting period, usually lasting five to ten years; an exercise point at which 
the executive directors can claim their ownership of the shares; a post-exercise 
period during which the director will hold the shares; and finally a transferability 
point at which they can sell the shares for cash. Because there is no limitation 
on the holding period, under most circumstances executives will use their 
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power to push the share prices to a high level and sell the shares immediately 
after the exercise point. Managers’ behaviour focusing on short-term profits in 
this way will certainly jeopardise companies’ long-term success and 
shareholders’ long-term interests.  
 
Also as mentioned in Chapter 3, equity markets and product markets may 
sometimes help with pay for underperformance. Under good industrial 
performance or if the firm has previously performed badly, the equity options of 
executive managers will increase dramatically without any effort on their part 
due to long-term incentives, such as improvements in the company’s share 
prices.167 There is a method that the remuneration committee can use to avoid 
paying executives for under-performance: the peer group review. This includes 
a review of the level and structure of executive pay given by comparative firms 
in the same industry, and the analysis is carried out by the remuneration 
committee, remuneration consultants and sometimes even by the managers.168 
The reason why the company and remuneration consultants pay attention to 
this comparison (referred to by Bebchuk and mentioned in Chapter 3) is that 
shareholders, especially institutional shareholders, already recognize peer 
group reviews as a general performance measure for long-term incentive 
plans.169  
 
Perhaps long-term incentive plans may work better if corporate governance 
codes or even legislation such as the Companies Act were to require that these 
equity options must be exercisable after at least three to five years after the 
vesting period. Particularly for executives who have left companies with their 
work accomplished, these long-term vested equities prove that they have 
contributed to the companies’ long-term productivity. Even though they are not 
able to claim their money, they would not lose too much because the companies 
will have certainly provided them with other bonuses, short-term incentives and 
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benefits. If executives are dismissed or resign because of underperformance, 
companies will probably cancel their long-term incentive plans, as mentioned 
in Chapter 3.  
 
For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code states that: 
 
“for share-based remuneration the remuneration committee should 
consider requiring directors to hold a minimum number of shares and 
to hold shares for a further period after vesting or exercise, including 
for a period after leaving the company, subject to the need to finance 
any costs of acquisition and associated tax liabilities. In normal 
circumstances, shares granted or other forms of deferred 
remuneration should not vest or be paid, and options should not be 
exercisable, in less than three years. Longer periods may be 
appropriate. Grants under executive share options and other long-
term incentive schemes should normally be phased in rather than 
awarded in one large block.”170  
 
According to Deloitte’s study on the executive remuneration reports of FTSE 
350 companies, 51% of the FTSE 100 companies and 32% of the FTSE 350 
companies now have their long-term incentive equity plans with further holding 
period after exercise of the options.171 It can be observed that Schedule A has 
provided a good example in encouraging public companies to adopt longer 
holding period of the long-term incentive plans. This improvement has also 
shown that under a good directive of regulation, it is possible to develop and 
adjust the structure of executive remuneration policy, even though the 
regulation is seemed as a soft law.  
 
Also, if governments consider that this legislation has intervened too much in 
the governance issues of public firms, institutional shareholders can strongly 
                                            
170 FRC, UK Corporate Governance Code 2016, Schedule A  
171 Deloitte, “Your Guide: Directors’ remuneration in FTSE 100 companies”, p.10, October 
2015; “Your Guide: Directors’ remuneration in FTSE 250 companies”, October 2015, p.8, 
available at: http://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/tax/articles/executive-pay-
publications.html last accessed, 13 July 2016. 
 250 
recommend in their remuneration guidelines for their investee companies to 
provide longer vesting period equity incentives.  
 
This thesis proposes that, perhaps next step to promote a longer holding period 
of exercisable shares is that, certain regulations can force remuneration 
committees to provide reasons in the remuneration policy, together with the 
expertise of consultants from peer group analysis, as to why the holding period 
should be shorter than three years under special circumstances.  
 
B.2. Short-term incentive options 
 
The HSBC case is worth discussing since it raises several interesting points 
concerning pay policy design. In 2011 the HSBC remuneration committee 
proposed that to benefit the long-term profits of the company, top executives 
would only be able to sell their equity options after their retirement.172 From the 
remuneration structure discussion mentioned above, it seems better if these 
top bankers maintain their equity holdings for a longer time. The HSBC 
remuneration committee designed their long-term incentive plan with five years 
as a vesting period to promote the firm’s future success. This policy has 
influenced the level of pay of HSBC’s CEO, Stuart Gulliver: in 2011 his pay was 
£12.5 million, but from 2012 to 2015 his remuneration was £7.5 million, £7.4 
million, £8 million and £7.6 million respectively.173  
 
However, shareholders were confused by the criteria suggested by John 
Thornton, the chairman of the remuneration committee at that time, measuring 
the share awards in a way that was not based on the firm’s share returns.174 
                                            
172 Financial Times, M. Serdarevic & P. Jenkins, “HSBC Proposes Pay Shake-Up”, 22 March 
2011. 
173 Data collected from: Mirror, “HSBC boss earns 500 times more than bank’s lowest paid 
workers last year”, March 2013, available at: http://www.mirror.co.uk/money/city-news/hsbc-
boss-stuart-gulliver-earns-1743018; and Wall Street Journal, “Here’s What HSBC’s Best-Paid 
Executives Earned”, 24 February 2014, available at: 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/02/24/heres-what-hsbcs-best-paid-executives-earned/ 
last accessed, 26 July 2016 
174 The Guardian, J. Treanor, “Investors split over HSBC plans to shake up executive 
bonuses”, 21 March 2011, available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/mar/21/hsbc-executive-bonuses-proposals last 
accessed, 26 July 2016 
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Also, in 2015 nearly 30% of shareholders voted against the CEO’s pay report, 
compared with 16% in 2014 and 11% in 2013, because of some misconduct in 
investing and a sudden increase in Gulliver’s basic salary.175 The increase in 
the shareholder veto in 2014 was due to the newly introduced EU executive 
bonus cap rule, as mentioned in Chapter 4, whereby executive bonuses and 
other financial incentives cannot be more than 100% of their salary or 200% 
with the shareholders’ approval. Gulliver’s salary increased by 70%, from 
£2.5m to £4.2m, and he complained that “we had a compensation plan here 
that the shareholders liked but sadly because of the EU directive we’ve had to 
change it. This isn’t something we would have wanted to do. … It’s much more 
complicated.”176 
 
Thus, although long-term incentives are now the most contentious issue in 
executive pay packages, other elements such as bonus plans and other short-
term incentives are also influencing the total pay levels and shareholders’ 
attitudes towards pay reports.  
 
With the use of restricted share options and long-term equity plans increasing 
rapidly since the late 1990s and during the 2000s, managers took “unnecessary 
and excessive” risks to enhance the share prices up to 2008, which attracted 
the attention of the public and governments to managers’ compensation.177 In 
2010, long-term incentive options made up 47.8% of the total pay of the US 
Fortune 500 companies, compared to 44.7% in 2006; in the UK, FTSE 350 
executives received their remuneration with long-term incentives comprising 
49.6% in 2010 and 39.7% in 2006.178 As discussed above, proposals such as 
increasing the periods for long-term equity plans, recovering deferred bonuses 
and reducing golden parachutes had already been realised before the financial 
                                            
175 Financial Times, Martin Arnold, “Almost a third of investors refuse to back HSBC pay,” 
March 2015 
176 The Independent, “HSBC Stuart Gulliver to get 70% pay rise – taking his salary to £4.2m 
a year”, Feb 2014, available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/hsbc-
stuart-gulliver-to-get-70-pay-rise--taking-his-salary-to-42m-a-year-9150504.html last 
accessed, 26 July 2016 
177 Wall Street Journal, P. Dvorak & J. S. Lublin, “Bailout’s Bid to Limit Executive Pay Will Be 
Tough to Realize”, 6 October, 2008. 
178 data was from The Conference Board, “The US Top Executive Compensation Report” and 
Income Data Services, “Directors’ Pay Report”. 
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crisis.179 Their role in linking performance and pay, and how to regulate them 
in law, will be analysed next: 
 
In Chapter 3, it was acknowledged that short-term incentives, normally annual 
bonuses and restricted equity options, will be granted to executive managers 
after a conditional period, which is shorter compared to long-term incentive 
options. These short-term incentive plans are more heavily influenced by the 
firm’s business strategy and financial status compared with long-term incentive 
plans, which are mainly designed to promote long-term relationships with 
executives. Executives tend to sell all of their shareholdings after the vesting 
period, so it is in their own interest to boost the share prices before selling, or 
focus excessively on short-term prices for those options while neglecting the 
long-term performance of the firm.180 This phenomenon has been recognized 
not only in academic papers, but also in institutional shareholders’ principles.  
 
In my opinion, the rules for reporting short-term incentive pay should be 
regulated in the corporate governance code, under the “comply or explain” 
principle in section D.3 Concision, which was suggested in section II of this 
chapter. As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, under Murphy’s theory the 
economic cost of companies granting equity options should be emphasised and 
calculated as if the companies did not grant those shares to its managers. 
Murphy suggests that remuneration committees and boards should calculate 
how much the company’s income would be if its executive managers were not 
granted short-term share plans and include these figures in the firm’s 
remuneration report, or even show what the company has spent on granting 
shares to managers instead of selling them to outside investors. 181  This 
requirement will improve the transparency of the pay reporting, and promote 
the long-term success of the company through shareholder engagement and 
                                            
179 Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, “Congress Passes New Limits on Executive 
Compensation Paid by Troubled Financial Institutions”, 3 October 2008, available at: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20081209094043/http://www.sonnenschein.com/pubs/e-
alerts/Congress_Passes_New_.html last accessed, 26 July 2016; 
and also Supra n. 186, Wall Street Journal 
180 J. M. Fried, “Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading 
Disclosures” (1998) 71 South California Law Review 303, p.365. 




NAPF’s institutional shareholders alliance principle on executive remuneration 
suggests that there has been too much debate between firms and investors 
around short-term or medium-term compensation designs.182 They suggest 
that the current average three-year period of equity vesting in executive pay is 
not the best way to promote long-term success, particularly for the largest and 
most complex companies such as those listed in the FTSE 100.183 Studies of 
executive compensation from the financial industry suggest that to stop 
executive managers focusing on short-term profits and gaining excessive pay 
because of wind-ups such as inflated asset prices, incentive plans should be 
extended to five to ten years, not only for long-term equity plans but also for 
restricted share options.184  
 
To promote the firm’s long-term success, Bhagat and Romano even propose 
that financial incentives in executive pay should all be changed into restricted 
stock or long-term stock options.185 The condition they suggest for financial 
incentives is that after the vesting period executive directors should wait for two 
to four years after their resignation or last day in office to sell the shares they 
already owned.186  
 
From the perspective of financial incentive development, perhaps short-term 
incentives should be merged slowly into long-term incentive plans, because 
shareholders prefer to invest in companies where executive remuneration is 
based more on long-term share plans.187 However, due to the comparative 
advantages of short-term options over long-term incentives, such as attracting 
new executive managers to join the business and paying managers for short-
                                            
182 Supra, n. 30, NAPF, Hermes et al., “Remuneration principles for building and reinforcing 
long-term business success”, p.3 
183 Ibid. 
184 Supra, n.99, J. Cullen, “Executive Compensation in Imperpect Financial Markets”, p.97  
185 S. Bhagat & R. Romano, “Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing 
to the Long-Term” (2009) Yale Law and Economics Research Paper No. 374, pp.380-1  
186 Ibid., S. Bhagat & R. Romano. 
187 J. Brickley, S. Bhagat & R. Lease, “The Impact of Long-Range Managerial Compensation 
Plans to Shareholder Wealth” (1985) 7 Journal of Accounting and Economics115, p.120. 
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term performance by encouraging their long-term passion, current investors still 
approve of short-term plans.188 Thus, perhaps this is not the time to remove 
this pay element from the executive remuneration structure.  
 
IV. Fair Pay? 
 
A. Fairness in Regulation 
The central question in regulating in relation to pay inequality pay should be 
how far the government can intervene in fairness issues. Are the gaps between 
rich and poor, and the redistribution among them an aspect of the rationales 
behind the regulation of executive remuneration? 
 
This following analyses inequality in pay in the business sector. First, how do 
pay gaps and inequality between executive directors and employees in a 
company influence the lower level employees’ performance and the firm’s long-
term productivity? Second, is inequality considered by directors when they are 
making pay decisions? If so, under what circumstances should regulation 
towards fairness occur?  
 
There have been several studies showing that increasing dispersion in pay in 
a company leads to lower productivity, less cooperation, and larger threats to 
turnover.189  In 1963 Hicks discussed the importance of the psychology of 
workers, noting that “it is also necessary that there should not be strong feelings 
of injustice about the relative treatment of employees since these would 
diminish the efficiency of the team.”190 Additionally, research has also indicated 
that with less dispersion in pay, firms will perform better because the employees 
                                            
188 R. Kolb, Too Much Is Not Enough: Incentives in Executive Compensation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012) p.160. 
189 M. Bloom & F. G. Michel, “The Relationships among Organizational Context, Pay 
Dispersion and Managerial Turnover” (2002) 45 Academic Management Journal 33, p.38; J. 
Pfeffer & N. Langton, “The Effect of Wage Dispersion on Satisfaction, Productivity and 
Working Collaboratively: Evidence from College and University Faculty” (1993) 38 
Administration Science Quarterly 382, p.400. 
190 J. Hicks, The Theory of Wages, (New York St Martin’s Press,1963) p.112 
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are less resentful towards the executives and more willing to contribute to the 
company.191 
 
Therefore, since this question has already been investigated, it can be 
concluded here that there is a negative correlation between compensation of 
executives and employees, and the performance of employees and even the 
whole firm. Then the next essential question will be, how will directors consider 
this situation and deal with existing pay inequality? 
 
After studying 122 public firms over a five-year period, research done by Wade, 
O’Reilly and Pollock proposed that, first, CEO compensation is correlated 
positively with the lower level employees’ pay, and second, CEOs are 
concerned with fairness as well as their own self-interest, and while they are 
negotiating to increase their own payment they will also think about their 
subordinates and, if possible, the employees as well.192  
 
In August 2015 the US government provided a disclosure requirement on the 
ratio between the pay of regular employees and that of top executives. A new 
section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act regulates that a public company’s pay 
policy needs to give a record of the ratio of the total remuneration of its CEO to 
the median total compensation received by the rest of its employees, which will 
promote board accountability to shareholders in relation to executive 
compensation practices.193 As noted by the SEC Chair Mary Jo White, this rule 
                                            
191 O. Faleye, E. Reis & A. Venkateswaran, “The Effect of Executive-Employee Pay Disparity 
on Labour Productivity,” 2010, available at: 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.615.3427 p.5; P. Martins, 
“Dispersion in Wage Premiums and Firm Performance”, (2008) 8 Centre for Globalisation 
Research, Vol.8, available at: https://ideas.repec.org/p/cgs/wpaper/8.html p.5, both last 
accessed, 26 July 2016; also D. Cowherd & D. Levine, “Product Quality and Pay Equity 
between Lower-level Employees and Top Management: An investigation of distributive justice 
theory” (1992) 37 Administrative Science Quarterly 302, pp.316-7. 
192 J. B. Wade, C. A. O’Reilly, III & T. G. Pollock, “Overpaid CEOs and Underpaid Managers: 
Fairness and Executive Compensation” (2006) 17 Organization Science 527, p.539. 
193 SEC, L. Aguilar, “The CEO Pay Ratio Rule: A Workable Solution for Both Issuers and 
Investors”, 5 August 2015, available at: http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-on-
open-meeting-on-pay-ratio-aguilar.html last accessed, 26 July 2016  
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“provides companies with substantial flexibility in determining the pay ratio, 
while remaining true to the statutory requirements.”194 
  
From the SEC’s statements, this new provision aims to promote board 
accountability for executive remuneration and flexibility in pay policy design by 
providing shareholders with clear pay ratio information in annual reports, proxy 
statements and even registration statements. From this perspective, though it 
touches on the topic of reporting pay ratios in the pay report, this new rule says 
nearly nothing about fairness in pay, or narrowing the pay gap between CEOs 
and employees. Although “think tanks” in the US and the UK have both 
suggested that the pay ratio should be used to decrease pay gaps and 
inequality in the work place, 195  this amendment does not seem to draw 
attention to these issues. The rationale behind this disclosure requirement for 
pay ratios may be found in the SEC’s proposal for amendments to section 953(a) 
of the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires listed companies to provide a clearer 
description of the relationship between the executive compensation paid to the 
managers and the shareholders’ total share return. It also requires a description 
of the relationship between the firm’s total share return and the share return of 
its comparative peer group companies over the most recent five years, chosen 
by the compensation committee.196 This proposed amendment, along with the 
BIS reform mentioned in Chapter 5, will help shareholders by providing detailed 
remuneration reports containing more information for voting on remuneration 
issues. As discussed in Chapter 4, the US shareholder say on pay stays on the 
advisory level. Requiring a pay ratio to be reported in the pay statement may 
provide shareholders with a more general view of CEO pay levels, but it rarely 
provides way to decrease pay gaps. Governments in the UK and the US are 
still focusing on attracting investment in their public companies, apparently by 
                                            
194 SEC, SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio Disclosure, “Rule Implements Dodd-Frank Mandate 
While Providing Companies with Flexibility to Calculate Pay Ratio”, 5 August 2015, available 
at: http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html last accessed, 26 July 2016 
195 Such as: Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), “2014 Executive Pay Reform Scorecard: 
Institute for Policy Studies; and High Pay Centre, “Reform Agenda: How to Make Top Pay 
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providing shareholders with more detailed information and the power to decide 
on pay policy and reports. If any solution through regulation is possible, 
probably it would relate to redistribution, tax regulation, or draw from another 
corporate governance model, for example the German model that was 
discussed in Chapter 4. Providing shareholders with power may not be the right 
way to stop inequities in pay.  
 
B. Having Employees on the Board? 
Thus, is there any opportunity to have employee representatives on the board? 
The German model will certainly not fit all the corporate governance legislation 
in the world. Nonetheless, it provides some useful lessons. The Volkswagen 
case shows that to stop pay for underperformance, it is not enough merely to 
have employees on the board. After the German auto giant’s emission scandal 
in 2016, the management board members’ bonuses were cut by 30%. 197 
However, this reduction in executive pay did not assuage the dissatisfaction of 
its shareholders.198 TCI, an aggressive UK-based activist investor with £993 
million invested in Volkswagen, published a letter to the company’s 
management and supervisory boards about the shareholders’ requirements for 
executive remuneration reform. 199  In this letter, this hedge fund investor 
suggests that the reason why managers in Volkswagen could be paid for 
underperformance was that they spent lots of their efforts to save unnecessary 
jobs and increase employees’ wages.200 Because the company has employees 
representing the German Labour Union on its supervisory board, and because 
these employee representatives have the power to decide how to pay 
management teams, it becomes important for executives to care much more 
about employee’s benefits in order to keep their compensation level. After an 
                                            
197 Reuter’s, “VW Management Accepts Bonus Cuts of at least 30 percent: source”, April 
13th, 2016, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-volkswagen-uaw-
idUSKCN0XA1WU, last accessed, 26 July 2016 
198 The Motley Fool, “Volkswagen Shareholders Are Fuming Over Executive Pay”, 15 May 
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evaluation of Volkswagen’s recent cash-flow and payouts, TCI also points out 
that shareholders should have the power to monitor executive pay practice by 
annual voting on the remuneration report, and intervention from investors can 
be a good way of reforming executive pay practice.201  
 
Besides this letter, governance experts have also expressed their concerns 
about having employees on the board. Their first concern is the accountability 
of the board. Under German law half of the supervisory board seats are 
reserved for employees who lack professional knowledge, which may mean 
that the board lacks accountability to shareholders. Since 2002 the chairman of 
Volkswagen has first discussed business issues with the workers’ council and 
agreed a position, and then brought it to the shareholders –not like the situation 
in the UK, where the chairman arrives at a common position with the 
shareholders first and then talks with the board. 202  A former Volkswagen 
executive once said that “the board was really a show.”203 Although having 
employee representatives on board, these representatives seem not active in 
doing their monitoring and supervising job as expected. Current and former 
employee representatives of Volkswagen supervisory board stated that they 
knew nothing of the company’s emissions cheating and had never discussed 
engine issues with any other director ever before.204  
 
The second concern comes from the board’s interaction. To ensure that 
employee representatives are willing to allow a generous pay package, 
executives may place too much attention on gaining employees’ favour and 
support, neglecting payback for shareholders and the whole firm’s interests. 
Charles Tilley has noted that to regain the public’s trust on executive 
remuneration, it is necessary to ensure that a pay policy is “embedded with a 
strategy for delivering long-term sustainable corporate growth”. 205  As 
mentioned before, it is the firm’s long-term productivity that should be set as 
                                            
201 Ibid., p.3. 
202 Financial Times, “Volkswagen: System failure,” 4 November 2015. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid. 
205 The Guardian, C. Tilley, “For Fair Pay, See Plato”, June 2010, available at: 
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the main goal of remuneration design and practice, not the balance among the 
interests of shareholders, managers and employees. Increasing the employee 
monitoring function is aimed at improving the independence of the board and 
the remuneration committee. However, if employee representatives start 
leaning towards increasing managers’ pay for underperformance, the problem 
will probably be the same with non-executive independent directors, or even 
worse, for independent directors who do not have that a strong relationship with 
the firm. One lesson learnt from Volkswagen is that perhaps governments 
should think twice before providing any legislation that puts employee 
representatives on the board.  
 
There have been several other suggestions, such as having more employees 
holding the equity of the firm; “broader capital ownership would curb income 
and wealth inequality, expand investment and employment, and reduce the 
demand for redistribution through the state.”206 It may be a wise option for the 
company to benefit and retain valued employees. However, from the legislation 
perspective, it is not the duty of the Companies Act or a corporate governance 
code to intervene that much. On the other hand, if benefitting and retaining 
employees should draw the attention of regulation, learned from the German 
companies, perhaps regulations like this may not bring improvement for 
executive remuneration.  
 
Reports about an increase in general income and the recovery of pay in the 
public sector may mean that the UK government refrains from thinking about 
adding regulation in favour of fairness at the present time. Perhaps this overall 
increase was the reason why the UK parliament turned down the pay ratio 
reporting law and placing employee representatives on boards to negotiate 
                                            
206 Financial Times, “Get Profits Share to Support a More Equal Income Distribution”, 21 
August 2015. 
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payment issues. 207  The UK is still a shareholder primacy country. 208 
Additionally, while the worker’s wage is increasing at its fastest rate for six 
years209 and in the context of the UK’s smooth economic recovery, which has 
decreased unemployment and inflation since 2011, 210  there will be fewer 
opportunities to regulate for a pay cap in this country.  
 
Pay inequality can be controlled by corporate governance, but if long-term firm 
productivity is not affected by the pay gap, then inequity problems probably will 




An article in the Financial Times suggested that executive remuneration should 
be simplified in structure, and reforms should push companies to reduce the 
complexity of their reports.211 However, this suggestion for simplifying pay 
structures probably stems from only a partial understanding of pay structure 
and practice. Complexity in executive pay cannot be avoided since it derives 
from the variation incentives set for managers, although the aims of those 
incentives can be stated simply and clearly in pay reports and policies. Also, it 
is the job of remuneration committees and boards to make those aims 
accountable to shareholders for resolution. Since the shareholder say on pay 
movement has become a popular legislative approach it has been seen that 
this power has proved to have some difficulties to implement, so current 
regulations should be developed upon the present foundations to improve the 
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quality of shareholder monitoring.  
 
Due to differing cultures and industries, each government has unique methods 
of regulating remuneration practice. This chapter only provides suggestions for 
legislations that are useful under general regulatory conditions.  
 
On the perspective of shareholder voting power, this chapter proposes that to 
improve understanding of the complexity of remuneration report, shareholders 
should have a meeting before they vote on executive remuneration report at 
annual meetings; to prevent pay for underperformance of executive directors, 
shareholder should have a binding vote on the implementation pay report of 
executives who are going to leave the company.  
 
On the perspective of board’s accountability, suggestions have been made that 
to better communicate with shareholders, there should be a concision 
requirement on remuneration reporting content and structure, from the 
regulation, such as from the corporate governance code; also, to promote the 
independence of board members and their negotiation with executive directors 
upon executive remuneration, certain legislation should be provided in pursing 
liability of the members who did not fulfil their duty of care. 
 
From the perspective of pay for performance, to promote a company’s long-
term productivity through adjusting the structure of executive remuneration, 
regulations should encourage companies to enhance the executives’ share 
holding period after these shares have been exercised; also encourage firms 
to disclose the economic cost in issuing restricted share options to executive 
directors. 
 
These proposals cannot ensure that executive compensation levels will be 
reduced after they have been enshrined in legislation. However, they may make 
remuneration practice, such as shareholder engagement in reports and 
remuneration committee accountability, become and more efficient.  
 
There still is huge concern about shareholder engagement in the shareholding 
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meetings and their passivity in relation to corporate governance, especially in 
terms of international hedge funds who should be interested in what is going 
on as long as the company is running well. However, with the shareholder say 
on pay becoming a globally adopted corporate governance measure to align 
pay with performance, evidence has shown that there is a trend towards 
participating in pay resolutions among international mutual funds, pension 
funds, hedge funds and individual investors. 212  Although providing 
shareholders with a say on pay is not guaranteed to lead to pay for performance 
and promote the firm’s long-term success, with more investors who are 
knowledgeable about and willing to engage in remuneration practice, 
shareholder intervention may develop in a positive direction.  
 
Additionally, from the point of view of executive directors’ incentive design, in 
Chapter 3 it was suggested that besides financial incentives in executive pay 
packages, there are also several metrics designed to award managers for their 
leadership, community skills and teamwork performance, as long as the 
performance can bring effective management. Financial performance 
measures are usually calculated on a quantitative basis, but these non-financial 
performance criteria are qualitative.213 Probably it is not practical to provide 
rewards like this in the real world. The standards for paying managers for their 
non-financial performance may be quite subjective compared to financial 
incentive schemes. As mentioned above, current concerns towards the 
relationship between remuneration committees and executive managers make 
it even harder for legislation to provide appropriate methods to pay directors for 
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The oldest Chinese philosophy book, I Ching (also “the Classic of Changes”) 
says that there are three principles that can be used to understand everything 
in the world: a. Principle of Changes, which means that nothing is 
unchangeable while everything is developing in its own way; b. Principle of 
Simplicity, saying that though everything is changing, there is nothing that 
cannot be simplified after it has been analysed and understood; c. Principle of 
Immobility, suggesting that there is only one true authority existing in the world 
that never changes.1 
 
The former two principles can be applied to nearly every piece of research and 
this is the case with the issues of executive remuneration. Executive 
remuneration, as a social issue relates to corporate finance, corporate 
governance, legislation, politics, and the economy, can be understood and 
simplified after careful analysis:  
 
The executive remuneration issue is developing and changing ever since it had 
been created. The creation of executive remuneration comes from the agency 
theory, under which the agent is paid by the principal in exchange of the agent’s 
work. Influenced by and developed with various factors, such as capital market, 
labour market, product market and corporate governance, executive 
remuneration is no long simply about setting pay based on the negotiation 
between the principal and the agent.  
 
Changes in the structure of executive pay and the way which public company 
uses to produce the remuneration policy has made executive remuneration 
more complex. Excessive level and deficient structure of executive pay has 
                                            
1 Chu Hsi, translated by Joseph A. Alder, Introduction to the Study of the Classic of Change, 
(Global Scholarly Publications, New York, 2002) p.24; also Chinese handouts site in 
http://www.quanxue.cn/CT_NanHuaiJin/YiJing/YiJing01.html last accessed on July 13th 2016 
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existed for more than a decade, though it was after the financial crisis during 
2007-09 had the public put attention to this problem. After realising that the 
problem of executive remuneration cannot be solved simply by markets and 
corporate governance, various regulations towards remuneration from 
governments appeared.   
 
There are two research questions leading this thesis. First is, shall we regulate 
executive remuneration. Second is, what type of regulation we can use to solve 
the problems caused by remuneration issues. 
 
To answer these two questions, Chapter 2 provided explanation from various 
theories considering what is executive remuneration and how to understand its 
problems. With the separation of management and ownership in corporate 
governance, it is the duty of board and remuneration committee to produce 
executive pay policy and report. Shareholders will pay executive directors 
under the policy and report. This interaction has concluded by the optimal 
contracting theory developed from the concept of agency cost proposed by the 
agency theory. The optimal contracting theory suggests that, the main function 
of executive pay should be encouraging and rewarding executives for better 
performance. However, under the managerial theory mentioned in Chapter 2, 
the internal relationship between board members and executive managers 
have made this design of pay complicated. Companies with poor governance 
may have their remuneration policies and reports manipulated by executive 
directors, which may lead to paying for underperformance and harm of the 
companies. Thus shareholder should interfere in the pay setting process. Also, 
economists have proposed that the financial elements in executive 
remuneration is also very important in understanding and setting the pay policy. 
Thus remuneration committee should emphasise the economic cost in issuing 
equity options in executive pay. Furthermore, theories from other scholars even 
suggest that directors can deal with all of the social and economic issues quite 
well in practices, thus shareholders realising they have the problems of 
information asymmetry should rely on the decision of board and remuneration 
committee in remuneration setting. Various theories provide various 
perspectives in understanding executive remuneration and various solutions in 
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solving the problems it has caused, there is one principle they all admit upon. 
Chapter 2 functions in elaborating that this basic principle in understanding 
executive remuneration is that executive pay should be set according to their 
performance, namely pay for performance.  
 
Chapter 3 explained how to align pay with performance and how this alignment 
fails because of various reasons. From the structure of executive pay, it can be 
summarised that elements of this pay is influenced deeply by the markets. 
Markets, which include labour market, product market, capital market and 
corporate governance, have always been relied upon to influence executive 
remuneration and solve its intrinsic problems, such as issues of incomplete 
contracting and undue influence of the executive directors over boardroom. 
However, investigated in Chapter 3, the influence from the markets can be 
easily used by executive directors to manipulate their own pay. Lessons 
learned from the financial crisis have also confirmed this failure of the markets. 
Thus, certain interference from the government is needed in this issue, since 
the markets have lost their positive functions.  
 
The first research question thus was answered. Executive remuneration 
problems, with its problems cannot be solved efficiently with the markets, are 
in need of other forms of interference. Next discussion will be focused on what 
form of this interference should be: 
 
There is an over 70-year history of governments adjusting executive pay since 
the separation of management and ownership of public firms.2 Chapter 4 first 
analysed the history of the US government in interfering with the executive 
remuneration issues. After this analysis, it proposed that through all those 
regulation and political efforts in adjusting the level and improving the structure 
of executive pay, it is shareholder’s voting power in pay that not only have been 
designed reasonably, but also have contributed to solving certain problems of 
executive remuneration. This voting power, is called shareholder say on pay. 
                                            
2 S. A. Banks, B. Cheffins & H. Wells, “Executive Pay: What worked?” (2016) University of 
Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 38, p.5 
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Chapter 4 then listed the legislative interference through providing shareholders 
with say on pay from various nations, concluding that shareholder say on pay 
has formed a worldwide trend in remuneration regulations. However, since 
several countries already introduced shareholder say on pay before the 
financial crisis of 2007-09, why the regulations did not stop the remuneration 
from growing excessively? Were these say on pay regulations not strong 
enough? 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 together answered the second research question. Chapter 5 
provided a general evaluation of the UK binding say on pay reform which was 
introduced in the Companies Act to empower shareholder’s monitoring function 
in the setting of executive remuneration. This shareholder binding say on pay 
was provided to attract investment in the UK and to promote the long-term 
productivity of public companies, under the legislative intention of the UK 
government. Certain merits of this reform have been summarised by this thesis, 
such as the design of shareholder annual advisory voting on the 
implementation report of executive directors, and the introduction of claw-back 
requirements. However, more importantly, this thesis proposes that, this reform 
still leave several big problems of executive remuneration unsolved. Such as 
pay for underperformance, complexity for shareholders in reading and 
understanding remuneration reports and the increasing gap between executive 
directors and employees. Chapter 5 collected evidence and pointed out that, 
part of the reasons why there are still concerns left was because the UK 
government did not intend to provide legislation to decrease the pay gap and 
reduce the level of executive pay. The concern of the UK government was how 
to attract more investments in this country for a long-term productivity. This 
binding say on pay reform entertains shareholders with providing stronger 
monitoring power as a showcase to suggest that the government is trying to 
solve the remuneration problems. Nonetheless in practice, this reform makes 
the power of shareholders still difficult to control the executive pay.  
 
Based on the study of Chapter 5, this thesis provided several opinions towards 
how shall we regulate the issues of executive remuneration in Chapter 6, to 
answer the second research question. Chapter 6 proposed that, improvement 
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in regulations can be made through three perspectives: shareholder 
empowerment, board accountability and pay design.  
 
1. From the shareholder aspect: a. shareholders should be encouraged by 
corporate governance code or stewardship code to meet and discuss about 
how to vote on new remuneration policy, before they attend annual 
meetings for voting; b. shareholders should be given a binding vote from 
company law on the remuneration report of executive directors who is 
departing from the company. 
2. From the board accountability aspect: a. corporate governance code should 
add a concision section to require board and remuneration committee to 
provide a more understandable remuneration report with high standard of 
transparency; b. legislation should be designed specifically (not only under 
the fiduciary duty) to pursue the liability of board members who fail to 
negotiate executive remuneration package with either the executive 
directors or the other board members.  
3. From the perspective of improving pay design: a. corporate governance 
code should have clear provisions of encouraging, and even requiring 
longer holding period of shares that executive directors would own after they 
purchase their long-term incentive options in the pay package; b. 
regulations of corporate governance should also pay attention to short-term 
incentive options in remuneration report: Certain requirements should be 
made for remuneration committee to report and explain the economic costs 
of the company in granting these short-term options to executive directors.  
 
Besides answering the research questions, this thesis also proposes that, there 
is hardly any objective standard to justify what is a good executive remuneration 
design. From the discussions in Chapters 2 and 3, it can be observed that 
executive remuneration is quite a complex issue, and the problem of it is related 
to various factors. With many theories trying to explain and solve the problems 
of executive remuneration from different perspective, no certain valuation has 
been given to answer if there is any standard to tell what is a good remuneration 
design or not.  
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Executive remuneration is still being influenced largely by the markets, with the 
level of it increasing and decreasing dramatically according to the condition of 
economy.3 Besides the intrinsic influence from the markets, other relationships, 
such as the negotiation between board and executive directors, the interference 
of the shareholder say on pay, and different corporate cultures affecting the pay 
level and structure, can also change executive remuneration directly. There is 
no priority among these various factors in influencing executive remuneration. 
Therefore, there is no prediction towards what will be a good remuneration 
policy. What can be certain is that the more tightly pay is aligned with 
performance, the better the remuneration policy and report is designed. Thus, 
pay for performance is currently the only standard in justifying executive 
remuneration design.  
 
There are also some limitations in this thesis:  
 
1. This thesis proposes its thinking of regulation that can help to improve 
remuneration report from normative perspective. Those proposals of 
regulation stay at a very original level, without investigating the practical 
possibility of implementation.  
2. This thesis does not discuss about the cost that empowering shareholder 
say on pay will cause to shareholders and firms. The cost may include the 
potential spending of time and monetary cost that shareholders would pay 
when: consulting with voting advisory service, negotiating with board and 
remuneration committee that may happen during the pay policy making 
process, meeting and discussing with other shareholders around voting 
issues before their attendance of the annual meeting.  
3. No new element that can be added into executive remuneration structure 
have been proposed by this thesis. Proposals from scholars, such as 
requiring executive directors to hold debts of their firms as part of 
remuneration,4 and increasing the proportion of non-financial rewards, are 
                                            
3 EPI Economic Policy Institute, “CEO Pay Continues to Rise as Typical Workers Are Paid 
Less”, 12 June 2014, available at: http://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-pay-continues-to-rise/ 
last accessed, 12 October 2016 
4 A. Edmans & Q. Liu, “Inside Debt”, (2011) 15 Review of Finance 75, pp.83-4. 
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developing. Today’s executive pay design is far from perfection. However, 
it is hard to imagine what would be in the executive pay packages if we 
excluded all of the current pay elements, such as restricted share options 
and long-term incentive plans. Studies show that shareholders, though 
dissatisfied with pay for underperformance, generally approve of current 
forms of executive pay. 5  The new ideas of adding new elements in 
executive pay might be used several years later if they have been proved to 
be useful in aligning pay with performance and earned their popularity.  
 
Overall, this thesis contributes in two factors for further research on executive 
remuneration:  
1. Understanding executive remuneration: this thesis proposes that to 
understand executive remuneration and its problems, elements from three 
perspectives shall be analysed: a. the surface: the level of and structure of 
executive pay; b. the intrinsic influential elements: capital market, product 
market, labour market, and corporate governance; c. the governmental 
interference: regulations made under company law and corporate 
governance. It also proposes that certain regulations made by the 
government have solved several remuneration problems, while leaving 
several concerns.  
2. How to regulate executive remuneration: this thesis provides legislative 
methods to solve current executive remuneration problems through three 
aspects: how to empower shareholder say on pay; how to increase the 
accountability of board and remuneration committee; how to improve the 
design of remuneration policy to align pay with performance.  
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